

THE I. N. A. HEROES

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THE I. N. A. HEROES

Autobiographies

OF

Maj. Gen. Shahnawaz

Col. Prem K. Sahgal

Col. Gurbax Singh Dhillon

OF

THE AZAD HIND FAUJ

Were they "puppets" or men of strong determination prepared to lay down their lives for the honour and safety of their motherland has been laid down in the pages of this book by the heroes in their own pens.

1946

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THE HEROES



DHILLON

SHAHNAWAZ

SAHGAL

To

**All those brave sons and daughters of India
who fought the battle of India's freedom,
far away from their country and continued
their epic march to Delhi in the face of the
greatest mechanised power of the world.**

JAI-YA-HO

(National Anthem of the Azad Hind Fauj.)

Sabh sukh chain ki barkha barse Bharat bhag hai jiga,
Punjab Sindh Guirat Maratha Dravid Utkal Banga.
Chanchal Sagar Bind Himala neela Jamna Ganga,

Tere nit gun gae,
Tujh se Jeewan pae,
Sabh tan pae asha :

Suraj ban kar jag par chamke Bharat nam subhaga,

Jai-ya ho, Jai-ya ho, Jai-ya ho,
Jai-ya Jai-ya Jai-ya Jai-ya ho.

Sab ke dil men prit basae teri mithi bani,
Har sube ke rahnewale har mazhab ke prani

Sab bhed aur farak mita ke
Sab god men teri ake,
Guonden prem ki mala ;

Suraj ban kar jag men chamke Bharat nam subhaga

Jai-ya ho. Jai-ya ho, Jai-ya ho,
Jai-ya Jai-ya Jai-ya Jai-ya ho

Subha savere pankh pakheru tere hi gun gain
Bas bhari bharpoor havaen jeewan me rut laen,

Sab mil kar Hind Pukare,
Jai Azad Hind ke nahre
Piara desh hamara.

Suraj ban kar jag par chamke Bharat nam subhaga.

Jai-ya ho, Jai-ya ho, Jai-ya ho
Jai-ya, Jai-ya, Jai-ya Jai-ya ho,
Bharat nam subhaga.

Inqalab Zindabad

Azad Hind Zindabad

Netaji Zindabad.

PREFACE

The trial of the three I. N. A. Officers has caused great excitement in the country. It has been revealed to the common man for the first time that the foreign rule in India is not all powerful and eternal. The gallant deeds of the men and officers of the Azad Hind Fauj in the battlefields of Burma and Malaya and on the Arakan Front have set a new precedent before the country and the desire to shake off the foreign domination has become greater in the Indian mind than at any other time in the history of the British connections in India.

The personality of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and the achievements of the Indian National Army have inspired new hopes in the rank and file of the Indian masses. Major General Shahnawaz, Colonel Prem K. Sahgal and Colonel Gurbax Singh Dhillon have become the torch-bearers of India's fight for freedom and the real heroes of the people.

What role did they play in the formation and growth of the Indian National Army; how the first I. N. A. was formed and dissolved; how did Netaji come to have the supreme command of the Azad Hind Fauj; what were the relations of the Indian National Army with the Nipponeese Forces; were they "puppets" or men of strong determination prepared to lay down their lives for the honour and safety of their

motherland has been laid down in the pages of this book.

They fought the war of India's liberation beyond the Far Eastern frontiers of India but unfortunately failed. Had they been successful they would have been regarded as the greatest victors of all the times. And now that they have failed they are being treated as ordinary criminals, traitors and rebels in the British courts. But what is going to be the final verdict of history we all shall have to wait and see.

Being an enterprising publisher it has always been my endeavour to present books on current political problems but the present volume is inspired by altogether a different reason. A retired judge of the Lahore High Court in the course of his talk with me remarked :

" I do not form judgments easily about men but my judgment about these boys is that they are above average in intellect and far above average in character. To save these officers to my mind is to save nationalism in India."

Since then my desire to collect more facts about them and publish them in book form became almost irresistible. Hence the present publication.

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I

MAJOR-GENERAL SHAHNAWAZ AZAD HIND FAUJ

(1)

LIFE STORY

Early History

I was born in a Janjua-Rajput family in Rawalpindi district in January 1914. My father Late Lt. Tikka Khan served with distinction in 58th F. F. Rifles for 30 years, and was the head of perhaps "The most militarized" family in India. During the last Great World War (1914—18) and the recent Great World War (1939—45), every able-bodied member of my family joined the army, and at least 60 of them are at present serving as King's and Viceroy's Commissioned Officers; in addition to these several others have been either killed or wounded in the recent war.

Education

(a) My father died in 1923, and I was brought up under the guardianship of my Grand Uncle K. S. Risaldar Nur Khan, another distinguished soldier, and received my primary education in my village—Matore.

(b) In 1926 I was admitted to the Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College, Dehra Dun, and qualified in a competitive examination for the Indian Military Academy in June 1932. On passing out of

R. I. M. C. I was awarded the undermentioned scholarships for being the best Cadet :—

- (i) Sir Partab Singh Memorial Prize.
- (ii) King Emperor's Cadetship.

Army Service

I passed out of the I. M. A. in December 1935, as an under officer.

I was Commissioned in Feb. 1936 and posted for one year to 1st Bn. "The Royal Norfolk Regt." at Jhansi.

In Feb. 1937, I was posted to 1st Bn. 14th Punjab Regt. at Jhelum and shortly afterwards proceeded on active service in Waziristan (1937-38).

In 1939, I was transferred to our training Battalion at Ferozepore, where I was a Company Commander, when my active Battalion went overseas to Malaya in March 1941. In December 1941, realizing that war with the Japanese would break out shortly, my Commanding Officer especially wrote to the G. H. Q. India and asked for me to be sent out to join the Battalion in Malaya.

Twice his requests were turned down, because my services could not be spared from the Training Centre. Eventually on his demand that "it was imperative in the interest of the Bn. that I should be sent out," I was ordered to proceed overseas to join the Bn. I left Ferozepore in mid January, and arrived in Singapore on 29th January 1942.

Malayan Campaign

I joined my Battalion at the Naval Base in Singapore on night 30/31st January and was put in

command of a Company and allotted the task of defending the Naval Base.

I continued to do this until 10th February 1942 when the Japanese having landed on Australian front pushed inland and threatened to encircle us.

On night 10/11th February, I was ordered to withdraw with my Battalion to Biddadari to which position I held on after troops on my right and left flanks had run away on 15th Feb. including the British officers.

On 15th February, I received orders to surrender.
Surrender in Singapore.

On the day following the surrender, all Indians including King's Commissioned Officers, were ordered to assemble at the Farrer Park for being handed over to the Japs. (This was a departure from the normal procedure, as all officers are kept separate from the rank and file). On 16th February, we were officially handed over by the British representative, Col. Hunt, to the Japanese representative, Major Fujiwara, who in turn handed us over to Capt. Mohan Singh, an officer of my own Battalion. Faujiwara's words were:—"I hereby hand you over to G.O.C. Capt. Mohan Singh, who shall have the power of life and death over you."

To guard against being exploited by the Japanese and actuated by a traditional sense of loyalty and gratitude to the king I at once set about creating active propaganda against the formation of an I.N.A. inspite of the fact that I had a feeling of being deserted and frustration.

*Certain pages had to be removed from the book as per instructions from Major General Shahnawaz. The reader should not be puzzled therefore to see the marking of pages in this manner at certain places.

On Feb. 17, 1942, I along with 22,000 P. O. W. was sent to Neesoon Camp, where I organised a block of officers to resist the I. N. A.

In March 1942, I was appointed Commander of Neesoon Camp, where I continued my obstructionist activities.

Return to Singapore and Crisis in the I. N. A.

In Nov. 1942, the O. T. S. was disbanded by order of Capt. Mohan Singh, and a crisis arose between him and the Japs.

In December, Mohan Singh was arrested and taken away and a fresh drive was made by Mr. R. B. Bose, to reconcile the officers, and men of the I. N. A. with a view to inducing them to remain in the I. N. A.

At a final meeting held at Biddadari in February, 1942, Gen. Iwakuro declared that all members of the I. N. A. were bound by the Bangkok resolution to continue serving in the I.N.A. and that Mohan Singh had no authority to disband the I. N. A.

Finally he declared that any one attempting to disorganize the I.N.A. would be treated as a mutineer and the Japs army would give all such aid as the President of the Council of Action demanded, to restore order in the I. N. A. This was a very critical time, the Japs were out to catch a few ring-leaders and execute them, with the intention of terrorizing others to continue in the I. N. A. All senior officers realized this and took the precaution of keeping well in the background. I could not stand this and replied to Gen. Iwakuro and made him admit that the Japs had no justification for forcing us to continue in such a

movement, as in a " holy movement " for securing India's Independence—there was no place for deceit and coercion. He agreed and every one was allowed a free choice of either continuing in the I. N. A. or going out of it.

Personally I wished to get out of the I. N. A. but at this conference and the following day at a meeting at his Bungalow with Gen. Iwakuro, I had committed myself too far and could not retrace my steps, and so joined the Second I. N. A. in February 1943, as Chief of General Staff to the D. M. B. At this time my main objects were :

- (a) To see that the mistakes made in the previous I. N. A., i.e., concentration camps etc. were not repeated.
- (b) That every one was given a free chance of leaving the I. N. A. or joining it voluntarily fully realizing the consequences of doing so, especially the fact that they would have to fight against great odds and possibly against first the British and then the Japs.

In May/June 1943, I went on a tour of mainland on Malaya to make arrangements for any such men who wished to join the I. N. A. to come down to Singapore.

In July 1943, Netaji S. C. Bose arrived in Singapore and in the following month took over direct command of the I. N. A. and at a conference held at his H. Q. it was decided to raise a " Crack Regt." which was to go into action first and depending on its achievement the rest of the I. N. A.

was to be employed.

Netaji's speech had a profound effect on me and entirely changed my whole outlook, and I took the greatest and hardest decision of my life—That of fighting my own kith and kin, whom I was certain I could never induce to join me.

At the back of my mind was also a sense of traditional loyalty and gratitude to H. M. the King, and the oath of allegiance which I owed to him.

But when I pondered deeply over it, I decided that either it was a question of being loyal to the King or my country and I decided to be loyal to the country and in the actual fight in 1944, I fought against my younger brother who was wounded and against my cousin almost daily for two months.

In October 1943, on declaration of the Provisional Government I was appointed a Minister.

Raising and Activities of "Subhas Bde."

In September 1943, No. I Guerilla Regt. was raised at Taiping and I was appointed to command it.

After a period of short, but intensive, training the Regt. left for the front in November and arrived in Rangoon in January 1944. On 4th February 1944, the Regt. left Rangoon for the front. Prior to departure, Netaji addressed the Regt. and told every one of the greatest responsibility that rested on their shoulders and the hardships that awaited them. He also gave a chance to any one unwilling to go to the

front to stay behind in Rangoon and some officers and men were left behind.

The Regiment was split up for operations as under:—No. 1 Bn. went for operations on the Arakan front in the Kaladan Valley, under command of Major P. S. Raturi (I. A. Capt. 5/18, Gharwal Rifles) No. 2 and 3 Bns. under command of Lt.-Col. Shahnawaz Khan on Haka-Falam front and later on Kohima front.

On receipt of orders from the Supreme Commander of the "Azad Hind Fauj" the Regt. started withdrawing in June 1942, and arrived at Budalin in September 1944, having lost more than 50 per cent. of its men.

In October 1944, I went to meet Netaji at Mandalay, and then went with him to Rangoon, to attend certain meetings of the Cabinet.

In December 1944, I was ordered to return to Mandalay to help in the evacuation of No. 1 Dn. and two hospitals to Pyinmana. There being practically no transport facilities other than hired bullock carts. The evacuation was completed in January 1945, and I was appointed Offg. Commander No. 1 Dn. at Pyinmana.

In February 1945, Netaji S. C. Bose came to Pyinmana and told me that owing to injury received in an air bombardment, Col. Aziz Ahmad, Comd. No. 2 Dn., would be unable to command No. 2 Dn. He therefore ordered me to accompany him to

Kyauk-Padaung and Popa on a tour of front line troops, and take over command of No. 2 Dn.

On 20th February we arrived at Meiktila,¹ and found that No. 4 Regt. had been heavily engaged at Nyavngu and Pagan and had fallen back on Kyauk-Padaung and returned to Meiktila on 24th February 1945, to report the situation.

At this the British mechanized forces were closing in on us and by great deal of persuasion, I managed to induce Netaji to come away from Meiktila. At this time the enemy tanks were only 8 miles from us.

We arrived at Pyinmana on 26th Feb. 1945, and Netaji decided that with the remnants of No. 1 Dn. he was going to put a fight to the last at Pyinmana. He asked me to take command of this force. He said he was determined to stay there and fight himself.

The British forces were, however, halted at Meiktila and Netaji returned to Rangoon, early in March.

On 7th March 1945, I bade my last farewell to him and left for Popa to take over command of No. 2 Dn. where the situation had become very grave.

I arrived there on 12th March, and in accordance with my previous orders I found the Dn. engaged in fighting against the enemy.

On this front No. 2 Dn. was fighting against most overwhelming odds; where the enemy forces were supported by numerous tanks, aeroplanes and artillery, we had none of these weapons. But

in spite of these drawbacks we held our own against them. In these operations No. 2 Regt. under command of Col. P. K. Sahgal and No. 4 Regt. under command of Col. G. S. Dhillon distinguished themselves.

Another officer who deserves a special mention was Capt. Bagri, who commanded a Batallion in No. 2 Regt. and who, in every action, fought like a lion, and finally laid down his life at the altar of his motherland, always to be revered by his comrades as a "Shaheed-i-Bharat."

On 12th April 1945, I received orders to withdraw 2nd Dn. to Magwe. During the withdrawal No. 2 Regt. was overtaken by enemy in the vicinity of Prome and had to surrender. On 19th April 1945, No. 4 Regt. with Dn. H. Q. arrived at Magwe and joined No. 1 Regt. which had been there since March 1945.

Next day, we were forced by enemy mechanized columns to withdraw to Prome, and on arrival there we found that the British forces were already there. We broke through and continued our withdrawal to Moulmein where we had received orders to assemble.

Early in May I arrived with the remnants of 2 Dn. at Taikyi—30 miles North of Rangoon—and found that Rangoon had been occupied by the British; another British column had occupied Pegu, and blocked our retreat to Moulmein. I then, on finding myself encircled from all sides, entered Peguuomas to-

continue the fight. But eventually with the last party of 45 men I was captured on 16th May 1945.

My ambition has always been :—

- (a) To show to the world that when it comes to the question of making supreme sacrifices for the liberation of our motherland, the Muslims would in no way lag behind any one else.
- (b) That given an opportunity, the most privileged and politically backward classes, are willing to make supreme sacrifices for the liberation of their motherland.

(2)

MY REACTIONS AND REASONS
FOR JOINING THE I. N. A.

Brief background of the environments in which I was brought up.

I was born in a family of Janjua-Rajputs in Rawalpindi. My father was the leader of our clan in the district. He served in the I. A. for 30 years. My grandfather was also the Chief of the tribe and was granted a large tract of land in Montgomery District for his services in the last war. In the last war (1914—18) and in the recent world war (1939—45) every able-bodied member of my family joined the army. At present there are 62 of them serving as officers in the Indian Army.

In short I belong to a so-called privileged family, in which loyalty to the Crown was a valued tradition.

On the death of my father, my mother and the rest of the family were granted a pension by the Government.

I was educated at the Prince of Wales's Royal Military College, Dehra Dun, where half of my expenses were borne by the Government.

In 1933 I passed out into the Indian Military Academy, and received the undermentioned scholarships :—

1. King Emperor's Cadetship.
2. Sir Pratab Singh memorial prize, for being the best Cadet and for belonging to a family having the best military services.

I passed out in 1935 and was posted to a British Battalion for one year and later to 1/14th Punjab Regt. in Feb. 1937.

In short I was brought up in an atmosphere which was purely military and up to the time of my meeting with Netaji S. C. Bose at Singapore in July 1943, I was politically almost uneducated. I was brought up to see India, through the eyes of a British Officer, and all that I was interested in was soldiering and sport.

When in January 1942 I was called to Singapore, to rejoin my Battalion which had been in action in Malaya, I was determined to go there and put up a good show in the fighting and to uphold the martial traditions of my family.

I arrived very late in Singapore, January 29th, 1942, when the situation had become very critical, but in spite of this I was determined to put up a brave fight.

In the battle of Singapore on the 13th, 14th and 15th February 1942, when most of the British Officers had disappeared with their units, from my right and left flanks, I held on to my position until ordered to surrender by my Commanding Officer.

I resented this order, especially when I felt that I had not been given a fair chance to fight the enemy, and to have brought me to Singapore so late in the fight, only to be ordered to lay down my arms, was I considered a crime and an injustice to my honour as a soldier to lay down my arms and surrender.

Surrender and Concentration of the Farrer Park

On the night of the surrender 15/16th February 1942, we received orders that all Indians, including

the King's Commissioned Officers, were to concentrate at Farrer Park. All British Officers and other ranks were to concentrate at Changi.

All of us, especially the officers, were surprised to hear this order, because according to the laws of warfare, all captured officers whether Indian or British are kept together and separate from the rank and file.

We had heard of the Japanese methods and atrocities before, and felt that the British brother officers were leaving us in the lurch, to face it all by ourselves.

On the morning of 16th February 1945, when we were marching off to our concentration area, our Commanding Officer Major Mac Adam, along with other British officers, came to see off the Bn. While shaking hands with me, he said, "I suppose, this is the parting of our ways." At the time I did not understand the full significance of this, as I had no idea of Japanese intentions, whereas he must have known about it when he said so. But he did not tell any of us what to expect, or any advice as to which course we were to follow. His last words confirmed my feeling of "being left in the lurch." This was the feeling and the state of mind in which I went to the assembly area at the Farrer Park.

Handing over ceremony.

At the Farrer Park we were handed over to the Commander of Jap. Int. Department, Major Fujiwara, by Col. Hunt, the representative of the British

Government. When handing over, Col. Hunt called the parade to attention and said :—

"To-day, I, on behalf of the British Government, hand you over to the Japanese Government as Prisoners of War."

After this he handed over the nominal rolls of all prisoners of war to the Jap representative. Major Fujiwara, (there were approx. 42,000 P.O.W. there), then again brought the parade to attention and said :—

"On behalf of the Jap Government, I take you over under my charge." He then went on to say that "I on behalf of the Jap Government now hand you over to Capt. Mohan Singh, G. O. C., Indian National Army, who shall have the power of life and death over you."

After this Col. Hunt departed. After this Major Fujiwara first made a speech, in which he declared that we would not be treated as prisoners, but as brothers by the Japs and expressed a hope that all of us would join the I. N. A. which was being raised to fight for India's freedom under the leadership of G. O. C. Capt. Mohan Singh.

After this Capt. Mohan Singh came on the stage and delivered a similar speech.

The speeches came as complete bombshell to us. The very idea of joining hands with our former enemies and to fight against our own kith and kin was fantastic.

I, as well as most of the officers, had a feeling of being completely helpless, at being handed over

like cattle by the British to the Japs and by the Japs to Capt. Mohan Singh whom they gave powers of life and death over us.

I was fully convinced that we would be "exploited" by the Japs, purely for their own ends. I, therefore, firmly, made up my mind not to have anything to do with such an I. N. A. and in spite of the feeling of frustration and helplessness the element of traditional loyalty to the King triumphed and not only did I make up my own mind to keep out of the I. N. A., but as the head of famous Military tribe, I felt it my duty to warn all others especially the men I commanded and the men of my area to keep out of it.

The sort of remarks, I made on the occasion were :—"If any one asks you to shoot at your own brothers, turn round and shoot him first."

There were many King's Commissioned Officers whom I knew well before the war. All of us got together and decided to keep out of the I.N.A.

In this frame of mind we marched off the next day, to our camp in Neesoon. On arrival there I continued to persist in my idea and kept on addressing every one who came to me for advice, to keep out of it. After a few days I got the command of Neesoon Camp. There were approx, 20,000 P. O. Ws.

The first thing I did was to organize a bloc of officers, approx, 30 in number to resist the I. N. A. These officers were mainly Mnslims and the intention was to keep the bulk of Muslim rank and file out of the I. N. A.

I commanded the camp from March to, June 1942, during which period my only concern was how could I improve the unfortunate lot of the men under my command.

Early in April Major Mahabir Singh Dhillon came to Neesoon and delivered a lecture to approx. 500 N. C. O's in that camp. He said :—" I have very pleasant news for you : The Japanese have landed at Madras." After this he gave some other world news and his review on them. After had finished I got up and spoke to the N. C. Os and said. " The news given out by Major Dhillon is far from pleasant, in fact it is shocking. It is a pity that at the time when the sacred soil of our motherland was being trodden down below the dirty feet of the Aggressor (Japan) we were prisoners in Singapore and could do nothing to protect India's honour." This was meant to counter the effect of Major Dhillon's lecture. Later I learnt that the news of Japanese landing on Madras was false and informed all concerned.

Again at the end of April 1942, when Col. Gill was going to Bangkok, I collected all the officers at his bungalow to bid him farewell.

At that meeting I accused him of putting us all in a difficult situation by making us accept Biddadari resolutions etc. and at the time when we needed his guidance and leadership most, he was deserting us.

In reply to me he said he was being pushed out of Singapore against his wishes.

This was the trend of my mind at the time.

Stay at Kuala-Lumpur June-Sept. 1942

I arrived at Kuala-Lumpur by a goods train early in June. I was followed there by several parties of P. O. W. On arrival of all the parties, I was ordered to assemble them for the Japanese Commander's Inspection. I did so. The Jap Commander then addressed all the P.O.W. and said, "I welcome you all and am very pleased to have you under my command. We regard you not as prisoners of war, but as brothers, as we are all Asiatics.

"It is the most ardent desire of all Japanese people that India should achieve its independence as soon as possible ; and to enable you to participate in the freedom fight, we have made arrangements for re-arming, and training for that purpose."

This was greatly resented by all the P. O. W. as they had no intention of being re-armed and to undergo military training under the Japs.

On conclusion of the parade the P. O. W. refused to dismiss unless their status and position was clarified. I took the Japanese Commander to my office, and in the presence of other P.O.W. officers explained the situation among the Indian P.O.W. who surrendered in Singapore. I told him that some who were known as the "Volunteers" were willing to take up arms and fight the British, and others who were known as the "non-volunteers" wished to remain and be treated purely as P. O. W.

I requested him that the question of Indian Independence was an affair of the Indians and that

the Japanese should not force any Indian against his wishes to participate in it.

I assured him that as far as the Japs were concerned we were all willing to help them in their war against the Anglo-American domination of Asia. I went on to say that the volunteers would help by actually fighting the British and the non-volunteers would help by strengthening rear bases and lines of communications, such as building aerodromes, railways, roads, etc.

He agreed with me and said that the latter task was even more important from their point of view than the first one, and so he agreed to issue orders to all Jap Commanders in Malaya under his command.

Very briefly it was :—

Volunteers for fighting.

Non-volunteers for labour etc.

A similar trouble occurred at Seramban, where on refusal of the P. O. W. to take up arms the Japanese fixed machine guns all round the camp, put the camp commander Capt. Ghulam Mohd. in a cell and gave the P. O. W. 24 hrs to think about it, after which if the P.O. W. still insisted they would all be shot.

I heard about this and at once rushed to Seramban with the Jap Commander's decision, which he had given at Kaula-Lumpur and after a great deal of persuasion I was able to make them see our point of view.

In a similar manner I visited all the stations in Malaya, where the Indian P. O. W. were employed,

and ensured that the Indian P. O. W. were not coerced to take up arms or undergo Military training under the Japs.

At Kuala-Lumpur, the Japs tried to teach the Indian P. O. W. Jap foot-drill, words of command and Jap method of saluting. I refused to allow them to do so. Although it is interesting to note that the English P. O. W. in Rangoon did all this.

During this period my main pre-occupation was to improve the lot of the men under my command.

System of Command.

There were approx. 10,000 Indian P. O. W. in Malaya. They were stationed at Kualalumpur—Alorstar—Sungeipatani—Ipoh Malacca—Seramban and Port Dickson east station was under command of the local Jap Command. Indian P.O.W. had their own camp commanders. All these stations were under the Jap. General Headquarters at Kuala-Lumpur, where I had my Headquarters and came under command of the Jap. Commander. My job was to visit all Indian P. O. W. camps and represent any of their difficulties, etc., to the Jap. G.H.Q.

While in that position I managed to secure for the Indian P. O. W. excellent living conditions—very likely the best given to any P. O. W. in the Far East.

Food : was excellent—Eggs, fish and chickens.

Work and Pay : was paid regularly and work was very moderate.

There were adequate arrangements for recreation of troops, they played foot-ball, hockey, etc.

Cinema shows were given in camps and troops could go out and see any picture by paying 10 cents (2 annas).

P O. W. soldiers could go out to the town with a pass from their own camp commander, every day from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M. Officers could go out in Muf-ti and visit any civilian friends. They could stay out from 10 A.M. to mid-night.

Six men selected for execution by the Japs.

On one occasion when I was out of the station, on tour, the Japanese took away 21 N.C.O.'s belonging to a S. and M. Unit on the accusation that they were too pro-British. They selected six out of these for execution and made them sign their last will. When I returned from tour I found this out. I at once went to the Jap G.H.Q. and requested them to hand over my soldiers to me. I told them that I was supposed to be the Commander of Indian troops and that in principle it was wrong for the Jap to deal dis-rect with my subordinate officers and take away the men under my command without my knowledge. Fi-nally I informed them that if they insisted on doing this I would resign from my appointment.

They then told me that I could take away 15 of the 21 N. C. O.'s back and that the other six, they had decided to execute as they were too pro-British, and being Japanese Prisoners were still insisting that they had taken an oath to be loyal to the King.

I explained the full significance of this oath to them and told them that the normal procedure for dealing with any serious offence in the Indian Army

was to hold a "court of enquiry" and I assured them that I would go very thoroughly into the case and if in the end, the court found their offence to be of a serious nature, I would myself hand over the men to the Japanese for punishment.

They agreed to this and I brought back all 21 N. C. Os. safely to their unit, held a court of enquiry and released all of them.

"Quit India Resolution" and Mass Rally at K.L.

On August 8th, 1942, the Indian civilians at Kaula-Lumpur were going to hold a mass rally to express their appreciation and approval of the "Quit India Resolution" passed by the Indian National Congress and to express their indignation at the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi and other prominent national leaders. That day in the morning, a Jap Liaison officer, Lt. Nyui, came to me and told me that the Gen. Comdg. K. L. area wished to know if I and my troops would like to take part in the rally. I told him that *we would*. He then went on to say that in that case we will have to march to the scene of the meeting carrying at the head of the column, Japnese—Indian National Flags crossed. He said that this would be a sign of goodwill and close co-operation between the Japanese and the Indians.

I told him to go and inform the General that if that was the condition, I would not take part in the meeting. I told him that no Indian wishes to carry a National flag of another nation, and that if the Japanese intention was to show to the world that they could make

the prisoners carry Japanese flag by force then they ought to insist on this otherwise not. Finally I assured him that if we go to the meeting we will march there only under our own National Flag and *will not carry* any Japanese flags. He went to the General and informed him of this. The Japanese General not only allowed me to have my own way but also issued orders that on that day no civilians were to show or carry any Jap flags.

We went to the meeting, which was held at a big open Maidan at K. L. There were approx. 15,000 people of all nationalities present there. Some high ranking Japanese officers were also present at that meeting.

I was asked to deliver a speech on behalf of the Indian soldiers. I did so, and in the course of the speech, I said:—Nobody must ever have any misconceptions that the Japanese were going to make the I. N. A. a puppet force. I said, if on arriving in India, we found that the Japanese had any designs on it, we would turn round and fight them most vigorously, and assured them all that rather than become a Japanese puppet, every single soldier of I. N. A., would perish fighting to uphold India's honour. This remark of mine must have thrilled the masses, as there was wild cheering. Perhaps it was too bold a statement to make when the people were *terrified* of the Japanese.

A recording of my speech was also made. The next day, the Japanese General met me and congratulated me on my speech and said if we go into India with the intention of just replacing the British you

must fight us otherwise you would be traitors to your country.

Recall to Singapore

In September 1942 I was recalled to Singapore, and posted as 2/In Command to Col. Bhagat at the Officer Training School. Later I was appointed Comdt. O. T. S. which commenced in Nov. 1942 and after a few days it was disbanded by the order of Captain Mohan Singh.

In my opening address to the cadets I said:— "That independence was our birth-right, and to achieve this object we have to fight the British, and later we must be prepared to fight the Japanese too if they showed any intentions of dominating India."

"That the fight for India's liberation had been going on in India for a long time and that we were a part and parcel of that struggle, and that to us it was immaterial who won the war, all that we were concerned with was our own Independence, and that our fight had to go on until the time when India was completely independent."

The Crisis

At the end of November 1942 some differences of opinion arose between Capt. Mohan Singh and the Japanese, over the official ratification of the resolutions passed at the Bangkok Conference.

He was arrested in December 1942 and taken away. Before his arrest, however, he issued order for the disbandment of the I. N. A.

On receipt of disbandment orders, the I. N. A. ceased all work, dumped all their arms and equipment

and burnt all I. N. A. Badges and from then on they maintained they were prisoners of war.

The Japanese and Mr. R. B. Bose, the President of the Council of Action, refused to admit this. This state of affairs dragged on till February 1943. I was determined to stay out of all future I. N. A. I also advised several officers and men to get out once and never to join another I. N. A. which by this time it was quite clear that the Japanese were determined to start and a vigorous propaganda campaign was already well advanced to say that legally the I. N. A. could not be disbanded by Capt. Mohan Singh as he himself had been appointed General to command it by the President of the Council of Action—Mr. R. B. Bose. They said Mohan Singh could resign from the post himself, but had no authority to disband the I. N. A.

Lecture by Gen. Iwakuro at Biddadari

In February 1943 after the Japanese had carried out intensive propaganda in the I. N. A. General Iwakuro called a meeting of all I. N. A. Officers (approx. 300) at Biddadari, and delivered a lecture. The salient point of his speech were :

(a) "That the I. N. A. had been raised as a result of decision taken by all the Indians in East Asia, at or Bangkok Conference.

(b) That the Japanese Government had sympathized with the desire of Indians to fight for the liberation of their country, and granted facilities for the representatives to meet at Bangkok and decide upon the ways and means of conducting their campaign.

(c) That a Council of Action was selected by the Conference and Mr. R. B. Bose was appointed the

President, who had appointed Captain Mohan Singh to command the I. N. A. forces.

(d) That the Japanese Government had given a promise of all-out aid to the President, and finally he said that Captain Mohan Singh could, if he so chose resign the command of the I. N. A., but he had no authority to disband the I. N. A. without the sanction of the President and that any attempt at disorganizing the I. N. A. would be treated as mutiny."

This was a very critical time. The Japanese were determined to keep the I. N. A. going through sheer force, and at the time they were looking for ring leaders, they wished to make scapegoats, to frighten others to remain in the I. N. A. The senior officers realising the gravity of the situation kept themselves well out of the light.

I could not stand this and replied to General Iwakuro and made him admit that the Japanese had no justification for forcing us to continue in such a movement, as in a " holy movement " for securing India's independence, there was no place for deceit and coercion. He agreed and as a result of this every one was allowed a free choice of either continuing in the I.N.A. or going out of it.

I had no wish to continue in the I.N.A. at that time, next day I was sent for by General Iwakuro at his bungalow for a " heart talk " as he called it.

He told me that he had fully appreciated the force of my argument at the previous day's meeting and wished a man like me ought to take over the leadership of the I. N. A. He asked me if I would like to accept the leadership of the I. N. A. I replied that I

would not as I have not the necessary ability or following.

He then requested me to give him my views on how a real and true I.N.A. could be started. I suggested :—

(a) That the question of Indian Independence should be treated as a "holy thing" and anything pertaining to it should be based on truth and on unshakable foundations.

(b) That there should be no coercion of any sort to induce any one to join it, everyone who came forward must do so of his own free will, fully realising the consequences of doing so. I also suggested that the people wishing to leave the I. N. A. should be treated kindly.

(c) Finally I told him that there was only one man outside India, who could start a real I. N. A. and that was Netaji S. Bose. I insisted that by the real I.N.A., I meant that it should be a formidable fighting force and not merely a propaganda army.

He agreed with me and assured me that he would try his best to make arrangement for Netaji S. C. Bose to come to Singapore from Germany.

I continued to remain out of the I. N. A.. but later due to persuasion by General Iwakuro, and by the fact that in trying to get others out of the I. N. A. without any blood I had committed myself too far and could not retrace my steps and so had to join the I. N. A. against my better judgement.

My feelings at the time were that whether I liked it or not, I was in the I.N.A. I realised that in trying

to save others I had sacrificed myself, I therefore set about to see that :—

(a) Every one who wished to leave the I. N. A. was able to do so without any fear of reprisals against him.

(b) Those who remained in the I. N. A. were to be prepared even to fight against the Japanese if they proved dishonest.

(c) The Japs did not exploit us for their own benefit.

By that time the Japanese had taken over all the P. O. W. under their own control and the men were quite happy. My next main worry was the treatment that would be given to the men of the I. N. A. who were gone out of it, after the crisis. We had an idea that they would be sent to the Pacific Islands, where conditions were very unpleasant. I, however, managed to arrange for approx. 20 Officers who were too old to undergo hardships to remain behind in Singapore.

1. Capt. Dilawar Khan 2. S. M. Chandans.
3. Lt. Shafi Ullah 4. S. M. Lal Khan.
5. Capt. T. M. Khanzada, 6. Sub. Hazara Singh.
M.C., D.S.O,

and several others.

The re-organisation of the I. N. A. was then started. I was the Chief of the General Staff to the D.M.B. (Director of Military Bureau) and in accordance with my intention, I set about to find such men for the I. N. A. as would be willing to fight the Japs if they were dishonest with us.

For this I undertook a tour of the mainland of Malaya. During this visit at Kuala-lumpur

I found the Japanese in control of our Indian Recruits Training Centre. I resented this strongly and reported it to Col. Bhonsle, the D. M. B. and later went and discussed this with the Jap Chief of Staff to put an end to this.

During this period I was not very happy as the Japanese were openly and ruthlessly exploiting us by creating factions among the army as well as in the civil.

Col. Bhonsle, a senior and experienced officer, although a perfect gentleman was helpless and could do nothing to stop Jap exploitation. I was disgusted with the state of affairs and took no interest in it.

Early in July 1943 Netaji S. C. Bose arrived and took over complete control and saved the situation.

Netaji's arrival and its effect on me

When Netaji arrived in Singapore, I watched him very keenly. I had never seen him or met him before, and did not know very much about his activities in India. I heard a number of his public speeches, which had a profound effect on me. It will not be wrong to say that I was hypnotized by his personality and his speeches. He placed the true picture of India before us and for the first time in my life I saw INDIA, through the eyes of an Indian. He rid me of the Anglo-phobia, of which I had been a victim since my very childhood.

I was most impressed by his selflessness, his absolute devotion to his country, his frankness and his refusal to bow before the Japanese wishes. I knew that in his hands India's honour was safe, he would

never barter it for anything in the world. Also when I heard him give a free choice to everyone in the I. N. A. to leave its ranks if they were not prepared to make extreme sacrifices and his warning to those who stayed on in the I. N. A. to be prepared to face thirst, hunger, forced marches and in the end death, and when with my own eyes I saw the madding enthusiasm of thousands of poverty-stricken Indians in the Far East, who gave to the I. N. A. all that they possessed and whole families joined the Azad Hind Fauj and became "Fakirs" for the sake of their country, I knew we had a *real* leader and when he in the name of millions of poverty-stricken, unarmed and helpless Indians appealed to us to come forward and sacrifice our lives for *their* liberation no honourable Indian could have refused *this much* to him.

I found a leader and decided to follow him, and for me it was the greatest and the most difficult decision of my life—That of fighting against my kith and kin, who were in the British Indian Army in very large numbers, and whom, I was certain, I could never induce to see eye to eye with me.

At the back of my mind was the traditional urge of loyalty to the King. I owed all my education to him. My family and my tribe were one of the privileged classes in India. They were all prosperous and contented. This too we owed to the British Government and I knew that no change in India would bring them any more prosperity. In fact they were likely to suffer by it and lastly, there was the oath of allegiance which I as an officer owed to the King.

I fully realized the consequences of "waging war against the King."

But on the other hand when I thought of the "starving millions" who were being ruthlessly exploited by the British, and were being deliberately kept illiterate and ignorant to make this exploitation easier I developed a great hatred for the system of rule in India, which to me it seemed was based on "injustice" and to remove this injustice I decided to sacrifice my everything—My life, my home, my family and its traditions. I made up my mind to fight even against my brother if he stood in my way, and in the actual fighting that followed in 1944, we fought against each other. He was wounded. My cousin and I were fighting each other in Chin Hill, almost daily for two months. What enabled me do this was the feeling that the British were sucking the life blood of India, and of the streams they were sucking, they were giving a drop of that blood to my family to enlist their aid for this inhuman act. I realized that the prosperity of any tribe was due to this "Drop of India's Blood" and I considered it Immoral to thrive on it. In short the question before me was the King or the Country. I *decided* to be loyal to my country and gave my word of honour to my NETAJI that I would sacrifice myself for the sake of my country.

I was a soldier, and once I had "taken the decision" I concentrated on fighting from the first to the last day. I also realized that if on going into India, which was probable due to poor British

defences, the Japs were dishonest, I would be much more useful to my country with a rifle in hand in India, than as a P. O. W. in Malaya.

In Sept. 1943, Netaji decided to select a picked Regt., consisting of the "Cream of the I. N. A." and send it into action to form the spearhead of the advance into India. I was given the proud privilege of commanding this Regt.

At Rangoon in Feb. 1944, on the eve of the departure of the Regiment to the front, Netaji came and delivered a farewell speech. He addressed us thus میرے زندگی اور مرت کے ساتھیوں "The eyes of whole of India nay, the whole world are focussed on you. The fate of 400 million Indians depends on what you accomplish on the battlefield. You are the strength of my arms. I fully realized the magnitude of the task I had undertaken and my knees trembled under this heavy burden of responsibility; but I was determined to overcome all obstacles and was certain of victory. I knew that whatever might happen, nothing could stop me from achieving the greatest victory—that of laying down my life for the sake of my country, on the battlefield."

At first I was nervous, I prayed to Almighty God to give me the necessary guidance and strength to enable me to achieve my object.

The actual achievements and sufferings of "SUBHAS" Brigade is an epic story, which is described in full detail elsewhere, but here suffice it to say that no army in the world could have achieved so much with so little; and no country

could have wished for truer sons. The last words of a soldier, who was dying through starvation and lack of medical aid—there were hundreds of maggots in his wounds—sum up concisely the achievement of the Regiment that lost 60 per cent. of its men in the first campaign. His words were :—"Sahib, please tell Netaji, that I died happily and that I did my duty."

In Oct. 1944, the Regiment, having returned from the front, concentrated at Budalin, near Yeu. During the seven months that they were at the front, they established their superiority over the enemy wherever they went. In fact their main difficulty was that the enemy would not stand up against them and fight—(See my letter to Netaji written from Haka in May 1944). During this phase there was never an occasion when they attacked the enemy and did put him to flight or captured their posts, and there was never an occasion when they withdrew, even an inch, before the enemy's onslaught.

In Oct. 1944, I went to Mandalay to report to Netaji and then accompanied him to Rangoon, where I stayed till December.

In Dec. 1944, I returned to Mandalay to take over the command of No. 1 Division and held in its evacuation to Pyinmana. This was completed early in February 1945.

On 18th Feb. 1945 Netaji came to Pyinmana, to inspect No. 1 Division. He told me that No. 2 Division had moved from Rangoon to Popa front, but unfortunately Col. Aziz Ahmad, the

Divisional Commander, had been injured in an enemy bombing raid, and that he was in a difficult situation, because he could not find a suitable officer to replace him. He said Gen. Bhonsle, the Chief of Staff, was not willing to come forward, because he thought that it was a "come down" for him to command a Division, and Gen. Kiani was unable to go because of his ill-health and his inability to co-operate with the Jap Divisional Commander, Gen. Yamamoto, in that area.

Every one at that time realized that the military situation was very grave and the battle of Burma had been lost. However I could not see Netaji in difficulties and offered my services, although at that time I was under treatment for Beri-Beri.

On 20th Feb. 1945, I accompanied Netaji to Meiktila, when he was going to inspect front line troops in Popa-Kyauk-Padaung area.

When we were at Meiktila, the enemy mechanized columns broke through and almost encircled us. We managed to escape and return to Pyinmana and then to Rangoon.

On 7th March 1945, I bid my last farewell to Netaji and proceeded to Popa to take command of No. 2 Division.

At the time of my departure Netaji was extremely upset and worried about the situation in No. 2 Division, both from a Military point of view, and the internal situation, which had become very grave indeed by the desertion of 4 officers of the Divisional

Headquarters. Netaji told me that he was very much ashamed of it and could not show his face to anyone.

This grieved me immensely and I assured Netaji that the situation was not so bad as he thought, and promised him that we (I and other senior officers of the Div.) would uphold India's honour, even under the most adverse conditions. Thus when I left Rangoon for the front, to take over command of No. 2 Division, the only thought in my mind was to allay Netaji's anxieties or die in the attempt. This was the frame of my mind at the time when I left Rangoon.

The events that followed are given in full detail elsewhere. Suffice it to say that with the help and outstanding leadership of my Regimental Commanders at Popa Lt. Col. P. K. Sahgal and Lt. Col. G. S. Dhillon, the situation was completely restored, and we halted the enemy's advance for over one month and rejuvenated the spirit and morale of the men ; and later to the great joy of all of us received Netaji's message expressing his complete satisfaction with the situation in No. 2 Division, both from a Military as well as internal point of view.

On April 12th the Division received orders to withdraw to Magwe Taundwingy area. This was much against my wish, and during the withdrawal No. 2 Regt. under Col. Sahgal was overtaken by enemy tank columns and had to surrender. I with Col. G. S. Dhillon and the remnants of No. 1, 2, and 4 Regts. withdrew to Pegu, in an attempt to break

through and reach Moulmein. But we were unable to do so and had to surrender.

During this retreat from Popa-Pegu, we covered over 500 miles on foot, with no transport or proper ration supply ; in doing so we had to break through six enemy encirclements, and only surrendered after we had heard that Netaji had ordered all I.N.A. units in Rangoon to surrender and when we had no other alternative left.

Some soldiers unable to induce themselves to accept this order, prefered to take their own lives and committed "suicide." I did not do so, because I felt it my duty still to lead my men and share their hardships as I had done on the battlefield.

"JAIHIND"

(2)

SEPOY MOHD. HUSSAIN'S CASE
(SHOT AT POPA ON 29TH MARCH 1945)

On 5th March 1945, when I was in Rangoon, I was sent for by Netaji, for a talk in which he told me that:-

(a) The Military situation on 2 Div. Front had become very grave and that this had been made worse by the Divisional Commander Col. Aziz Ahmed's inability to go there owing to a head injury. He also stated that he had asked both Major-General J. K. Bhonsle and Major-General M. Z. Kiani to proceed to that front and take over command, but both of them had declined to do so, the former, because he considered it below his dignity to command a division, after holding the appointment of the Chief of Staff, and the latter because of ill-health, and his inability to co-operate with the local Japanese Commander on that front.

Netaji then told me that he wished me to take over the command of 2 Division and proceed to Popa as soon as possible.

(b) He went on to say that there were other bad news from that front, and it was that four Majors, namely, Mohd. Riaz, Mohd. Sarwar, P. J. Madan and S. N. Dey, all of Divisional H. Q., had deserted to the

British side a few days earlier. He said that by this cowardly act they had brought shame and disgrace on India's honour, and that as a result of their action we had lost all our respect in the eyes of our Allies the Japanese and the Burmese.

He impressed upon me the necessity of preventing any more desertions, and that I had his permission to use any methods including award of Summary Capital Punishment to stop it.

He finally concluded by saying that if there were any more desertions among the troops, the only course left open to him, would be to "commit suicide." I could see that Netaji was extremely upset and meant what he said.

I was very devoted to my Netaji and was determined that to allay his anxiety and to uphold India's honour, I would stop short of nothing.

This was the frame of mind in which I arrived at Popa on 12th March 1945, and took over command of No. 2 Division.

On arrival at Popa, I found the situation very critical. The troops had lost confidence in their officers and their morale was low.

A large number of other officers, besides those who had deserted, were being detained in custody on suspicion of having intentions to desert.

The Military situation was even more critical. Powerful enemy mechanized columns had captured Meiktila and were threatening our rear. Large forces were also being massed opposite our front, after their crossing of the Irrawaddy. They had

complete air superiority and we were being subjected to constant bombing and machine-gunning from numerous aeroplanes the enemy used on this front. These were rendered very devastating by the exact information of an H. Q. and troop concentration given to the enemy by the deserters.

My first and foremost task was therefore to restore the lost confidence of the men in their officers, and secondly to build up their morale, by taking offensive action on the enemy and defeating them in battle, and by taking steps for stopping further deserters. Both these objects were achieved to a very great degree.

As given above desertions had two very unfortunate results :—

(a) They had bad effect on the morale of other soldiers.

(b) They revealed the exact location of our Head Quarters, troop concentrations, supply and ammunition dumps and Hospitals, with the result that these were bombed and great loss of life and material was inflicted on us.

On one occasion our Hospital area was bombed and some patients were killed and all our medicines were burnt, with the result that these could never be replaced and the sick and wounded naturally suffered.

There was great indignation against such indiscriminate bombing; and against deserters who were the cause of it.

In the meantime written orders were received from the Supreme Commander "AZAD HIND FAUJ" (Netaji S. C. Bose) that in future the punishment for desertion would be death, and the Divisional and Regimental Commanders were given the power to award this punishment summarily.

A few days later I received a personal letter from Netaji, in which he asked me to exercise utmost vigilance to prevent desertions and to take any steps, which I considered necessary including award of Capital Punishment to the offenders. He also asked me to convey his message to all the Regimental Commanders. I did so and obtained the initials of Cols. P. K. Sahgal and G. S. Dhillon on it.

Also before my arrival at Popa, four men of No. 4 Regiment had been shot for desertion. Thus a precedent had already been created, before Sy. Mohd. Hussain of No. 2 Regt. was brought up before me for desertion. The award of Capital Punishment on him was distasteful to me, but at a time when the extreme necessity was to restore confidence of the troops in their leaders I could show no weakness, especially because Mohd. Hussain was a Muslim and any leniency in dealing with his case might have been misinterpreted on communal lines. This was all the more important in view of the fact that I was new to the Division and had just taken over its command, and had no previous contact with the officers and men of that unit.

Full facts of the case are as under :—

On 26th or 27th March 1945, Maj. B.S. Negi, 2/In Command to Col. Sahgal, commanding No. 2 Regiment and Lt. Khazin Shah, commanding 1st Bn. of No. 2 Regiment came to my Head Quarters and reported that they had some men to be brought up before me for attempted desertion. I asked them to march them in before me.

They produced three men before me.

Sy. Mohd. Hussain	} All on charge of desertion.
Sy. Alladit a	
Sy. Jagiri Ram	

Major Negi handed over the charge sheet to me and explained that owing to being unwell Col. Sahgal could not come himself, and that he had gone into the case of those three men and was of the opinion that they deserved the extreme penalty. Lt. Khazin Shah, the Battalion Commander, was also of the same opinion.

I read out the charge sheet to the three accused, two pleaded *not guilty* and one Sy. Mohd. Hussain pleaded guilty. I returned the charge sheet to Major Negi, after full investigation and asked him to bring up Mohd. Hussain before me the next day for desertion, and that the other two were to be dealt with by the Regimental Commander, as they were not guilty of desertion.

Next day Mohd. Hussain, along with the other two, was brought up before me. I read out the charge sheet to him, and asked him to tell me the truth. He said, that he *did* intend to desert and that he had

also instigated the other two to desert with him. I then asked the other two witnesses Sy. Alladitta and Sy. Jagiri Ram to make their statements. They both admitted that Sy. Mohd. Hussain had tried to instigate them to desert and that he had told them that he was going to desert.

Being fully satisfied from the evidence that the man was guilty I awarded the punishment of death to him. Once the charge was established against the man, there was no other alternative left for me, by the existing orders on the subject, and by the precedent of 4 men of No. 4 Regt. shot before my arrival.

I ordered Maj. Mehr Das, my senior staff officer, who was also present there, to take down in writing the full statement and confession of Sy. Mohd. Hussain, before the sentence was carried.

This I understand he was not likely to do, as we had to move out immediately on active operations to stop a serious advance by the enemy.

When, where and how (if ever) Sy. Mohd. Hussain was shot is not known to me.

I would also like to point out that at the time when I awarded the punishment to him, I and Sy. Mohd. Hussain were both subject to the I. N. A. Act. He had voluntarily accepted to join the organization, and to abide by its rules and regulations.

Prior to his being sent to the front, he had been given undermentioned opportunities of not going to the front if he did not wish to do so :—

- (a) In Singapore, before the Regt. started moving to the front in Burma.
- (b) At Rangoon, in a speech by Netaji, and by the Regimental Commander in which they asked all men who were physically or mentally unfit to go to the front to stay behind.

Some men did actually stay behind.

Again on arrival at Popa, the Regiment Commander Col. P. K. Sahgal gave every one an opportunity to go back to Rangoon, if they did not wish to stay on and fight in Popa or to go over to the Allies, but in the latter case, he said the men would not be allowed to take I. N. A. Arms with them. Some men were actually sent back from Popa.

In conclusion, if in spite of voluntarily joining the organization and accepting its rules and regulations and given ample opportunities of staying behind, away from the front, the man still insisted on betraying his country and his comrades he well deserved the punishment which he received.

(3)

SURRENDER.

Having left Popa on 12th April in accordance with orders, we reached the outskirts of Pegu, on 16th May having marched over 500 miles, without any proper supply of rations or transport. During this march, by which we intended to join NETAJI at Moulmein, we broke six times through enemy encirclements.

On 16th May I realized that the situation had become almost hopeless ; this was made worse by the false information given to me by a Japanese Brigade Commander. He said, the British forces had crossed the Sittang river and that fighting was probably going on at Moulmein."

Rangoon had been captured by the Allies and the British forces were stretched out along the road Rangoon-Pegu-Meiktila and Mandalay. So I ordered all the troops with me to go and surrender to the British at Pegu.

This they did under command of Major A. B. Singh and Jagir Singh.

I did not intend ever to surrender to the British and so took a party of approximately 5 officers and 40 soldiers with the intention of continuing the fight. (See my diary). In the meantime the British forces

closed round us and finally without any rations or medicines, in a country whose population was very hostile, there was no other course left for us, but to surrender.

The following day, 17th May at about 11.00 hrs. we sent an officer 2/Lt. (I. N. A.) Rai Singh, with a white flag and a letter. The contents of which were :—

To

The Commander of British Forces.

From

The Commander of I. N. A. Tps. 2 Division.

"We have ceased fighting and wish to surrender, our party consisting of 45 men."

It was signed by G. S. Dhillon.

At about 16.00 hrs. Lt. Rai Singh returned. He was accompanied by a 2/Lt. Tehl Singh of 2/1st Punjab Regiment. Lt. Tehl Singh came and met us and asked us to accompany him to his company area; where we were all disarmed and taken to his Coy. H. Qrs. where I met Major Ram Singh, 2/1st Punjab Regiment, who was commanding the Company. From there we were taken to their Battalion Head Quarters and eventually to the Corp. Head Quarters, where the officers were separated from the men and taken to Pegu Jail.

The following day 18th May, Col. G. S. Dhillon and I were taken to the F. I. C. (Forward Interrogation Centre) and a guard was placed over the house in which we were accommodated. After a few days

this guard was removed and we were told by Major Orr, the Officer Commanding F. C. C. that we were on Parole. Up to this time we had been wearing our I. N. A. Uniform and Badges of rank.

We told him he could make us "take off" our I. N. A. Badges of rank, but could not order us to put on British Badges of rank. He agreed to this.

On 9th June I left Pegu for Rangoon and from there for Calcutta by Air arriving on 11th June and DELHI on 14th June 1945.

(4)

STATEMENT IN THE COURT.

Mr. President and members of this honourable court.

In this statement I am going to lay before you, very frankly, the considerations and motives that have impelled me from the day of my surrender in Singapore on 15th February 1942 to the day of my capture by the British forces at Pegu on 16th May 1945.

Before touching on the actual period, I would like to throw some light on my early history and Army career :—

Early History

I was born in a family of Janjua Rajputs in Rawalpindi. My father who was the leader of the Tribe in the District served in the Indian Army for 30 years.

In the first and the second World Wars, every able-bodied member of my family joined the army. At present there are over 80 of them serving as officers in the Indian Army.

In short I belong to a family in which loyalty to the Crown has always been a valued tradition.

I was educated at the Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College, Dehra Dun.

In 1933 I passed out into the I. M. A. Dehra Dun, and received the undermentioned scholarships :—

(a) King Emperor's Cadetship.

(b) Sir Partap Singh Memorial Prize for being the best cadet and for belonging to a family having the best military services to its credit.

I passed out of the I. M. A. as an under officer and was attached to a British Battalion for one year, after which I was posted to 1st Bn. 14th Punjab Regiment in February, 1937.

In short I was brought up in an atmosphere which was purely military and up to the time of my meeting with NETAJI S. C. Bose at Singapore in July 1943, I was politically almost uneducated. I was brought up to see India through the eyes of a young British officer, and all that I was interested in was soldiering and sport.

Call to Malaya

In March 1941, my Battalion went overseas to Malaya. At that time I was left behind in command of a company at the Training Centre at Ferozepore.

Early in November 1941, my O. C. Lt. Col. L. V. Fitzpatrick wrote to the G. H. Q. India, asking for my being sent out to join the Battalion. The Officer Commanding of the Training Centre, however, refused to allow me to go, on the grounds that my services could not be spared. He also protested about it to the G.H.Q. and an Indian Army Order was published.

stating that in future the active Bns. should not ask for any officer by name.

Col. Fitzpatrick, however, again applied for me through Malaya High Command, but his request was again turned down.

Early in Dec. 1941, he wrote a private letter to the Officer Commanding the Training Centre, stating that it was imperative in the interests of the Battalion that I should be sent out to join it.

On receipt of this letter I was allowed to proceed to Malaya and join my Battalion.

I was very proud of my Battalion, and was very happy to join it in the fight against the Japanese.

On 16th January, 1942, I sailed from Bombay, determined to live up to the good name of the Sherdil Bn. and to uphold the martial traditions of my family.

I arrived at S.ngapore on January 29th, 1942, when the situation had become very critical. In spite of this I was determined to put up a brave fight.

In the battle of Singapore on 13th, 14th and 15th February 1942, when the British officers, on my right and left flanks, had disappeared with their units, I held on to my position until ordered by my Commanding Officer to surrender.

I resented this order very much especially because I felt that I had not been given a fair chance to fight the enemy. To have brought me to Singapore so late in the fight, only to be ordered to lay down my arms, and to surrender unconditionally, I considered

to be extremely unjust to myself and to my sense of honour as a soldier.

Surrender and the Concentration at the Farrer Park

On the night of 15/16th Feb. 1942 the day of surrender, we received orders that all Indians, including the King's Commissioned Officers, were to concentrate at Farrer Park : and all British Officers and other ranks were to concentrate at Changi.

All of us, especially the officers, were surprised to hear this order, because according to the laws of civilized warfare, all captured officers irrespective of nationality, whether Indian or British, are kept together, and separate from the rank and file.

We had heard of the Japanese ways before, and felt that British brother officers were leaving us in the lurch to face it all by ourselves.

On the morning of the 16th Feb. 1942, when we were marching off to our concentration area, our Commanding Officer Major MacAdam, along with other British Officers, came to see off the Bn ; when shaking hands with me, he said, "I suppose this is the parting of our ways."

These words confirmed my belief that we, the Indians, were being left in the lurch. These were the feelings and the state of mind in which I went to Farrer Park.

Handing over Ceremony

At Farrer Park we were handed over to the commander of the Japanese Intelligence Department

Maj. Fujiwara, by Col. Hunt, the representative of the British Govt. When handing over. Col. Hunt called the parade to attention and said :—

“To-day I, on behalf of the British Govt. hand you over to the Japanese Government, whose orders you will obey as you have done ours.”

Major Fujiwara then brought the parade to attention and said, “On behalf of the Japanese Government I take you over, under my charge.” He then went to say, “I on behalf of the Japanese Govt. now hand you over to G. O. C. Mohan Singh, who shall have the power of life and death over you.”

Major Fujiwara made a speech in which he declared that we would not be treated as prisoners, but as brothers by the Japanese, and expressed the hope that all of us would join the Army which would be raised to fight for India's Freedom, under the leadership of G. O. C. Mohan Singh.

After this Capt. Mohan Singh came to the stage and made a similar speech.

These speeches came to me as a complete bomb-shell. The very idea of joining hands with our former enemies to fight against our own kith and kin was fantastic.

I as well as most of the other officers had a feeling of being completely helpless at being handed over like cattle by the British to the Japs and by the Japs to Capt. Mohan Singh, whom they gave powers of life and death over us.

With all due regards to Capt. Mohan Singh's sincerity and leadership which he displayed later ; I had known him well for the last 10 years. He had always been an efficient, but an average officer. The mere fact of being handed over to him, and his announcement as the G. O. C. having powers of life and death over us, made me feel suspicious of the Japanese intentions, as among the Indian P. of W. there were some very senior and brilliant officers like Col. Gill and Col. Bhonsle with at least 15 to 20 years' service in the army, whereas Capt. Mohan Singh had only 8 to 9 years' service.

I was fully convinced, knowing Capt. Mohan Singh so well, that *politically* at any rate, he would not be able to cope with the Japanese political intrigues and we would be exploited by them for their own ends. I, therefore, firmly made up my mind not to have anything to do with organisation and in spite of the feeling of frustration and helplessness, the element of traditional loyalty to the King triumphed and not only did I make up my own mind to keep out of the I. N. A. but as the head of a famous military tribe I felt it my duty to warn others, especially the men I commanded and the men that came from my area, to keep out of it. The advice that I gave them at that time was that if any of them was asked to shoot at his own brethren, he should turn round and shoot at the person asking him to do so.

Three stages

The period from the time of my surrender in Singapore in February 1942 to the time of my capture by the British in May 1945, can be divided into 3 distinct parts :—

Part I. 15th February 1942 to the end of May 1942, during which period I was against the very idea of such an organization coming into existence, and fought against it as vigorously as was possible, under the unfortunate circumstances in which we were placed.

Part II. June 1942 to June 1943. Realizing that I had failed in my first object, I decided in the interests of my men, to volunteer for the I. N. A., with full determination that I would do everything possible to break it or to sabotage it from within, as soon as I felt that it would submit to Japanese exploitation.

Part III. July 1943 to May 1945, when I was fully convinced that it was a genuine army of liberation.

I would like to give some details and important events that took place in each of the above given parts :—

In the first part, I was against the idea of creating an Indian National Army, because

- (a) I realized that the Japanese were out to exploit us, and none of us was politically capable of dealing with them;

(b) The handing over of all the Indian P. O. W. to Capt. Mohan Singh by the Japanese made me feel even more suspicious of their intentions, and so I felt it my duty to fight against it.

Move to Neesoon

The next day, 17th February, 1942, I went with my Battalion to Neesoon Camp, and after a few days I was appointed Camp Commandant.

There were approx. 20,000 P. of W. in that camp. The accommodation there was sufficient only for approx. 8 to 10 thousand men.

There were no sanitation arrangements.

There was no Water Supply.

Hospital arrangements were very poor and we had no medicines.

As a result of this, dysentery and other epidemics broke out.

The discipline of troops had gone off completely, and so I had a very difficult task to perform ; but thanks to the strenuous efforts of the camp medical staff, particularly Col. Chaudhri, Maj. Elahi Bux, and Major Gilani, disease was controlled, and by the efforts of a S. and M. unit, electric water and sanitary arrangements were completed.

After the events in Farrer Park I was fully convinced that the Japanese were going to exploit us, and so on reaching Neesoon Camp, one of the first things I did was to organize a block of officers, whose object it was to prevent the formation of the I. N. A.

I commanded the Neesoon Camp from March to June 1942, during which period my only concern was to improve the unfortunate lot of the men under my command.

During the time I was commanding Neesoon, the largest Indian P. of W. Camp in Singapore, not a single person was ever sent to any concentration or detention camp. I allowed every one to have, and express, his opinion freely and to decide for himself, without any outside pressure.

By the end of May 1942 it had become quite evident that in spite of all our efforts the I. N. A. would come into existence.

In the same month we had to decide whether or not we would volunteer for the I. N. A. and volunteers and non-volunteers were to be separated. I received orders from the Head Quarters to forward lists of volunteers and non-volunteers to them, for allotment of separate camps to each category.

In view of this new situation I held several meetings of the "Block" and it was decided that since we had failed in our first object to prevent the formation of the I. N. A. the next best thing was for senior officers to join it with the object of :—

- (a) Giving protection and help to P. of W.
- (b) To stop its being exploited by the Japanese.
- (c) To sabotage and wreck it from within, the moment we felt that it would submit to Japanese exploitation.

I, however, advised the rank and file to keep out of it.

In accordance with this decision, in the middle of May, 1942, at Neeson, in the presence of all officers of the camp, I declared myself a volunteer, but gave every one a free choice to decide for himself. I also gave orders that any one trying to persuade any one else to join the I. N. A. would be punished. I also asked for the list which had to be forwarded to I. N. A. H.Q. on the following day.

Mosque Meeting

The same afternoon I called a meeting of all Muslim officers in the mosque and told them my reasons for joining the I. N. A. I also told them that they would be separated shortly, and I asked them to give an assurance that they would not become volunteers, through any force or coercion used against them by the Japanese. They all agreed and said a "Dua-Khair"—a religious confirmation of the decision taken.

PART II

Bangkok Conference

Early in June 1942 Captain Mohan Singh called a conference of all senior officers at his residence to discuss the plans for the forthcoming conference to be held at Bangkok.

He revealed that he had to take 90 delegates there on behalf of Indian P. of W. He went on to say that he proposed to take only 30 delegates and 60 proxy votes.

My own feeling was that at Bangkok we were likely to be committed too far and was not in favour of Indian P. O. W. participating in such a conference. In the discussion that followed some misunderstanding arose over the selection of delegates and from Neesoon, the biggest P. of W. camp in Malaya, only one delegate and not a single proxy vote was sent to the conference.

On account of this misunderstanding the same evening I was relieved of the command of Neesoon Camp and was ordered to proceed to Kuala-Lumpur, with working parties of prisoners of war.

Stay at Kaula-Lumpur

I arrived at Kaula-Lumpur by a goods train early in June and was appointed Commander of all P. of W. parties in Malaya. My duty was to tour all P. of W. stations in Malaya and put up their grievances to the Japanese General Head Quarters which was at Kaula-Lumpur.

At Kaula-Lumpur I was ordered by the Japanese to assemble all troops for the Garrison Commander's inspection. The Japanese Commander addressing the P. of W. said, "I welcome you all and am very pleased to have you under my command. We regard you not as P. of W. but as our brothers as we are all Asiatics. It is the most ardent desire of all Japanese people that India should achieve its independence as soon as possible and to enable you to participate in the fight for freedom we have made arrangements for rearming and training you for that purpose." I realized

that the Japanese were out to exploit the Indian P. of W. who resented taking up arms.

I explained to the Japanese Commander that the question of Indian Independence was an affair of the Indians and that the Japanese had no right to force any Indian against his wishes to participate in it. He agreed with me and it was decided that in future the Indian P. of W. would be asked to do only labour and other P. of W. duties.

A similar trouble arose at Seremban, where on refusal of the P. of W. to take up arms the Japanese fixed machine guns all round their camp, put the Camp Commander Lt. Ghulam Mohd. 3/16' P. R., in a cell and gave the P. of W. 24 hours to think about it and decide, after which if they still insisted they would all be shot.

I heard about it and at once rushed to Seremban, with the Japanese G. H. Q. decision given at Kuala-Lumpur, and after a great deal of persuasion I was able to make the Japanese there to see our point of view so that future trouble was averted. In a similar manner I visited all Indian P. of W. camps in Malaya and ensured that they were not coerced to take up arms or undergo any form of military training under the Japs.

At Kaula-Lumpur the Japanese tried to teach the Indian P. of W. Japanese foot drill, words of command and saluting. I refused to allow them to do so, although it will be interesting to know that the English prisoners of war in Rangoon did this.

While holding this position I managed to secure for the Indian P. of W. excellent living conditions--very likely the best given to any P. of W. in the Far East.

- (a) Food was excellent--eggs, fish, chicken and vegetables.
- (b) Work was moderate and pay was given regularly.
- (c) There were adequate arrangements for the recreation of troops; they played hockey, foot-ball, etc. Cinema shows were given in camps and troops could go out and see any picture by paying 10 cents.
- (d) P. of W. soldiers could go out of their camp on a pass given by their unit commanders from 10 A. M. to 4 P. M. daily, and on holidays officers could go out in Mufti and visit any civilian friends from 10 A. M. to midnight.
- (e) On Fridays Muslims were allowed to go and say prayers in the Jumma Masjid, and Hindus and Sikhs could go to their respective religious places in the town on Sundays.

S. & M. Men selected for execution

On one occasion when I was out of the station on tour, the Japanese took away 23 N. C. Os. belonging to 42 Fd. Pk. Coy R. Bombay S. & M. on the accusation that they were too pro-British and selected some of

them for execution and made them sign their last will. When I returned from tour I found this and at once went to the Japanese G. H. Q. and requested them to hand over my soldiers to me. I told them that I was supposed to be the Commander of Indian Troops and that, in principle, it was wrong for the Japanese to deal direct with my subordinate officers and take away the men under my command without my knowledge.

Finally I told them that if they insisted on doing this I would resign from my appointment. They then told me that I could take away 15 of them and the rest they said they must execute as they were too "Pro-British" and being Japanese prisoners they were still insisting that they had taken an oath to be loyal to the British King. They said they could not allow such Indians to live. I explained the full significance of this oath to them and told them that the normal procedure for dealing with any serious offence in the Indian Army was to hold a court of enquiry and I assured them that I would go very thoroughly into the case, and if in the end the court found their offence of a serious nature I would myself hand them over to the Japanese for punishment. They eventually agreed to this and I brought back all the twenty-three N.C.Os. safely to their unit, held a court of enquiry and released all of them.

In Dec. 1942 I was recalled to Singapore. During the period of my stay at Kaula-Lumpur as commander of P. O. W. in Malaya.

- (a) I served them to the best of my ability. Many a time I had to travel by goods train without food and had to face insults and humiliations from junior Japanese officers for the sake of the men I commanded.
- (b) I refused to allow the Japanese to exploit in any way the Indian P. O. W. for their own ends and at the same time secured for them good treatment.
- (c) I always upheld the honour and prestige of my country and refused to accept any racial superiority of the Japanese.
- (d) I also induced the Japanese not to arrest any Indian soldiers who had turned civilians during the War and were honourably earning their living. The case of one Sy. Abdul Matlab of 2/16 P. R. who had opened a tea shop at Serembam Railway Station is a typical one.
- (e) At Kaula-Lumpur I helped the Indian destitute civilians as much as I could. There were scores of them dying of starvation. I requested all P. O. W. to fast for one day in a week and send all the food thus saved to them. The Japanese Commander, on coming to know of this, was so impressed that he gave 90 sacks of rice a month for the destitute camp which we were supporting.
- (f) At Singapore in May 1943, the Japanese ordered officers of 2/12 P. F. R. to provide three hundred men to do guard duties over

Japanese aerodromes. The men refused to go, but the Japanese insisted and it looked as if a serious situation would develop. Sub Fazal Dad Khan of 2/12 F. F. R. then approached me and informed me of the critical situation that had arisen. I went to the Seletar Camp with Sub. Fazal Dad Khan, talked to the Japanese Officer and succeeded in convincing him that it was wrong to persuade P. O. W. to take up arms. After this the unit was never troubled by the Japs.

I was recalled to Singapore in September 1942 and one of the first things I did was to go and pay a visit to all the P. O. W. Camps in Singapore, where there were large numbers of men from my area. All along during my stay in Singapore I had been most concerned about the welfare of the P. O. W., whom I quite often used to visit and distribute among them my I. N. A. pocket money, and clothing and medicine.

There was the case of one P. O. W. Jem. Mirsaman, 2/10 Balauch Regt., who had an ulcer in the stomach ; the doctor said that he would not survive. I took him to my bungalow, kept him with me for over 4 months and through good nourishment, completely cured him and then sent him back to rejoin his unit which was still a P. O. W. unit. There are several such instances.

On recall from Kuala-Lumpur, I was appointed a Commandant O. T. S. which had to be disbanded after a few days, by order of Capt. Mohan Singh, who had some misunderstanding with the Japanese.

I took full advantage of this situation and together with other members of my "Block" persuaded Capt. Mohan Singh to disband the I. N. A. I did so because I knew that the Japanese were trying to exploit us.

I joined the 2nd I. N. A. in Feb. 1943—on being told that Netaji S. C. Bose would be coming to Singapore to take over its command.

At this time I also realized that whether we liked it or not, the Japanese were definitely going into India.

I also realized that the fight would, in all probability, be carried into Indian territory as I did not think that the British forces would be able to stop the Japanese advance.

I had also seen with my own eyes the indiscriminate looting and raping in Malaya, and I did not wish it to happen in India. I felt that by going into India we would be able to stop this, or at any rate, I would be much more useful to my country with a rifle in my hand to save the life, property and honour of Indians, than as a helpless prisoner of war in Malaya.

I, therefore, set about to collect such men for the I. N. A. who would be prepared to fight even against the Japanese if they proved dishonest, and this fact has been established beyond doubt even by the prosecution witnesses.

Netaji's arrival and its effect on me.

When Netaji arrived in Singapore, I watched him very keenly. I had never seen or met him before, and did not know very much about his activities in India. I heard a number of his public speeches, which had a profound effect on me. It will not be wrong to say that I was hypnotized by his personality and his speeches. He placed the true picture of India before us and for the first time in my life I saw India, through the eyes of an Indian.

I was most impressed by his selflessness, his absolute devotion to our country, his frankness and his refusal to bow before the Japanese wishes. I knew that in his hands India's honour was safe; he would never barter it for anything in the world. Also when I heard him give a free choice to everyone in the I. N. A. to leave its ranks if they were not prepared to make extreme sacrifices and his warning to those who stayed on in the I. N. A. to be prepared to face, "thirst, hunger, forced marches and in the end death" and when with my own eyes I saw the enthusiasm of thousands of poverty-stricken Indians in the Far East, who gave to the I. N. A. all that they possessed and whole families joined the Azad Hind Fauj and became "Fakirs" for the sake of their country. I knew we had a *real* leader; and when he, in the name of millions of poverty-stricken, unarmed and helpless Indians, appealed

to us to come forward and sacrifice our lives for their liberation ; no honourable Indian could have refused this much to him.

I found a leader and decided to follow him, and for me it was the greatest and the most difficult decision of my life, i.e., of fighting against my kith and kin, who were in the British Indian Army in very large numbers, and whom, I was certain, I could never induce to see eye to eye with me.

At the back of my mind was the traditional urge of loyalty to the King. I owed all my education to him. My family and my tribe were one of the privileged classes in India. They were all prosperous and contented. This, too, we owed to the British Government and I knew that no change in India would bring them any more prosperity. In fact they were likely to suffer by it.

But on the other hand, when I thought of the "starving millions" who were being ruthlessly exploited by the British, and were being deliberately kept illiterate and ignorant to make this exploitation easier, I developed a great hatred for the system of rule in India, which to me, it seemed, was based on "injustice" and to remove this injustice I decided to sacrifice my everything—my life, my home, my family and its traditions. I made up my mind to fight even against my brother if he stood in my way, and in the actual fighting that followed in 1944, we actually fought against each other. He was wounded. My cousin and I were fighting each other in Chin Hill, almost daily for two months.

In short the question before me was the King or the Country. I decided to be loyal to my country and gave my word of honour to my Netaji that I would sacrifice myself for her sake.

Differential Treatment

Another thing, which has always upset me, has been the difference of treatment between an Indian and a British soldier.

I saw with my own eyes that as far as fighting was concerned there was no difference. The Indian soldier stood his ground and fought to the last. Why then there should be so much difference in their pay, allowances, food and living conditions I have never been able to understand. It seemed to me to be extremely unjust.

Secondly, I would also like to point out that the I. N. A. was raised, organized, trained and led in the field entirely by Indians. Comparatively junior officers commanded Divisions and Brigades; O., C. Os. commanded battalions, and under the circumstances, they did not do it "too badly." But on the other hand, out of 2½ millions of Indians in the Indian Army, not a single officer was given the command of a Division, and only one Indian was given the command of a Brigade.

There were some very senior and competent Indian officers in the Indian Army, and it appeared to me that the lack of talent could not have been the reason for more Indians not getting higher com-

mands. This also appeared to my mind to be very unjust.

I was a soldier and once I had taken the decision I concentrated on fighting from the first to the last.

In September 1943, Netaji decided to select a picked Regt. consisting of the cream of I. N. A. and send it into action to form the spearhead of the advance into India. It was known as "Subhas Brigade" and I was selected to command it. The Brigade took part in fighting in the Arakan, Haka-Falam' and in the vicinity of Kohima.

In December 1944, I was appointed Commander of No. 1 Division which was at Mandalay then.

In February 1945, when No. 1 D. III H. Q. was at Pyinmama, Netaji came there and told me that No. 2, a fresh Division of the I. N. A., was moving to the front in the vicinity of Popa, and that unfortunately its Division Commander Col. Aziz Ahmed had been injured in an air raid. He, therefore, ordered me to take over its command. I did so, but in April 1945 I had to fall back to Pegu, where I was captured by the British forces.

In joining the I. N. A. I was prompted only by motives of patriotism. I fought a straightforward and honourable fight on the battlefield, against most overwhelming odds. I was further handicapped by lack of proper medical, transport and ration supplies, and for long periods I, with my troops, had to live on paddy and jungle grass, when even salt was a luxury for us.

During these operations I, with my men, marched over 3,000 miles in Burma

I gave good treatment to the British troops, whom my soldiers captured, and expected to receive the same treatment for my troops when they surrendered as Prisoners of War.

Finally Sir ! I wish to bring to your notice, and to the notice of my country, that no mercenary or puppet army could have faced the hardships as the I. N. A. did. We fought only for India's Independence.

I do not deny having taken part in the fight but I did so as a member of the regular fighting forces of the Provisional Government of Free India who waged war for the liberation of their motherland according to the rules of civilised warfare and to whom the status of belligerency had been accorded by the British Forces opposing us. I, therefore, committed no offence for which I can be tried by a Court Martial or by any other Court.

As for the charge of abetment of murder, even if the facts alleged by the prosecution were true, I could not be held to have committed any offence. Mohd. Hussain, who had voluntarily joined the I. N. A. and submitted himself to its discipline, admittedly attempted to desert and to induce others to desert at a very critical juncture. If he had succeeded in his attempt he would have carried all information about the force under my command to the British, which would have meant complete dis-

aster for us. Under the Indian National Army Act and under the Military Codes of all civilised nations, the offence attempted to be committed was the most serious and heinous one punishable with death. It is, however, in fact wrong that I sentenced him to death or that he was shot in execution of a sentence passed by me. Mohd. Hussain and his companions were only informally produced before me, there being no crime report drawn up. I only very strongly admonished Mohd. Hussain and told him that he had committed an offence for which he could and should be shot. I, however, left the matter there and asked the case to be put up again before me or the Regimental Commander who had in the meanwhile been vested with the power to try such cases, if the men concerned attempted to misbehave a second time. The case never came up before me again presumably because the contingency never arose.

PART II
COL. P. K. SAHGAL

II

COL. P. K. SAHGAL

AZAD HIND FAUJ

(1)

LIFE STORY

1. Born on the 25th March 1917 at Hoshiarpur (Punjab).

Father. Mr. Justice Achhru Ram, a lawyer from Jullundur.

Mother. Shrimati Rattan Devi from Hoshiarpur.

Early childhood. Mostly spent at Jullundur—was very much interested in the Arya Samaj in the early days. Attended the 1929-30 Congress session at Lahore. At that time a student of Doaba High School, Jullundur. On return from Lahore took active part in the non-co-operation movement and was an active member of the Jullundur Students Union.

Move to Lahore. End of 1930, my father moved to Lahore to practise at the High Court and the whole family moved with him. I matriculated from the Central Model High School, Lahore, in 1932 and joined the Government College, Lahore.

Government College and the Indian Military Academy. I passed my intermediate in 1934 and in 1935 sat for the competitive examination of

entrance to the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun. I was successful and joined the I. M. A. in 1936. I was commissioned with effect from the 29th January 1938 and after attachment with a British Unit, I was posted to the 5th Bn. of the Baluch Regiment.

Malaya. In 1940 I was transferred to the 2nd Bn. of the Baluch Regt. and sailed for Malaya with the Bn. in October 1940. I landed in Singapore on the 11th November 1940 and after a stay of about a fortnight there, my Bn. moved to Kota Bharu in Kalantan State on the North-East Coast of Malaya. At the end of November I was promoted an Acting Captain.

Kota Bharu. Soon after our arrival in Kota Bharu my Bn. was allotted the task of beach defences and throughout 1941, we spent most of our time preparing these defences. I was commanding a company which was given the task of defending eleven thousand yards of the beach.

Malayan Campaign. The Japanese landed in Kota Bharu on the night of the 7/8th December 1941. By the morning of the 9th Japanese occupied Kota Bharu aerodrome and the town. At midday on the 9th I was allotted the task of commanding a mixed force which was acting as rear guard to my brigade. On the 11th I rejoined my Bn. and we fought our way down the Mainland of Malaya. During this time the Company distinguished itself in action on more than one occasion.

Battle of Singapore. We crossed the Johore crossway on the night of 30/31st January and on arrival

in Singapore we were sent to the vicinity of the Sambawang aerodrome, with a counter-attack role in case of landing on the East Coast. The Japanese landed in Singapore on the morning of the 8th Feb. 1942. The initial landing took place in the part of the front which was held by the Australians and it was preceded by a very heavy artillery barrage. The Australians did not stand up to the Japanese onslaught and fell back in disorder. On the 10th my Bn. moved out to counter-attack and 11th Ind. Div. to which my Bn. belonged drove the Japanese back into the sea but as the Australian front had completely collapsed, therefore we also had to fall back. My Bn. was involved in heavy fighting throughout the battle of Singapore. I was captured by the Japanese on the 14th February and Singapore surrendered on the 15th Feb.

Ceremony at Farrear Park. On the 10th Feb. all the Indian troops were marched off to the Farrear Park, where on the 17th they were handed over to the Japanese by Lt. Col. Hunt. The Japanese in their turn handed the Indians over to Capt. Mohan Singh, G O. C., I. N. A.

Prisoner of War. On the 18th Feb., my Bn. went to Neesoin Camp where I met Lt. Col. N. S. Gill. On the 19th Lt. Col. Gill told me that he was going to form a headquarters in the Neesoin camp to administer the Indian prisoners of war and asked me if I would like to take charge of the Adjutant General's branch of this H. Q. I

accordingly posted to the H. Q. in that appointment. My work consisted of keeping the records of Indian Officers and soldiers and preparing nominal rolls or other routine returns which were demanded by Captain Mohan Singh's H. Q. I continued to carry out these duties until these H. Qs. were dissolved.

Bidadari Resolutions. In April 1942, Capt. Mohan Singh and the companions returned from Tokyo and a conference of Senior Officers was held in Bidadari Camp. I was present at this conference. Four resolutions which later came to be commonly known as Bidadari resolutions were passed and Officers and men were asked to volunteer on these resolutions. I did not trust the Japanese and I also felt that there was no sense in asking Officers and men to volunteer on the basis of those resolutions. I was of the opinion that if volunteers are to be asked for, they must be asked for participation in Indian War of Liberation. Therefore I refused to accept these resolutions and went to Tengali Aerodrome camp which was a non-volunteer camp. When representatives were going to Bangkok, I was asked if I would like to go. I refused to go because I thought that these people were wasting their time and nothing substantial would ever come out of all these conferences.

Joining the I. N. A. Delegates from the Bangkok Conference returned to Singapore in the month of July and at the end of that month Capt. Mohan Singh sent for me and asked me to assist in

the organisation of the I. N. A. I consented to do so and later realising that Capt. Mohan Singh really meant business, I volunteered to join the I. N. A. I finally made up my mind to join the Indian National Army because I felt that the Japanese were absolutely determined to go to India and if they were accompanied by a really strong I. N. A. the Japanese would not be permitted to commit the same atrocities as they had committed in Malaya and other countries in East Asia and also if they did not honour their pledges regarding Indian Independence, a well armed and organised I. N. A. would be in a position to put up an armed opposition against them. After joining the I. N. A. I was posted to H. Q. 1st Hind Field Force Group where I stayed until the I. N. A. broke.

Crisis in the I. N. A. The I. N. A. under orders of Gen. Mohan Singh was broken at the end of December 1942. I was one of the few officers who were opposed to the idea of breaking up the I. N. A. I was convinced that if we broke up the I. N. A. Japanese would revive a puppet army, through which they would be able to exploit the Indians. I was also of the opinion, that having once started an Indian Independence movement, we had no excuse for inaction, specially when the Indians in India had asked the British to quit and the British were employing every possible weapon of oppression to break their indomitable will to be free. Mr. Rash Behari Bose further clarified the issues and the news that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose was coming to the

Far East, finally helped the majority of the Officers and men of the I. N. A. to reorganise the I. N. A.

Directorate of Military Bureau. The I. N. A. was reorganised under the Director of Military Bureau and I was appointed the Military Secretary in the Directorate.

Arrival of Netaji. On arrival of Netaji, the Directorate of Military Bureau was reorganised into H.Qs. Supreme Command and I continued in my post of Military Secretary. In the course of my duties I came into very close contact with Netaji and soon became one of his closest and most trusted associates.

Arrival in Burma. Netaji with the Head Quarters of the Provisional Government moved to Rangoon on the 6th January 1944. I followed him and reached Rangoon on the 20th January. H. Q. Supreme Command was set up in Rangoon and I being the senior most Officer present in the H. Q. took charge of them, in addition to my duties of Military Secretary; I was also performing the duties of Assistant Chief of Staff and Deputy Adjutant General. In February came the news of the wonderful exploits of the I. N. A. in the Arakans. Soon afterwards No. 1. Division moved towards the Manipur front.

Mamiyo. Netaji left Rangoon on the 8th April and moved to Mamiyo with the members of the Provisional Government preparatory to going to Imphal. Lt. Col. Habib-ur-Rahman arrived in Rangoon on the

6th April and I handed over the charge of the H. Q. in Rangoon to him. On the 15th April, I went to Mamiyo and stayed with Netaji and I returned to Rangoon on the 5th May.

Rangoon Again. I once again took charge of the H. Q. in Rangoon and Col. Habib-ur-Rahman went to the front. Netaji returned to Rangoon in June 1943. I stayed in Rangoon with H. Q. Supreme Command until October 1943. During this time No. 1. Division had to withdraw back and I was responsible for making arrangements to meet their requirements on arrival in the back areas. Arrangements had also to be made to prepare No. 2 Division which was arriving in Burma, to move to the front. In September Netaji returned to the front to meet No. 1 Division and on his return we had long discussions about our future action. Netaji was determined that in the coming operations No. 2 Division must give a good account of itself and he wished to send his most trusted Officers with the Division. I had been carrying out staff work ever since the inception of the I. N. A. and was very keen to participate in active operations; therefore I requested Netaji that I should be given command of No. 5 Grla. Regt. in No. 2 Division which was to be reorganised into 2 Inf. Regt.

In October 1943 Netaji went to Japan to confer with the new Government of Japan. At the end of October I left Rangoon to go to the front to visit units No. 1 Division. I returned to Rangoon

in the beginning of December and left the H. Q. Supreme Command on the 9th December 1944.

No. 2 Inf. Regt. I took over command of No. 5 Grla. Regiment on the 10th December 1944. Later on I organised this regiment into an Infantry Regiment which meant the addition of some 600 men and certain new weapons such as Mirtans into the Regiment. Intensive training was carried out to enable the regiment to fight as a field regiment in War.

On assuming the command of my regiment, I spoke at great length to the Officers and men of each unit under my command. I told them that they should have no illusions as to what was in store for them when they went to the front. I impressed on them that in the front line they must be prepared for hunger, thirst, conditions of great hardships and great dangers and finally death. Any-one who was unwilling or unfit to face these conditions was given the option of staying behind at the base and a certain number of men who were either unwilling or unfit to proceed to the front were left behind in Rangoon and no action whatsoever was taken against anyone.

Netaji's Inspection. On the 26th January 1945, Netaji inspected my regiment in Rangoon and warned them regarding the hardships and dangers in the front line and once again anyone who did not feel himself mentally or physically fit to proceed to the front was given the option of staying behind.

Move to the Front. On the 28th January, my regiment started its move to the front. The regiment was moving in parties of 250 Officers and men which left Rangoon every alternate day, by train. I left the same night by car for Pruna. At Pruna I made arrangements regarding transport and ration, etc., for the second stage of the journey (from Pruna to the front) which the whole division was doing on foot.

On the 31st at Pruna I issued the administrative orders for the second stage of the move for the whole division.

On the 3rd February I came back to Rangoon and on the 4th reported to the Supreme Commander the arrangements I had made for the move of the whole division.

On the 8th February I was notified by H. Q. Supreme Command that the role of my regiment was the defence of Popo Hill.

On the 12th February there was heavy bombing in Rangoon in which Col. Aziz Ahmed, the Divisional Commander, was injured; therefore I took charge of the advance H. Q. of the Division which was also moving to Popo.

I left Rangoon on the night of the 13th Feb. and the next day I spent at Saku Army H. Q. (Japanese Army H. Q. under whose unified command my division had been placed for operational purposes). I discussed the war situation in Burma with Major-General Iwakuro, the Chief of Staff of Saku Army

We also came to an agreement as to how No. 2 Division could best fulfil its role.

I arrived in Yomayang, the H. Q. of the Yomamoto Division, which was operating in the left of the Sector allotted to No. 2 Division. On the 17th February, here I learned that the British had already crossed the Irrawadi river and that No. 4 Grla. regiment of the I. N. A. had been badly wanted. I discussed with Major-General Yomamoto the measures to be adopted to meet the new situation and I immediately returned to Popoa.

Popoa Area. I arrived at Popoa in the early morning of the 18th, and met Maj. G. S. Dhillon who had withdrawn there with the remnants of No. 4 Grla. regiment. From him I learned the details of what had taken place on the Irrawadi River. I gave him orders to immediately reorganise his regiment and get them ready for battle and with all available men of my regiment I took up a defensive position covering Mount Popoa and also issued instructions to carry out intensive patrolling in the whole area.

On the 22nd Feb Col. Shah Nawaz came to Popoa and told me that he was going to take over command of the division. I acquainted him with the current situation and on the 23rd he left Popoa to report the situation to the Supreme Commander who was in Meikhu area. The day after Col. Shah Nawaz reached Meiktila; that town was attacked by the British and Shah Nawaz could not get back to Popoa therefore once again I assumed temporary command of the division.

On the 23rd Feb. I received orders from the Saku army to carry out Guerilla Warfare in front of Mount Popoa to help the Japanese forces which were counter-attacking the British forces east of Irrawadi. I detailed No. 4 Grla. regiment for this task.

Just about this time Khanji regiment of the Japanese army arrived in Popoa to help in the defence of Mount Popoa. An agreement was arrived at with the Command of the Khanjo regt. according to which he assumed the responsibility of holding the road Popoa—Myingyian and my regiment took up defences in the Popoa—Pynbin and Popoa—Kyank Padaung roads.

During this time the enemy was also carrying out active patrolling in our areas and there were many clashes between ours and their patrols; but the enemy patrols never stopped to give fight. This had a wonderful effect on the morale of the Officers and men under my command.

On the 1st March I sentenced S. O. Ganga Saran to death because he had refused to go out with a patrol when ordered to do so by his Battalion Commander. Later realising that he was capable of doing good work, I cancelled the punishment.

On the early morning of the 2nd March, five officers from the Divisional Headquarters deserted and went over to the enemy. They carried with them full information about our organisation, arms, equipment

and disposition. This was a great blow and had a very bad effect on the morale of the Units.

After the desertion of these officers I became certain that the enemy would take full advantage of the knowledge of my weak points and with the small garrison at my disposal I could not possibly defend Papao effectively against an organised attack by the British. Therefore I decided that in my case offensive was the best form of defensive and I issued instructions to carry out sorties into the enemy occupied areas. The enemy seemed to be very chary to give a pitched battle to any of our attacking units with the result that the morale of the officers and men went up very high.

On the 4th March a fighting patrol of my regiment put to flight an enemy patrol and captured two Jeep cars and a wireless set and a quantity of arms and ammunitions.

On the 5th March enemy about 500 strong supported by tanks approached the position held by the 1st Battalion of my regiment. This enemy was met by two Platoons (total strength about 40 men) and after trying to get past them, during the whole day, withdrew back in the evening.

On the 12th March Col. Shah Nawaz came to Papao and took over command of the Division.

On the 13th Dhillon's regiment went into attack and drove the enemy out of Tongram area.

On the 15th March I went to Pynbin with two Companies from my regiment to attack the enemy.

positions. The attack was coming out at night and the enemy on our approach left their positions and ran away. We encountered only one patrol which was annihilated. In this action the men marched 60 miles through desert, attacked four enemy positions, all in 36 hours and on one gallon of water per head for drinking, cooking and washing purposes.

On the 20th March Col. Shah Nawaz ordered me to undertake the defence of Kyank Padam—Meiktila road, because the enemy threat from that side had become very menacing. I sent the 2nd Battalion of my regiment for that task.

On the 21st March Capt. Bagri with one Company of the 3rd Bn. of my regiment went to Kalyo area and made contact with a mechanical column of the enemy supported by tanks and artillery. The fight lasted for about one hour and then the enemy withdrew back.

On the 23rd I went to inspect my Bn. positions on the Kyank Padang - Meiktila Road. I also carried out detailed reconnaissance of that area and sent a patrol to Meiktila to bring back detailed information of the enemy disposition in that area. On receipt of this information I was convinced that if we could drive the British out of Meiktila, then it would be a simple affair to clear the enemy from our own area. I also had information that the Indian troops of the British forces at Meiktila were likely to join us if tackled properly. Therefore I prepared plan of attack in Meiktila by our force and submitted it to my Divisional Commander

who agreed to it. Unfortunately Meiktila was outside our Divisional area and the Japanese did not agree to our carrying out an attack in the sector. They thought that they were strong enough to deal with the enemy in that sector, on their own.

On the 27th March I got orders to attack Pynbin in co-operation with the Japanese and No. 4 Grla. Regiment.

On the night of the 29th March I left Popa with an advance party in a car and a truck. Remaining troops followed on foot. Near Seiktin my party was ambushed and one battalion of the enemy opened fire on us from about 25 yards. I had 14 bullet holes in the radiator of my car. We had to abandon our vehicles and fall back. But soon, we counter-attacked with one Company of No. 1 Battalion, and as our troops went into attack, the enemy abandoned their positions and ran away. We recovered all our vehicles.

The troops under my command took up a defensive position in Lagyi area. On the morning of the 30th an enemy battalion came to Seiktin area about 1500 yards away from my position. This battalion spent the whole day firing ineffectively towards us but did not approach anywhere near us.

On the 31st an enemy mechanical column attacked and surrounded a Japanese Company in Kaley. One Company of my 3rd Battalion under the command of Capt. Bagri attacked and drove away the British forces and managed to bring back Japanese

wounded officers and men who had been abandoned by the Japanese.

On the evening of the 2nd April an enemy force about 2000 strong, supported by tanks and artillery approached my defences from two directions, but when our troops opened fire the enemy withdrew back.

Earlier in the day thirteen enemy planes bombed and machine-gunned my defences for about 40 minutes and afterwards enemy artillery kept on firing at us until 9 P.M. that night.

One enemy lorry approaching our position was captured.

On the 3rd April, one complete British Division, supported by 13 medium tanks, 30 light tanks and 30 armoured cars and field and heavy artillery started an attack on our position. Our force consisted of No. 1 Battalion and one Company of 3rd Battalion. Our only defence against the enemy tanks were our suicide squads consisting of men volunteered to tie explosives round their body and crash into enemy tanks, thus blowing them up.

Enemy's first attack against my 'B' echelon in the rear was successful and the enemy came in behind me cutting me off from Popa.

After that the enemy made four determined efforts to attack and break through from my right flank and one attack was made to break through in the left flank, but all these attacks were beaten back with heavy casualties to the enemy. Throughout the day we were under very heavy artillery fire.

In the evening I collected two platoons and attacked the enemy Battalion which had got in behind me, this attack was entirely successful and the enemy was driven back.

By that night the troops under my command were tired and completely exhausted. So arrangements were made for one Japanese Battalion to move up and relieve my units.

I reached Popa in the morning of the 4th April.

Withdrawal from Popa. On the 5th April owing to the general situation in Burma, No. 2 Div. I. N. A. was ordered to move to Magwe and Natmuk Tandangwyi areas. My regiment was to move to Tandangwyi and Natmuk areas and the Div. H. Q. and No. 4 Grla. regiment were to move to Magwe area

The withdrawal commenced on the 9th April, Units of No. 4 Grla. regiment were the first to withdraw. On the morning of the 11th, the British forces occupied Kyank Padaung and our direct line of withdrawal was cut off. Therefore it was decided that the Division Headquarters, remainder of No. 4 Grla. regiment and No. 2 Inf. Regt. would attempt a break through along the jungle route that very night. In the evening the enemy attacked and surrounded one of my Companies which was on outpost duty and all efforts to relieve them were unsuccessful. Later on I was informed by a British Intelligence officer that the attacking British Force sent a note to me of the Havildars commanding a platoon to surrender. The

platoon Havildar of the I. N. A. wrote on the back of the note that had been sent to him, "Mr. I do not come," and his platoon died fighting to the last man.

The withdrawal was carried out on the night of the 11th and although the units were ambushed on the way, they managed to assemble in the Kyank Pudaung—Meiktila road by the morning of the 12th.

On the afternoon of the 12th I received a note from the Commander of my special service Company, whom I had sent on ahead, informing me that a very strong Mechanical British Column had already moved from Meiktila towards Natmuk. I placed the information before the Divisional Commander and we both agreed that my regiment should move along the bullock cart tracks and if we found Natmuk under enemy occupation, we were to head further south.

On the night of the 12th I separated from the Divisional Commander, who headed for Magwe and I went towards Natmuk.

On the 17th April I divided my force into two columns, one column under Capt. Bagri went on ahead and the second column was under my personal command.

On the 13th morning I arrived in the vicinity of the Natmuk—Magwe road. I had already received information that Natmuk was in enemy hands and that an enemy column was moving towards Magwe. I decided to break through the enemy positions that night. Both the columns managed to do so quite safely. After another 3 nights' march we approached

Taundangwyi—Magwe road, and found the enemy in possession there also and once again we broke through his positions. Now I ordered the regiment to head for Allanmys.

Capt. Bagri after breaking through the enemy position for the second time moved one day's march ahead of my column. At Yamatha Captain Bagri's column came into contact with an enemy mechanical column supported by tanks and armoured cars. Captain Bagri destroyed two tanks and two lorries and inflicted about 50 casualties on the enemy. Capt. Bagri himself made the supreme sacrifice in this battle and on his death Lt. Sher Singh took over command of his column. After the incident at Yamatha the column under Lt. Sher Singh got on the main road and withdrew back to Prume, where it came under the command of Lt. Col. B. S. Nagi, my second in command, who had been sent there with the advance party.

The other column under my command was unable to get on the main road, but proceeded along the track following the Irrawadi river. I got information that one enemy Brigade was following behind me and that another mechanical column, i.e., 20th British Indian Division, was moving along the main road towards Allanmys. My column reached the vicinity of Allanmys on the 27th and the same day Units of the 20th British Division occupied Allanmys. Realising that it was not possible to get through that way I fell back about 10 miles to Magyigaon.

On the 28th at Magyigaon I called a conference of all the officers under my command and acquainted them with the whole situation. I told them that there were three courses open to us :—

- (a) Break through enemy line and make our way to Pegu Yomas.
- (b) Turn into civilians.
- (c) Surrender to the British.

I explained to them that I, for myself, had decided on the first course and I would, with those who wished to follow the same course, attempt a break through that night but I would not stand in the way of any one who wished to follow any of the alternative courses. I ordered them to explain everything to the men under their command and inform me regarding their decision. Eventually two hundred officers and men volunteered to follow me and about three hundred said that they wished to surrender and about 50 wished to turn civilians and those people were allowed to go away immediately.

I made all arrangements to break through that night and issued instructions for the others under Maj. Chatterjee's command of the hospital to surrender to the British Forces the next day.

In the afternoon I was attacked by a Gurkha column which had been following us. Now it became impossible to break through and as the majority of the officers and men wished to surrender therefore I wrote a letter to the Allied Commander offering the surrender of the Officers and men under my

command as prisoners of war. I sent this letter through Capt. Banta Singh, who also carried a flag of Truce.

The officers and men who were with me had marched over three hundred miles of desert in enemy occupied areas. The only food available was what we could carry on ourselves and we had been constantly menaced by enemy aeroplanes. On four occasions we had broken through the enemy lines and by now we were completely exhausted.

The British Commander accepted our surrender and we laid down our arms to the 4/2nd Gurkha Rifles. If the British Commander had not accepted our surrender as Prisoners of War, the officers and men under my command were determined to fight on till the end.

Captivity. On the evening of the 28th Lt. Col. Kitern ordered the officers to be separated from the men and when I spoke to him about this, he pointed out that this was the usual procedure with the Prisoners of War. On my giving an assurance to him that if he allowed my officers to stay with their men for that night only, I would hold myself responsible for the conduct of the officers to rejoin the men.

That night the guerillas were attacked by the Japanese but there was no incident among my men, although our surrendered arms and ammunition were stacked quite near us.

On the morning of the 29th I was first taken to H. Q. 32nd Brigade and later H. Q. 20th Div. Two

British and two Indian soldiers were detailed as guards on us, but I was permitted to keep my bat. men with me.

On the 31st April I¹ was sent to a Prisoner of War Cage in Magwe and later the officers and men who surrendered with me also arrived there. Here I also learned that the other column under Lt. Col. Nagi had been captured near Pegu and taken to Rangoon.

At Magwe, I was interrogated at 2 F. I. C. on the 12th May. I left Magwe by air and landed at Dohazani and from there was taken by train to Chittagong. On the 13th I was taken by train from Chittagong to Ziggergaru near Calcutta. I left Ziggergacha by train on the 18th and was brought to Red Fort, Delhi, on the 20th. I was kept in a cell during interrogation up to the 7th June and was then moved to the cage.

(2)

REASONS FOR JOINING THE I. N. A.

Background.

My father had taken an active part in the 1920-21 non-co-operation movement and from him I inherited an intense dislike for the alien rule. Added to this my own study of History and Political Science taught me that complete freedom was the birth-right of every human being and it was the sacred duty of every Indian to fight for the liberation of his motherland. In 1930, I got the first opportunity to participate in the non-violent struggle for Indian Independence. I was far too young and immature to understand the real significance of non-violence. I was only carried away by the urge to do something vital for my motherland and I followed the creed because it had been decreed by the Indian leaders. I did not fully understand the views expressed by various Indian leaders, but I felt certain that if we all did our bit, victory shall certainly be ours. When we failed to achieve our coveted goal, I felt disillusioned. To me it seemed futile that my countrymen and women should have to make such terrible sacrifices and endure such sufferings, fighting against an Imperialist power, which was determined to keep India in her bondage. I felt that the only language the British

would ever understand was violence. The terrorist movement in India appeared to me to be too weak and unco-ordinated to achieve anything vital. I did not know what to do and felt at a loose end and eventually decided to wait and allow coming events to decide my future action.

My father had intended me to follow in his profession of law and I was attracted by it. About 1932 the Government of India issued their scheme for the Indianisation of the Army. It was a new and attractive opening for the young men of India and I made up my mind to try my hand at soldiering. My plans were quite naturally opposed by my family, but I stuck to my decision. My father consoled himself by thinking that, owing to my bad record with the police, I would never be accepted in the Army. However I was successful in the open competition examination and went to the Indian Military Academy in 1936. Although I had often dreamed of a military rebellion in India, but when I joined the army, I had no set plan, my only ambition was to become a successful soldier.

After being commissioned, I did a year's attachment with two British Units and I grew to like the average type of Englishman. I made many friends and I found that I could get on well with most Englishmen. A vast majority of my English friends were very ignorant about conditions in India but they were quite willing to learn. I did not consider myself too well informed on the subject, but whatever little I

knew, I told my friends and found them sympathetic. Once an average Englishman was convinced that the Hindus and Muslims would not fly at each other's throat, as soon as the British had turned their backs on India. He was prepared to admit that it was sinful for the British to stay in India.

After finishing my attachment with the British Units I joined the 5th Bn. of the Baluch Regt. Majority of the officers in the Bn. were Indian and politically conscious. There was hardly anyone among the officers, who wished for the continuance of the British rule.

End of 1940 I was transferred to the 2nd Bn. of the Baluch Regt., which was not an Indianised Bn. There was a very good set of British officers in this Bn. and I made a number of friends. The "C. O." was specially kind to me and always listened to my advice and it was seldom that he rejected any of my requests. But I met a number of other Indian officers who were not quite so fortunate as I was. They were badly treated by their commanding officer and brother English officers.

Malaya.

I arrived in Malaya at the end of 1940 and was horrified to learn the contempt and hatred shown towards the Indians who had settled down there. The following three reasons were mainly responsible for this :—

- (a) The British had always used Indian soldiers and policemen.

- (b) The Indian money-lenders in Malaya were reputed to be worse than Jews.
- (c) The Indian workmen in Malaya accepted lesser wages than the workmen of other races.

I also found that colour distinction in Malaya was much worse than in India. Asiatics were not admitted into clubs and hotels and an Asiatic was not permitted to travel in the same railway compartment as a European. There were certain Europeans who started a press campaign in the Singapore press advocating that Asiatics should not even be permitted to travel in the same buses and trams as the Europeans.

End of December 1942, my Bn. moved to Kotaballim in Kelantem State. On arrival there I found that the local population was absolutely terrified of the Indian soldiers. I soon discovered the reasons for it. At the end of the First World War, there was an uprising in Kota Bharu and the British sent a company of Punjabi troops to quell the rebellion. These Punjabi troops were very brutal in their dealings towards the local Malays. The following incident will clearly show, how much the Kotaballan people hated the Indian soldiers.

I became very friendly with the Deputy Prime Minister Dato Stein—of Kelantam State. One day I was sitting with him, when his little son came running and started talking to his father in an excited manner. I asked the Dato what the matter was and

he explained to me that his son was very angry to see him talking to me, a Punjabi (Kota Bham Malays called every Indian soldier a Punjabi) because, according to the little boy, all Punjabis were wicked and the enemies of the Malays.

I and a number of other officers did our best to bring about a better relationship between our soldiers and the Malays. I was very lucky in having a number of very good friends among high Malay officials who were of great help and by the time the war started, the relations between our soldiers and the Malays had become really cordial. The Malays are a charming people but they do not care a great deal about their political future. However, I found that the educated Malays resented the inferior social status that was accorded to all Asiatics in Malaya, by the British.

In June 1941, we heard the news of the firing in the Indian labourers and the British action was naturally resented by all Indians. I often discussed the British Imperialistic ways with the other British officers in my regiment and expressed my opinion that the British preached one thing and practised another.

Witness. Lt. Col. P. W. Davis—The Baluch Regiment.

The Malayan Campaign.

By the end of November 1941, it became obvious that war with Japan was imminent. I had read about the Russo-Japanese war and admired the Japanese

for the courageous manner in which they had fought and defeated the Russians. The remarkable progress that the Japanese had made in a short time and the way that the Japanese had risen to be a first class power, in spite of the opposition of all the great powers of the world, was in my opinion a wonderful achievement and worthy of praise. But I hated them for their aggression against China and the cruel atrocities that they had committed in China, Manchuria and Korea.

The British propaganda about their war aims had also impressed me and I felt that their democratic and liberal form of government was far to be preferred to the Fascism of the Axis. In any case I felt that if the British won the war they would be compelled to meet Indian's demand for freedom and if they were defeated, we would achieve our object through a negotiated pact.

Therefore, when the war started, I fought loyally and to the best of my ability. The company which I commanded, distinguished itself in battle on more than one occasion and whenever there was a difficult mission to be carried out, I was invariably singled out for it. I had the full confidence of my C.O. and the Brigade Comdr. both of whom often commended the work done by my company.

During the campaign, I felt very much disappointed in the British leadership. The British strategy had been a complete failure and the top leaders stood discredited. The behaviour of many British officers was far

from correct, instead of leading their men, they seemed to be more concerned with their own personal comfort and safety. The callous manner in which the interests of the Asiatic people of Malaya were disregarded hurt me terribly. We had not only let down the people whom we were supposed to protect but they were also subjected to many insults and hardships and often exposed to great danger because of the insolent and callous behaviour of the British officers. Many Asiatics, including a number of Indians, were shot without any trial, on the suspicion of being enemy agents.

The fall of Singapore finally convinced me of the degeneration of the British people and I thought that the last days of the British Empire had come.

February to September 1942:

After the surrender of Singapore, I felt terribly let down by the British, who had handed us over to the Japanese and told us to obey their orders the same way as we had been obeying the orders of the British. I felt that if a British general could be forced to agree to such a handing over, the British nation must have such a pretty low level.

I also felt that the British were not in a position to check a Japanese invasion of India. Little attention had been paid to the preparation of the defence in India's North Eastern frontiers and the best Indian troops had been sent out on service overseas. The British officers and men during the Malayan Campaign had shown a marked disinclination to fight for

preservation of the overseas possessions of the British Crown.

In spite of my disillusionment with the British. I was far too distrustful of the Japanese and their intentions. I was horrified by the atrocities committed by the Japanese, and their economic exploitation of Malaya clearly showed the hollowness of their bombastic claims about the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and their war for the liberation of the Asiatic people.

I was in sympathy with Capt. Mohan Singh's cause but I did not think that we could do any good to India by allying ourselves with the Japanese. That is why, I did not accept the Bidadari resolution and refused to attend the Bangkok conference.

The Bangkok Conference.

In July the delegates from the Bangkok conference returned to Singapore. This conference was the first concrete step that had been taken in the Indian Independence movement. The international character of the Bangkok conference and the exhibition of the spontaneous desire of the Indians in the Far East to fight for Indian Independence, were most encouraging. I was also impressed by the resolution passed at the conference. These factors together with the following other considerations influenced me to join the I.N.A. :—

(a) It was quite evident that an Indian National Army was going to be raised and if the really sincere and patriotic officers kept out of it, it would be quite easy for the Japanese to

exploit their army. On the other hand, if the army was strong enough and had the moral courage to oppose the Japanese, then the Japanese would not be able to take an unfair advantage of the I. N. A.

- (b) The Japanese appeared to be absolutely determined to invade India and we knew that the British in India were not strong enough to resist such invasion. Therefore, it was our duty to organise and make ourselves as strong as possible. So that when we accompany the Japanese into India, we shall not only be in a position to protect our countrymen and women from the cruelties of the Japanese but we should also be in a position to put up armed resistance against the Japanese if they did not honour their promises.
- (c) The Indians in East Asia had been left, by the British, at the mercy of the Japanese. These Indian were also hated by the Chinese and other Asiatics, therefore it was our duty to organise ourselves to provide protection for the two million Indians of East Asia.
- (d) General Tojo and other members of the Japanese Government had made repeated

announcements about the Indian independence, whereas the British Imperialists had turned a deaf ear to all demands by the Indian Nationalists. Also, from the general behaviour of the Japanese it appeared that they were really sincere about Indian Independence movement.

(e) On the 8th of August 1942, the Congress Working Committee passed their famous "QUIT INDIA" resolution. To us it was tantamount to declaration of war on the British. When the Indians in India had declared war on the British Empire, what right had we to remain idle ? Our countrymen and women in India had decided to wage an unarmed and non-violent struggle against the weight of the British Empire and another Empire had offered us the arms and the opportunity to fight the British Empire and we naturally accepted it.

Soon came the harrowing tale of the British oppression in India. Our blood boiled when we heard that the British had bombed their peaceful cities and villages, fire had been opened on peaceful processions and innocent women and children were killed, Indian women were insulted and beaten by the British soldiers, a number of villagers in East India were laid waste and burned by the soldiers of the mighty British Empire and the oppression of the most horrible form, reminiscent of the

medieval times had been let loose to break the will of India to be free.

In these circumstances the historical urge, to be free—to smash the people who had inflicted such pain and suffering on the men and women of my country—asserted itself and I willingly volunteered myself to fight the British Imperialism for the freedom of my motherland.

Witnesses. Capt. R. M. Arshad, Capt. J. W. Roderques and Capt. G. M. Hussain.

Crisis and the Second I. N. A.

In December 1942, there was a crisis in the I. N. A. The main cause was the distrust of the Japanese and the fear that they would exploit the I. N. A. for their own ends. Majority of the officers were in favour of breaking up the I. N. A., but I was against it. I was of the opinion that in the I. N. A. lay our only strength and if we broke it we would be playing the Japanese game because, they would certainly raise a puppet army and use it to further their own purposes. I advocated that we ought to change our own ranks and strengthen the movement. We ought to make ourselves so strong that the Japanese would be forced to meet our demands. Another danger of breaking the I. N. A. was that we would have exposed the two million Indians in East Asia to the dreadful vengeance of the Japanese. In any case I thought it was sinful for us to sit idle and do nothing, while our countrymen and women in India were undergoing such terrible sufferings in their unarmed struggle against the British.

In the beginning there were very few who agreed with me, but the Japanese soon showed their hands. They began propaganda to raise a puppet army from amongst the civilians and certain prisoners of war. This caused a change of views among the majority of the officers who decided to reorganise the I. N. A. At this stage we were determined not to repeat the mistakes which we had committed in the previous I. N. A. Admissions to the new I. N. A. were made purely voluntary and only those officers and men were asked to join who were willing and prepared to fight the Japanese as well as the British, if they stood in the way of Indian Independence. The Japanese also realising the value of a really sincere army, gradually gave up their ideas of raising an alternative army and agreed to most of our demands.

News that Mr. Subhash Chandra Bose was coming to the Far East to take over the leadership of the Indian Independence movement, removed all our remaining doubts and we joined the I. N. A. whole-heartedly.

Witnesses. Capt. R. M. Arshad. Capt. S. M. Hussain

Arrival of Netaji

To say that Netaji's arrival in the Far East put a new life into the movement is putting it very mildly. His presence in East Asia electrified the Indian people and there was a spontaneous and overwhelming response to his demands for total mobilization of men and material.

I had the good fortune of making very close to him and came completely under his spell. I differed from him on many points and never hesitated to point out these differences to him. He invariably listened to me sympathetically and if I was right he did not hesitate to admit it. In course of time I became one of his closest associates and had the privilege of being in his complete confidence. He bestowed so much love and affection on me that he became more than a commander to me—he became my cherished friend and *guru*. In April 1944 I spent a fortnight with him in Maymyo. At that time he did not have very much work to do and every night he used to send for me in his room and talk to me until the early hours of the morning. That has been the greatest and the best education that I have ever received.

One of the greatest lessons he taught me was that it was our duty to fight and sacrifice ourselves for the freedom of India, but it was selfish to wish for the freedom to come in our life-time. He pointed it out to me that to work for Indian Independence and hope to see her free was not enough, our work and sacrifices must be free from such selfish thoughts. Our fight was for the 400 million peoples of India and our greatest reward would be to lay down our lives so that coming generations of India could live the lives of free men and women. This gave me a new angle from which to view our Independence movement. I also realised that our struggle was only one phase of the great struggle that had been going on within India, since the battle of Plassey. The final outcome of the

world war, that was then going on, receded in importance. I was a soldier whose job was to continue fighting till the end and have unshakable faith in final victory. Then it became clear that chances of an Axis victory were slender, the ideal kept me from being depressed. The same ideal urged me, at the end of 1944, to volunteer to go to the front and take an active part in the operations. There was little hope then of advancing into India, but I did not want to miss the opportunity of actively fighting the enemies of India. My dearest wish was granted and my regiment was pitted against a purely British division.

In my opinion the sanctity of our cause did not permit that any one should be kept in our ranks against his wishes, therefore, before my regiment moved to the front I gave every one the option of staying behind if they were unwilling to go to the front. On arrival at the front I once again gave the officers and men under my command, the option of going back if they did not wish to participate in the fighting and I also showed my willingness to permit people to go over to the enemy if they were desirous of doing so.

The officers and men under my command fought gallantly against the heavy odds. In every encounter with the enemy, they came out victorious. I can say with pardonable pride that the traditions of courage and selfless devotion to duty that these officers and men have created, the future of a National Army of India would do well to follow. They were small in

number and poorly equipped, and they fought a gigantic army equipped with the most modern weapons. But these men were inspired by the sanctity of their mission and their loyalty to India and their leader Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. These inspired their spiritual strength against the material strength of their enemy. Many of them made their supreme sacrifice in the execution of their duty. I would have considered it a great honour to have died with my comrades in the field of battle but this privilege has been denied to me.

(3)

THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF 4 MEN OF
NO. 4 GRLA. REGIMENT.

War Situation. By the beginning of March 1945, the war situation in Burma had become most critical for us. Mandalay and Meiktila had already fallen. There was a danger of enemy advance from Meiktila towards Kyauk Padang and our forces on the Meiktila—Kyauk Padaung road were far from adequate to check such an advance.

One enemy column was advancing towards Tangthu, which was the Head Quarters of the Japanese Division on our right.

On our own front the enemy was in position in Pyibin and Tamgran—both places only about 20 miles from Popa. Enemy patrols had approached Kyauk Padang and within 6 miles of Popa. A full scale enemy attack in Popa was expected at any time.

No. 4 Grla. Regt. could produce only nine hundred men for action and only half of No. 2 Infantry regiment had arrived in Popa. These troops were far from sufficient to defend Popa and Kyauk Padang against an enemy attack. Nor were the defence work in Popa anywhere near completion. We were bluffing the enemy by constant offensive

action in his own area and revelation of our weaknesses and the true state of defence could have been suicidal for us, at that stage.

State of No. 2 Division. On the 1st of March 1945, 4 senior officers of H. Q. No. 2 Div. had deserted from Popa and they had carried with them full information regarding the strength, arms, equipment and dispositions of the I. N. A. units in Popa and Kyauk Padang areas. Their desertion was a terrible blow to the morale of all ranks of the I. N. A. in Popa area. After their departure it had become very essential to adopt very severe measures to check any more desertions.

No. 4 Grla. Regiment had taken a long time to recover the blow that it had received in Nayangu and Pagan. The discipline in the regiment was not quite satisfactory and unless stern action was taken against all cases of indiscipline the morale and the fighting efficiency of the regiment would have suffered considerably.

No. 4 Grla. Regt. was reviewed by Netaji in Rangoon before it proceeded to the front (May 1944) and an option to stay behind was given to anyone who did not wish to proceed to the front. On assuming the command of the regiment, Lt. Col. G. S. Dhillon repeatedly spoke to the officers and men under his command and told them that those who were unwilling to go into the battle, should let him know and he would arrange to send them back to the rear areas and no disciplinay action would be

taken against them. He went so far as to say that if there was anyone who did not wish to openly confess his unwillingness to stay in the front line, he could be sent back under the excuse of some physical ailment.

In December 1944, eight deserters of No. 4 Grla. Regt. were captured and brought up before Col. G. S. Dhillon. He pardoned them all, but warned his officers and men that no mercy to such people shall be shown in future.

Before the regiment moved to Nayangu-Pagam area a number of men who were unwilling to participate in the battle were sent back without any disciplinary action being taken against them.

After the battle of Pagam a letter was received from the Supreme Commander, directing the I. N. A. Commanders in the field that no mercy should, in future, be shown to deserters and those who show cowardice in the face of the enemy. The contents of this letter were made known to all ranks of the regiment, and once again the members of the regiment were informed that those unwilling to stay on in the front line, could go back to the rear areas. They were also warned that henceforth no mercy whatsoever will be shown to those who either desert, or show cowardice in the face of the enemy.

The desertion. In accordance with No. 4 Grla. Regt. operation order No. 2 (Exhibit SSS) No. 2 Bn. at the end of Feb. 1945. established a Grla. activity in Tamgrin area.

On the 28th Feb. Sub-Officer Khiali Ram and five men deserted from No. 2 Bn. and went into hiding in a Burmese village. They wrote a 'letter in Urdu and Roman Hindustani, offering their surrender to the British and promised to give them valuable information about the I. N. A. dispositions. They gave this letter to the village head man, to take it to the British Commander in that sector. The village headman, instead of taking the letter to the British, delivered it to the Coy. Commander of the deserters.

The Company Commander concerned sent a patrol to recapture the deserters. The patrol sent surrounded the village and the deserters opened fire on the patrol. However all the deserters except the sub-officer, who had got away, were captured. One of the captured deserters later tried to run away, but was shot by the guard.

The Trial. The deserters, sepoys Duli Chand, Hari Singh, Daryao Singh and Dharam Singh, were produced before their Bn. Commander who investigated their case and sent them to Popa for trial by the Regimental Commander.

The Regimental Commander once again investigated the case and being satisfied that the men had actually committed the crimes for which they were charged, he handed them for trial by the officiating Divisional Commander.

The case was brought before me as I was the officiating Divisional Commander, on the 6th March 1943.

The men were charged with desertion and attempting to communicate with the enemy. The accused pleaded guilty. Lt. Col. G. S. Dhillon informed the Divisional Commander that he had repeatedly offered the chance of returning to the rear to those persons, who did not want to remain in the front line and that no one in his regiment was made to participate in battle against his wishes. The accused admitted that they had been given this option and that they had not taken advantage of it and they also admitted that they had been given the warning that all deserters would be shot.

After due investigation, I, as Divisional Commander, sentenced the four accused to death. Consideration of the existing war situation and the fact that the accused were in a position to give a valuable information to the enemy about our dispositions, precluded any merciful treatment of these men.

Powers of Punishment. According to the I. N. A. Act, the Supreme Comd. of the I. N. A. had unlimited powers. *Vide* his letter dated 21st February 1945, he vested the Divisional Commander with the powers to give death sentence. On the 3rd March the Supreme Commander had sent me a telegram vesting me with full powers of punishment.

After the desertion of the four senior officers of the Div. Hqrs. the Supreme Comd. vested all Commanders in the field with full powers of punishment. In addition orders were received that even a sepoy could shoot anyone found trying to desert.

(4)

LETTER OF SURRENDER

To

The Allied Commander,

I, with five hundred officers and men of the Indian National Army under my command, wish to surrender to the Allied Forces as "PRISONERS OF WAR "

**(Sd.) P. K. SAHGAL,
Lt. Col.**

28th April 1945.

Comd. No. 2 Inf. Regt. I. N. A.

(5)

SATEMENT IN THE COURT

I deny being guilty of any of the offences with which I have been charged. I also maintain that my trial before this Court Martial is illegal.

After serving one year's attachment with a British Regiment, I joined the 5th Battalion of the Baluch Regiment in February 1940. In October 1940 the O. C. of my unit was asked to send a suitable officer to fill up the vacancy of a Company Commander in the 2nd Battalion of the same Regiment which was proceeding overseas on active service. I was specially chosen for being posted to the 2nd Battalion.

I disembarked at Singapore with my new unit on 11th November 1940. A fortnight later we were sent to Kota Bharu in Kelantan State, where we were entrusted with the task of the preparation and manning of beach defences. Major-General Murray Lyones, then Commander of Northern Area in Malaya, Major-Gen. Barstow, Commander of the 9th Indian Division, Lt. Gen. Heath, the Corps Commander, and Lt. Gen. A. E. Percival, G. O. C., Malaya Command, inspected our work and complimented me on the very remarkable work done by my Company.

During the Malayan Campaign, the Company that I commanded distinguished itself in more than one

encounter with the Japanese. Although, generally, we were fighting a retreating battle, on occasions we were able to take the offensive and inflict very heavy losses on the enemy. On one occasion my Company annihilated a Japanese Force, approximately 500 strong, and captured a large quantity of enemy arms and equipment. This incident was noticed in the Press.

During the night of the 30/31st January 1942, we crossed the Johore Baru Causeway and reached Singapore. Although my Battalion had been in action without a break from the day the hostilities started and had suffered heavy casualties, and its officers and men were completely exhausted, and their morale was low owing to constant withdrawals and intense enemy air activity, they had immediately to undertake the defence of Singapore.

The Japanese landed in Singapore on the 8th February and on 10th February we marched out to counter-attack the enemy and drove them back into the sea in the Wood-lands area. Unfortunately, the next day we were ordered back to relieve the Australians in the Mandai Hill area. While we were moving along the Mandai Road, the Japanese launched an attack. The Australians abandoned their positions and ran away and the Japanese got possession of the high features on both sides of the Road. We were caught on the Road and my Company, which was the leading Company of the Battalion, suffered most heavily. My Company Subedar and three other men

of the Company H. Qrs. were killed within five minutes. The Company Head Quarters were cut off from the rest of the Company and although the Japanese beckoned my men to go over to them, I managed to reassemble, in an hour or so, the whole Company except three or four men whom the Australians had taken away with them. The Company was completely separated from the rest of the Battalion and we continued fighting on our own until the afternoon when we managed to rejoin the Battalion. The same night we were withdrawn to Neesoon where we stayed for twenty-four hours. The Japanese made three or four determined attacks to break through our positions but we did not allow a single Japanese to go through and the enemy lost three medium tanks in the engagement. During the night of the 12/13th February we were withdrawn to Biddadari where we eventually surrendered.

As we were withdrawing southwards on the mainland of Malaya, I was often approached by the Indians living in those areas. They all asked me the same question :—" You are leaving us behind, what is going to become of us ? We contributed all we could for the defence of Malaya and now why do you leave us at the mercy of the enemy ? The Chinese and Malays all hate us. They will loot and plunder our property, disgrace our women and murder us." There was little that I could do, or even say, to help them. The only thing that I could tell them was to trust in God, and to hope for the best. My heart went out in sympathy to them but I felt helpless and

ashamed because I was unable to do anything for them.

On 17th February 1942, in a meeting held at the Ferrar Park in Singapore Lt. Col. Hunt, as the representative of the British, handed over the Indian Officers and men, to the Japanese like a flock of sheep. This came as a great blow to us all. The Indian Army had fought bravely against the heaviest odds, and in return the British High Command had left them completely at the mercy of the Japanese. We felt that the British Government had, on its own, cut off all the bonds that had bound us to the British Crown and relieved us of all obligations to it. The Japanese handed us over to Capt. Mohan Singh, who was styled as the G. O. C. of the Indian National Army and we were left free under him to fashion our own destiny. We *bona fide* believed that the British Crown having ceased to provide any protection to us could no longer demand allegiance from us.

After formally taking over the Indian Officers and men, Capt. Mohan Singh proclaimed his intention of raising an Indian National Army for the liberation of India. He was acclaimed by all those who were present there and they all raised their hands to show their willingness to join the Army.

When call for volunteers was made by Capt. Mohan Singh, large numbers of officers and men came forward to enlist. There were, however, some who while equally desirous to see their motherland free from all foreign domination, were sceptic of the in-

tentions of the Japanese in encouraging the formation of the Indian National Army, and I was one of them. I had a feeling that the Japanese only intended to exploit the propaganda value of the proposed Indian National Army but had no desire of helping the cause of Indian freedom. I, therefore, in spite of my most ardent desire to see my country free at the earliest possible moment, refused to volunteer. In May 1942 volunteers were separated from non-volunteers and I with my Battalion was sent to the Tengan Aerodrome Non-volunteer Camp where I stayed as a non-volunteer till the end of August 1942. During this period no pressure of any kind was brought to bear upon me or other officers or men in my camp numbering about ten thousand to volunteer for the I. N. A. The rations provided to us were, considering the prevalent circumstances, quite good and medical aid was satisfactory.

In June 1942, I was invited to attend the Bangkok conference but I declined the invitation. However during the period between June and the end of August 1942 events of very far-reaching importance took place which compelled me to revise my earlier decision to keep out of the Indian National Army. In the first place, the Japanese forces met with the most astounding successes in every theatre of the War and an attack on India appeared to be imminent. Every one thought that the Indians would soon be exposed to a Japanese onslaught and even the B. B. C. London sent them messages of sympathy in their coming misfortune. The last Indian drafts that had arrived

to reinforce Singapore consisted only of raw recruits and gave one a fair indication of the type of men available for the defence of India. Officers who came to Singapore shortly before its surrender told us that there was no modern equipment available for the army in India. I was told that the soldiers were being trained with wooden rifles and light machine guns and that the defences of the North Eastern borders of India were almost non-existent. Every one of us felt convinced that if the Japanese invaded India, there was none to resist their advance. This was a most distressing thought for all of us.

In the second place, on the 8th August 1942, the Congress Working Committee passed the famous "Quit India" resolution. Countrywide demonstrations followed the passing of this Resolution. The All-India Radio Delhi and B. B. C. drew a curtain over the happenings in India. However, certain secret stations, supposed to be functioning somewhere in India, and the Japanese and other Axis-controlled Radio Stations outside India broadcast freely about these happenings and the measures taken by the Government to suppress the freedom movement. From the details broadcast by these stations a veritable reign of terror, similar to the one that had followed the Revolt of 1857, seemed to have set in. In view of the complete reticence of the British and the Indian Press and the official broadcasting agency on the subject, we had no reason to doubt the correctness of these broadcasts. Needless to say that they filled us with most terrible anxiety concerning our near and dear ones whom we had left behind and

with the bitterest resentment against the British Imperialism which seemed to be bent upon keeping our country under perpetual subjection.

I and those of my friends, with whom I was on intimate terms, every day discussed amongst ourselves the very critical situation then existing in India and the best way in which we could help her. We knew only too well the fate that would be in store for our countrymen—when a new foreign power invaded India. The British Government claimed the sole responsibility for the defence of the country and had with contempt rejected the offer of her own leaders to take charge of and organise such defence. The information we had about the state of the defence in India was by no means encouraging and the most optimist amongst us could not be sure of the ability of the British to stop the Japanese advance. The civilian population could not even think of organizing any resistance and must submit to untold sufferings and hardships. The "scorched earth policy" which the British Government had already decided upon, and even begun to follow, must add very considerably to the disaster. After protracted discussion the only solution that we could think of for our country's problems was the formation of a strong and well-disciplined armed body which should march into India side by side with the Japanese army, and while fighting for the liberation of India from the existing alien rule, should be able and ready to provide protection to their countrymen against any possible molestation by the Japanese, and to resist any attempt by the latter to establish themselves as rulers.

of the country in place of the British. This being also the avowed object of the Indian National Army, the question that began to agitate the minds of us, who had so far stayed away from that Army was whether it was not our duty to join that Army for securing the freedom of our country—not so much from the British who could hold her no longer but from the Japanese who were bent upon invading India. The protection that the Indian National Army had already been able to give to Indian life, property and honour in Malaya and Burma seemed to furnish another very strong argument in favour of joining it.

For days I passed through a terrible mental struggle. On the one side was my loyalty to my former comrades with whom I had fought shoulder to shoulder and on the other was the urge to save my mother-country from the horrors that stared her in the face. After a great deal of careful thought and deliberation I came to the conclusion that I must join the Indian National Army, which must be built up into a strong, well-armed, well-equipped and disciplined force, dedicated to the cause of India. Every soldier of the Army must be prepared to make the supreme sacrifice for the sake of India, and the Army must be prepared to fight even the Japanese if they attempted to harm the Indians or to establish themselves in India.

I did not join the I. N. A. through any fear of Japanese ill-treatment or from any ulterior or mercenary motives. In September 1942, as an I. N. A. Captain I only received eighty dollars a month whereas, if I had

stayed out of the I. N. A. I would have received one hundred and twenty dollars a month.

I joined the I. N. A. from purely patriotic motives. I joined it because I wanted freedom for my motherland and was ready to shed my blood for it. Another reason why I joined it was that I wanted to safeguard the honour of Indian women and the lives and property of my unarmed countrymen in Burma, Malaya and India. I joined for a noble cause and I never stooped to coerce or even to persuade any one to join the I. N. A. against his wishes. So far as I am aware, nobody ever coerced any one to join the I. N. A. The recruitment to the I. N. A. to my knowledge was purely voluntary. The evidence given by the prosecution on this point is false. In any event, I had nothing to do with any of the alleged atrocities and have no knowledge about them. From the very beginning I was convinced that our strength lay in our selfless devotion to our cause and my aim was that our army should be composed of only those who were willingly prepared to shed their blood for Mother India. For this very reason, before proceeding to the front, I explained at great length to the officers and men under my Command the noble ideals for which the I. N. A. had been raised and I also told them the grave dangers, difficulties and hardships that lay in the way of the fulfilment of those ideals. I warned every man that if he was not willingly prepared to fight and suffer for those ideals he need not proceed to the front. Many who did not consider themselves physically or mentally fit to participate in the operations decided to stay

behind. They were not subjected to any force or humiliations nor were they punished in any way. They were all transferred to the Reinforcement Group and left behind in Rangoon. On arrival on the front line, I gave another chance to those who did not wish to continue in the front line to return to the base. Those who took advantage of this offer were returned to Rangoon without being punished.

When I arrived in Popa, as I did not consider it honourable that any men should be kept in the ranks of the units under my command and made to fight against their wishes, before going into action, I expressly and publicly told all the men under my command that such of them as were desirous of going over to the British could do so at that time provided they left their arms behind and went in one organized party whom I assured a safe conduct through our lines.

I count a number of Englishmen and women among my very best friends. Against the English people I never cherished any enmity. To the officers and men under my command I had issued explicit instructions that any prisoner of war captured by them, be he of any nationality, was to be treated kindly.

Till the end of November 1944, I was Military Secretary in the Headquarters Supreme Command, I. N. A., and for a time officiated as Assistant Chief of the Staff. In December I was given the command of a Regiment which fought in the Popa Area. I took part in this fight as a member of the regularly organized fighting forces of the Independent Pro-

visional Government of Free India which fought according to the rules of civilized warfare for the liberation of my motherland from foreign rule. I claim that in doing so I committed no offence. On the other hand I have served my country to the best of my ability. I claim further that I am entitled to all the privileges of a Prisoner of War. In my Note of the 28th April, 1945, to the Commander of the British Forces to whom I and the Officers and men fighting under my command surrendered at Magyigaon, (the receipt of which Note is admitted by the Headquarters, Bahadurgarh Area, in their letter No. J 900/50, dated 12th October 1945, but which was stated in the letter to be "unavailable") I said quite plainly that we were ready to surrender only as Prisoners of War. On receipt of this Note, surrender was accepted without objection to the terms on which we had offered to surrender and after the surrender we were actually treated as Prisoners of War. Had we been told that surrender on the terms offered by us was not acceptable to the British Commander, we were determined to fight on and were in a position to do so because we were nearly six hundred strong, fully armed and equipped, and each one of us was prepared to shed the last drop of his blood for the sake of his country.

From the 13th February to the 12th March 1945, I was officiating as Divisional Commander in the absence of Col. Shah Nawaz Khan. In my capacity as Divisional Commander I had to try on 6th March 1945 four Sepoys, Hari Singh, Duli Chand, Daryao

Singh and Dharam Singh who had been committed for trial by Col. G. S. Dhillon for offences of desertion and attempting to communicate with the enemy, under Sections 35 and 29 (c) of the Indian National Army Act. They were found guilty and were sentenced to death. The sentence was, however, not carried out, the convicts, like many others who were similarly tried and sentenced about that time, having been pardoned on their expressing regret and giving an assurance not to misbehave in future. The fact of the sentence having been passed, was, of course, used for its propaganda value in order to deter others from deserting.

Even, however, if the sentence had been carried out, I could not be charged with the offence of abetment of murder. The four culprits had voluntarily joined the I. N. A. and had submitted to its discipline, and had voluntarily and willingly agreed to participate in the coming fight. They, having shamefully deserted while in action and in the face of the enemy, had committed an offence punishable with death under the Indian National Army Act and under the Military Law all the world over. The information which they sought to convey to the enemy would have meant the complete annihilation of the entire force under my command. The sentence was passed after proper trial in the exercise of authority lawfully vested in me.

Although the Indian National Army failed to achieve its primary object of liberating India, every one of us has the satisfaction that it fully accom-

plished its objective of protecting Indian life, property and honour in Malaya, Burma and other parts of South East Asia against all aggressors. The telegrams that I have received, after the commencement of this trial from the President of the Indian Christian Association Rangoon and the President of the Burma Indians' Association and which I am attaching to this statement bear ample testimony to this.

PART III
COL. G. S. DHILLON

III
COL. G. S. DHILLON.

AZAD HIND FAUJ.

(1)

LIFE STORY

Parentage

Father.—S. Thaker Singh Dhillon, V. A. S., retired from the Army after a long service of 32 years.

Mother :—Shrimati Karani Kaur Dhillon.

Brothers :—

- (a) The eldest, Gurdial Singh Dhillon, is a Jemadar Head Clerk in the Army. I have learnt that he has asked for his release from the Army because of my trial.
- (b) The elder, Balwant Singh Dhillon, is also a Jemadar in the R. I. A. S. C.
- (c) The younger, Amrik Singh Dhillon, is a Ranger in the Forest Department.

Home Address : Village Chak No. 32, P. O. Chhanga Manga, Tehsil Chunian, Dt. Lahore.

Childhood. Born at Algon in Lahore District in March 1914. My first recollections are those of Base Remount Depot. Deolali, where father was a Head Veterinary Surgeon. I used to take great

interest in watching incoming and outgoing troops and a large number of horses.

Education. I went to different institutions as below :—

- Primary.* (a) A private tutor at Deolali.
 (b) Primary School, Chhangamanga.
 (c) Middle School, Pattoki.
 (d) Primary School, Chak 32.
- School.* (a) Govt. High School, Chunian. I joined the Boy's Scouts Movement.
 (b) Govt. High School, Dipalpore.
 (c) D. B. Middle School, Raewind.
 (d) Victoria Dalip High School, Solan in Bhaghat State (Simla). I continued scouting in this School.
 (e) D. A. V. High School, Montgomery. It was in this school that I became interested in the Congress Non-co-operation Movement, and started wearing Khadar, writing National poetry, but a very early end was put to it by father who was a pro-British and anti-Congress. My inward sympathies, however, continued for the Congress.

I also took interest in learning about Arya Samaj and am one of its admirers up to to-day.

College. Gordon Mission College, Rawalpindi. My subjects were those of Medical Group with an intention to join Medical College. I did not pass the F.Sc. examination and eventually could not join the Medical profession. I have always missed the profession ever since.

In this College I got a chance to learn about Christianity, a religion I have always liked. Through a Muslim friend, a son of a Judge, I learnt a great deal about Islam and ever since have admired the religion. In short I have no religious prejudices.

In the Army. Failure to join the Medical profession, in spite of father's wish to try again, caused a great disappointment. I did not want to be a burden to him any longer, and requested him to allow me to join the Army. He agreed and I was enlisted as a recruit on 29th May 1933.

Recruiting was a difficult job, but I passed the course with very good marks. The training at Ferozepore ended on 24th Feb. 1934, the day I was attested and sent to join my active Battalion 4/14 Punjab Regiment, then at Lahore.

A Sepoy. As a sepoy, my Platoon Commander a Sikh Subedar kept me in the background because I was educated and belonged to a different district from that of his. Uneducated V.C.O's used to be very prejudiced against educated persons. A Muslim Jemadar Head Clerk was very kind to me during these difficult days and because of him, I selected to do an N. C. O. Training Course lasting 3 months. Luckily

I stood first in this course and was promoted Tem. Acting Unpaid Lance Naik due to the shortage of N.C.O'S.

A Mule Driver. Being in a light machine gun section, I had to take my turn to look after the section mule. Our mule (No. 36) was notorious for being the most troublesome animal in the transport lines. It had killed one man by kicking at a certain vital part of the body and had wounded many. None of my section fellow sepoys wanted me to do this job, but Platoon Commander wanted me to stop from attending evening classes in the Brigade, so that I may not pass the First Class English Examination which was to be held in the near future. His scheme worked according to plans, and as I had to attend the mule in the morning as well as in the evening, I missed classes and so could not take the examination.

During these days my wife Basant was staying with me in the married quarters. Disgusted with life, one day I told her that I was going to resign from the Army. She did not like my idea, and advised me to take permission from father. It so happened that while we were discussing this problem father turned up. I quietly told Basant to make no reference regarding my resignation to father, and myself went out to bring some milk. On my return father smiled at me and informed me that he was ashamed of a coward like myself. Basant had informed him about my intentions. He told me that he would ask my Platoon Commander to transfer me. I requested father not to do so, for my pride could not stand that my father should beg

for anything from a person so mean as my Platoon Commander. On this he said, "If you are so proud, then why are you crying?" With tears in my eyes I replied that I would continue to be a mule driver, but in case I was killed or wounded he should not repent. "Never," said he and continued "I have spent my life in horses and mules, take a tip that whenever you go to her give her 'gur' or 'roti' and she would become very tame" Father left that very evening. I acted on his advice and the mule became as tamed as a dog. I started liking the animal, now I had not to fear her, for she would follow me like a dog and beg for "gur" or "roti" by placing her neck over my shoulders or rubbing her nose on my chest.

Another difficulty left was, cleaning two sets of saddlery which I used to take to my quarter, where Basant would clean it and polish it so nicely that I always got a "shabash" from the transport officer. But poor Basant's hands used to bleed because of this rough work, yet she would not let me help her. She would say, "The time you want to spend on this work can better be spent in reading and writing so that on a day you could join the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun." She also used to clean my rifle and personal equipment for me, she became so efficient that she could criticise my turnout if there were any faults and promise it good.

Poverty as a Sepoy. Basant stayed with me for only about 5 to 6 months during which time we used to live within our pay. She had brought some money with

ther, which we spent all leaving eight annas. These 8 annas, we made up our mind to keep as a reserve. One day when we had no "atta" in the house, father happened to visit us. We had forgotten those eight annas, and were greatly worried that in case father found out the state of affairs we were in, he would be very much hurt. I went to the Regimental Bania, but there happened to be no "atta" in his shop. I did not like to borrow cash and was greatly upset, suddenly I remembered those 8 annas and ran back to my quarters. On reminding, Basant gave me the money and the situation was saved. Luckily while leaving father gave some money to Basant which came so handy.

Buying of fuel and rations used to leave us with practically nothing out of the pay, yet we wanted to pose out as if we were rich. I wonder how a poor sepoy can support his family. Thank God! we had no children. We never bought any clothes for us.

Kitchner College, Nowgong. Slowly and steadily by the help given to me by Jem. Head Clerk Atta Mohd. Shah, I was selected to do a prospective Cadets Long Course (2 years) at Nowgong in 1936.

I was an average student. Our course consisted of 30, out of this lot 13 were to be selected at the end of the course to do Cadet training in the Indian Military Academy. I was one of the selected.

At Nowgong, I came to be known as a good speaker or in any case loud speaker. I used to recite Hindustani poems rather well and at times also composed poetry. During my last turn there, I was elected the President

of the Gurdwara Committee. At times I used to go out on small shooting.

Indian Military Academy. Joined in 1938 and passed out in 1940 with date of commission being 26th July 1939. I was an average gentleman cadet and passed out 18th in a term of about 40.

1/14 Punjab Regiment. After getting the Commission, I was posted to 1/14, Punjab Regiment, then stationed at Lahore in the very lines where I had stayed as a Sepoy. In October, 1941, the Battalion moved to Secundrabad from where it moved for overseas in March 1941.

At Secunderabad, Basant came to stay with me for 42 days (19th Jan.—1st March 1941). During her stay, all officers called on me as a courtesy, which was the custom but the Colonel and the 2nd in command did not. It was the first time when I realized that officer or no officer I was an Indian, a member of an enslaved nation. While at Lahore, I had not been able to join the Officers' Swimming Club, this one was another insult. By the way I was one of those whom the C.O. liked and ours was an Indianized Battalion. When I told my feelings to some of the brother officers, I was surprised to learn many more stories of discrimination.

On 3rd March 1941 we were due to sail from Bombay for some unknown destination. I was the Baggage Officer. A certain Sergeant Major on the Embarkation Staff was rude to me. I overlooked as I did not wish to waste time on unnecessary unpleasant procedure of arresting him.

On about 5th March 1941, during a conference, I was shocked to hear the C. O. referring to the incident in a very angry tone without pointing out name. I was hurt and after the conference told him how I felt about it. The result was the C. O. did not talk to me throughout the voyage. Yet there were five British officers junior to me with whom he would often be seen drinking and chatting. My only consolation was that I was not the only officer being so treated, all the Indian officers, and all happened to be senior to me, were also treated accordingly.

We landed at Penang on 17th March 1941 and arrived at Ipoh on 18th March. All officers were staying at Majestic Hotel, Ipoh. In April I was in bed for about a week. I was surprised that the C.O., staying hardly about forty yards away, did not pay me a visit. I got a consolation, however, that he had not seen Major Kiani, his Adjutant, during the latter's illness, I was a junior guy.

We the Indians could not join the club. There are many unpleasant such like examples which I do not intend relating, for perhaps behaviour of individuals should not be taken as an excuse to blame a people.

On 7th May 1941, we moved from Ipoh to Sungi Patani. Here we had some unpleasantness with the C. O. and the 2nd in Command regarding Indian food and promotion and appointments of officers. We who were all regular officers were not given commands of Companies, but emergency commissioned British Tea planters and firm agents were given preference over us,

General Mohan Singh (a Major at the time afterwards a Capt.) and the C.O. had so much difference of opinion that they were not on talking terms for a long time.

About the middle of May 1941 Maj. M. Z. Kiani, the Adjutant, fell seriously ill and was removed to hospital. I became the officiating Adjutant and carried on up to 10th June 1941, when I left Malaya for India to do a Signal Course at Poona.

During my Adjutancy, I learnt a great deal of staff work from the C.O. This knowledge has proved very useful ever since. While I left him on 20th June 1941, he said, "Dhillon, I thank you for helping me as my Adjutant. I have found you much above my expectations and would be glad to receive you back." I thanked him in return and we said farewell to each other,

Signal Course. I landed at Madras on 3rd July 1941 and reported at the Training Depot, 10/14 Punjab, Ferozepore, on 6th July 1941. During the journey from Madras by rail, I saw the horrible sight of poverty, as I had not hitherto known. Begging children with bulged out tummies and naked bodies whom one could see at every stoppage, haunted me for days and nights. I became an enemy of the system which was governing the country. In spite of these feelings I continued serving. A mistake for which I cannot excuse myself. But what else could I do ? I did not want to be an unemployed.

I did the signal course at Poona from 4th Aug. to 4th Oct. 1941 and passed in an above, average position.

At Poona I met Gurdial Singh, my eldest brother, after about 16 years.

Malayan Campaign. After the course I had a month's leave and then landed back at Singapore on 30th Nov. 1941. I joined my Battalion on 5th Dec. 1941 at Jitra (North of Malaya). I took over the duties of the Battalion Signal Officer.

On 8th Dec. 1941 the Greater East Asia War broke out. 1/14 Punjab was the forward most unit which came into contact with the Japanese. After the battle at Chingham we were cut off on 11th Dec. 1941.

I collected some 40 men and was trying to rejoin our forces at Alorstar, while on 12th Dec. I met Capt. Habibul-Rehman Khan (recently wounded along with Netaji). We collected about 80 men of different units including British and made an effort to rejoin the forces, but Alorstar and Jitra had fallen. We sailed in a small boat or two from Kaula Kedah and on 15th Dec. 1941 landed at Miami Beach, Penang. Penang was being evacuated, we reported at 3 M. R. C. and under orders left the same day without having had any food or rest.

We were given commands of Companies found from M. R. C. and were ordered to defend a Bridge at Nibang Tibal until all forces had withdrawn from North of it.

On 20th Dec. 1941 we rejoined our Battalion at Ipoh. I was ill, and was evacuated to a hospital in Singapore. Having recovered I reported for duty at 7 M. R. C where I was given to officiate as Adjutant of the Indian Wing. During the battle of Singapore, I remained with 7 M. R. C.

It was very disgusting to note during those days that the Indian troops were not allowed to make use of Naafi Stores. In a conference of the Wing Commanders, when I suggested that the privilege should be granted to the Indian soldiers, all the British Officers turned it down, saying "It is against the regulations". I wonder why fighting side by side was not against them.

It was after the surrender that I rejoined my Battalion at Farrer Park on 17th Feb. 1942, and was handed over by Col. Hunt to the Japanese and then to Capt. Mohan Singh, the G. O. C., Indian National Army. Soon after Farrer Park meeting my battalion moved to Neesoon Camp. I accompanied.

P. O. W. After the surrender, the discipline and morale of troops suddenly went so low that men started beating their officers.

Just after being handed over to Mohan Singh Sahib, one day I had a long discussion with him regarding the I. N. A., which he wanted to raise. I asked for time to think over on my own. The question was the King or country? I chose the country and threw in my lot with him.

The condition at Neesoon Camp, where I was living was very bad. Due to lack of discipline,

dysentery had started. On permission from Mohan Singh, I addressed all officers and N. C. O's in that Camp. Main points of my talk were :—

- (a) Discipline
- (b) Sanitation
- (c) Dysentery.

Later on under instructions from Mohan Singh Sahib through Major M. S. Dhillon (who came over to the British in 1942) I gave two lectures to about 500 to 600 men at a time, with an idea to bring about :—

- (a) National Unity.
- (b) National Honour.
- (c) Discipline and Morale.
- (d) Feeling of Independence.

The main idea was that we were not sure as to what would be the Japanese attitude, and the amount of help we would receive from them. Whether we raised the I. N. A. or not the above points would be useful.

Main difficulties in those days were :—

- (a) Spirit of defeatism and so lack of sacrificing.
- (b) Poor discipline and morale
- (c) Communal-mindedness
- (d) Mohan Singh's juniority.
- (e) The Japanese element.
- (f) Pro-British persons.
- (g) Selfishness and opportunists.

Changi Garrison. On 11th March 1942 under instructions from Col. N. S. Gill I proceeded

to Changi Camp where British P. O. W. lived. I had 200 officers and men with me.

My Duties were :—

- (a) To supply sentry posts outside camps so that the P. O. W. do not escape or trouble civilians living just outside camps.
- (b) To patrol Changi area, for P. O. Ws. used to snatch food from local people by force and would destroy their crops. Some people had reported of rape cases.
- (c) To keep escapees (handed over by the Japanese) in my Garrison area until their handing over back to their respective Camp Commandants for necessary action. I was supplied no food for these deserters, so they were fed by my men. Our motto was "No-body will starve under an Indian's roof." My Adjutant 2/Lt. Sawarn Singh used to arrange rations on the quiet through a Japanese Sgt. Hirao. At times P. O. Ws. under my charge used to quarrel amongst themselves and our sentry had to restore peace.
- (d) To arrange necessary transport for supplying rations to P. O. W. and for their movements outside the Camp, I had 50 vehicles under my charge for the purpose.

My difficulties were :—

- (a) Not a pleasant job.
- (b) To start with, my men had great inferiority complex.

- (c) I was a Japanese tool which I hated to be. I had to receive orders from a Jap Liaison Officer with whom I was always at loggerheads.
- (d) I had to see, that my men having the power did not misuse it.
- (e) Acts of kindness were taken in wrong light both by the Japanese and the British.
- (f) All P. O. Ws. including Generals were opposed to me and my sentries.

The lighter side. At times certain P. O. W. used to escape only to be captured by my or Japanese guards or patrols so that during their detention they would get better food. The Australians used to be very friendly and helpful, so one could be kind to them. Giving protection to civilians was a pleasure.

A Shooting Incident. In May 1942 on a certain day at dusk about 14 P. O. W. attacked two of my sentries. One sentry fired for self-defence. Only one round was fired, which caused one killed and one wounded. Both casualties were brought to me. The wounded P. O. W. was treated in my camp hospital, and the body of the killed was handed over to the British P. O. W. The body was not recognised by them. The Japanese M. P. carried out a thorough enquiry at the end of which I was ordered to issue only 5 rounds to a sentry. On my part, I advised my men to shoot in the air to frighten and not to cause casualties. No shooting, however, took after this incident.

My Illness. On 29th June 1942, I got pneumonia, and was placed on D. I. and S. I. Lists by Lt. Col. B. Chaudry, I. M. S., who used to come to see me from Salitar Camp. I continued commanding the Garrison from my bed.

On 16th July 1942, the attack was repeated and on 5th Aug. 1942 I was removed to Salitar Hospital under Col. Chaudry's treatment.

From 3rd Oct. to 25th Nov. 1942 I spent a sick leave at Penang. Though I recovered, weakness continued and since then I never felt really fit in Malaya.

In Oct. 1943 I had to be operated upon in the nose and throat.

The First I. N. A.—On 1st Sep. 1942 I was commissioned as 2/Lt. in the I. N. A. Due to illness I remained on the strength of the reinforcement group and was given no appointment throughout the 1st I. N. A.

During the crisis, I was actively against starting the 2nd I. N. A. but afterwards changed my mind and helped in reorganisation.

The 2nd I. N. A.

(a) *D. Q. M. G.*—After the crisis, I was appointed Deputy Quarter Master General in the Army H. Q. under Col. M. Z. Kiani, the Army Commander. My duties as D. Q. M. G. were to be responsible for :—

1. Supplies of rations, oil and petrol.

2. The Ordnance Department dealing with supply, issue and maintenance of clothing, arms and equipment, Ammunition.
3. The Workshop.
4. Mechanical Transport.
5. Military Engineering Services.

Apart from the I. N. A., I had to supply fresh vegetables, fish, and certain foodstuffs to Indian P. O. W. Hospitals, though they were not under the I. N. A. Command.

In June 1943, Major N. N. Khosla took over the Department from me. I started working as Supply and Transport Officer under him.

(b) *5th Grla. Regt.* In December 1943, I was appointed 2nd in Command to Major J. W. Rodrigues. Apart from helping him in raising the Regiment my duties were :—

1. Training.
2. Discipline.
3. Morale.

On March 30th, 1944, the Regiment moved to Ipoh. It was very noticeable that though the Japanese and Malaya guards and parties often used to be attacked by the communists, yet they had so much respect for our leader and the movement that they never disturbed us.

(c) *Move to Burma.* For move to Burma I was attached with the 1st Inf. Regt. Left Jitra for Champhon by rail in July 1944. From Champhon

went to Khawaji and then back to Champhon in order to proceed to Bangkok from where I flew by Netaji's plane to Rangoon on 21st August 1944.

(d) No. 2 Divisional H. Qrs. On arrival in Burma I took over the "A" and "Q" Branches in No. 2 Div. H. Qrs. This was an officiating appointment due to the absence of respective staff officers on their way from Malaya. Col. Aziz Ahmed was the Divisional Commander.

(e) Nehru Brigade (4th Grla. Regt). On 13th November 1944 I was appointed Commander of the Nehru Brigade. I took over from Major Mahboob Ahmed at Myingyan. Mahboob had officiated only for about four days. While handing over the Brigade he also handed over graves of our heroes who had been bombed by the British on 4th November 1944.

When I took over, the Brigade was under-strength, poorly clothed and equipped. The discipline and morale was non-existing. Some deficiencies were made good, but my main efforts were devoted in improving the standard of discipline and morale apart from the fighting efficiency. This was done by giving lectures, personal touch and listening to the grievances of the the troops. Every body was given an option to stay or be sent back to a rear area. All officers including Sub. Officers were given separate interviews. Attention was paid to the medical side and welfare of troops.

One day per week was observed as "Jawanon ka Din." On this day officers used to share food with men in their lines.

On a special order of the day a slogan as under was given :—

"Khoon Ka Badla—Khoon—Khoon—Khoon."

Eight cases of desertion were brought before me. I excused all with a warning that there would be no mercy shown if they committed the crime again. It is interesting that they did not let me down. My policy was to get things done without or with least possible punishment.

Relationship with the Japanese. Our treatment to each was on reciprocal basis. I could never stand any interference by them and they knew it well.

Once one of the unit happened to enter my camp at night (24/25th December 1944) at Myingan after taking permission from the Japanese M. P. I warned them to clear out otherwise they would be fired upon by my guards. They cleared out within a couple of minutes.

Once, Japanese M. P. approached the Burmese authorities, to request them to see that a certain building was not occupied by the I. N. A. They were told to approach me direct, but the M. P. would not, saying that they were not allowed to interfere in the I. N. A. matters.

Relationship with the Burmese. Very cordial and friendly. They would always request us to occupy their villages so that Japanese might not come. For, the Japanese used to avoid us. We were much helped by them in the way of transport (bullock carts), fuel, vegetables and accommodation.

I received many donations from their officers for my hospitals, both in cash and kind.

In Action.

(a) Though the morale and discipline of the Brigade had improved yet it was not to my satisfaction. Materially I was still very poor. I was under-strength, was short of staff and officers, had no machine gun belts and spare parts, had no supporting weapons, there were only two M. T. vehicles both not reliable. I received order to occupy a defensive position opposite Pagan on the western side of Irrawadi. I was about 60 miles from this place. My only transport was 37 bullock carts and a Brigade had to move. I had no means of communication with my or the Japanese H. Qrs.

On 29th January 1945 I received orders to occupy the above-stated place by 20th January 1945. This means that the orders were late by 9 days. At the time I had an attack of tonsils. My staff car was out of order.

On 30th January 1945 I left Myingyan by foot to carry out a recce of the area I had to occupy. My Intelligence Officer and an N. C. O. accompanied me. I took a bullock cart with me, which came very useful. On 5th February 1945 I was back in Myingyan having done 108 miles by foot apart from 2 days race of the area. Considering that the

movement could not be carried out during the day due to enemy air attacks, it was a quick piece of work.

On 7th February 1945 my Jap Liaison Officer brought me the news that the enemy had arrived at Mitche about four miles opposite Nyangu which I was supposed to occupy. I was so harsh to Capt. Izuni, my Liaison Officer, that the poor fellow started crying.

I left Myingyan on 7th February 1945 having issued orders for all units to proceed that very evening. The sick, weak personnel, unwilling and undesirables were left back with Major Jagir Singh, my 2/Lt. in command who had been given instructions to arrange and send them back.

- (b) As my personal staff I took only one clerk.

Battles fought by the Brigade.

(i) Battle of Nyangu and Pagan	7th Feb. 1945 to 14th Feb. 1945.
(ii) Battle of Tanzang	16th March 1945.
(iii) Battle of Sade	16th, 17th, 19th March 1945.
(iv) Guerilla Warfare	24th Feb. to 3rd April 1945.

- (c) Apart from the above battles small actions were numerous connected with the defence of Kyauk-Padaung and Popa areas.

The withdrawal from Popa to Pegu without any transport, is a great military action of the Brigade.

- (d) From Magwe to Pegu up to my capture, I was with the Divisional Commander General Shahnawaz Khan. We were captured on 17th May 1945 at Bawaji near Pegu.
- (e) My casualties were about 200 out of an effective strength of about 800 to 900 which I could put into action to start with.
- (f) I estimate to have inflicted over 500 casualties on the enemy.

(2)

OUTLINES OF MY LIFE IN THE I. N. A. (BRITISH).

I am one of those who believed in Mohan Singh Sahib's leadership and sincerity. After having a talk with him just after the surrender of Singapore, I threw in my lot with him. Mohan Singh's task was a hard one. I am one of those who believe that he is a kind-hearted, efficient, brave, energetic, selfless national military leader.

I commanded Changi Garrison, i.e., guards over British P. O. W. from 11th March 1942 to August 5, 1942. Why this job over P. O. W.? I can't account for this. Having joined an organisation I was prepared to do any job—does not matter how dirty—and I did it.

My treatment to the British P. O. W. used to be cold but humanitarian. To Australians warmer. P. O. W. used to prefer living under me than under their own officers. I fell sick with pneumonia on 29th June 1942, these P. O. W. used to nurse me. On 26th July I had another attack and on 5th August I was removed to hospital. From 2nd October to 25th November I remained at Penang on sick leave.

On 1st September 1942 I was commissioned in the I. N. A. but due to illness and weak health remained attached to reinforcement group—no job.

During the I. N. A. crisis November 1942 to February 1943 at first I helped to break the I. N. A., but afterwards rejoined and helped in raising it again. I felt being spied upon but I continued.

After the crisis I became Deputy Quarter Master General in the Army H. Qrs. Remained so up to June 1943; when Maj. N. N. Khosla took over, I became his Supply and Transport Officer.

5th October to 26th October 1943 in hospital¹
—Nose and throat operation.

December 1943, 2nd in command of 5 Grla. Regt., helped raising and training it.

17th May to 21st August 1944, attached 1st Inf. Regt. for movement to Burma.

21st August 1944 to 6th October 1944 officiating head of the Adjutant and Quartermaster's Branches in No. 2 Divisional Head Quarters at Rangoon.

Nehru Brigade.

Took over on 13th November 1944 at Myingyan. My activities as its commander have been :—

- (a) At Myingyan :—13th November 1944 to 7th February 1945.
 - (i) Reorganising the Brigade.
 - (ii) Spiritual Training.
 - (iii) Preparation of Myingyan defences accompanied by warfare training.

(b) In Action :—

- (i) Battle of Pagan and Nyangn—7th to 14th February 1945.

- (ii) Reorganisation after the battle of Pagan.
- (iii) 25th February 1945 to 10th March 1945—
Defence of Kyauk-Padang and, Guerrilla
warfare in Tangzin and Pyinbin areas.
- (iv) Advance towards Nyangu—occupation of
Tangzin area and Guerrilla warfare, Patrol
activity, Battle of Sade and Tangzin—10th
March to 5th April 1945.
- (v) 5th April to 11th April 1945—defence of Popa.
Move to Magwe.
- (vi) Retreat from Magwe towards Moulmein—
19th April to 17th May 1945.
- (vii) Exhausted—surrounded—captured. Behind
Bars Pegu Jail 17th May 1945. Then Hos-
pital—Rangoon Central Jail arrived (C. S.
D. I. C.) Red Fort 5th July 1945.

(3)

WHY I JOINED THE I. N. A. ?

DIFFERENT STAGES OF MIND.

Before joining the Army.

During the school and college days I had my sympathies with the Congress without knowing much about it. These sympathies only remained within me and did not take any practical shape.

After joining the Army.

As I joined the Army at the very bottom rank, my experiences were those of poverty and struggle to get into the Indian Military Academy. I believed that to be a good Indian, one must be self-supporting and self-respecting. At the Academy the motto in the Chetwood Hall appealed to me. The motto was :—

"The honour, welfare and safety of your country comes first, always and every time.

The comfort, welfare and safety of the men you command comes next, always and every time.

Your own comforts and safety comes last, always and every time."

Ever since I read this motto, I started thinking of my country in a way I had never done before. I realized that it was not only difficult but impossible, to get

The Malayan Campaign.

My opportunity comes with the break of Greater East Asia War, yet my conscience did not let me desert my men. The campaign showed the British in their true colour of selfishness and inefficiency. My feelings grew more and more against them.

The First I. N. A.

After the surrender of Singapore, I met Mohan Singh Sahib again. He reminded me what I wanted to do a year ago and told me that that was the chance. After thinking for about a few days I took a vow that henceforth I would devote my life to my country, that I would not let even thoughts of my wife, parents and beloved ones interfere with this sacred duty, and that I would not drink until India was free.

Under General Mohan Singh I was all in all in the movement.

The Second I. N. A.

The I. N. A. crisis showed us in our true colours, yet I believed that by being in a movement, one could do a lot as long as one were sincere and that others' cowardice, weakness or selfishness were not an excuse for one's own. My main incentive remained the welfare of the men and the movement. Even after Netaji's arrival I always felt that Mohan Singh's I. N. A. was a better Military machine on revolutionary lines but politically, it even could not be compared with the 2nd one under Netaji. Though I continued

working hard, yet I was not satisfied with my surroundings. In October 1944, Netaji called me for an interview and I was surprised to learn that he exactly knew my feelings. During this interview which lasted for about two hours he gave me choice between a staff officership and a command. I chose command, for I wanted to work independently and in the front line. On 26th October 1944 Netaji called me again and told me that I would be given the command of 4th Grla. Regt. (Nehru Brigade). This was an appointment after my heart. Nehru Bde. was in the front at the time.

(4)

COLLECTION OF CLOTHING FROM THE
SEPARATED PERSONNEL—MARCH 1943

Situation

After the crisis about 4,000 officers and men refused to continue in the 2nd I. N. A. They were separated and accommodated in Salitar Camp where eventually Japanese P. O. W. H. Qrs. took them over and they were removed from that camp.

Reasons

Before separation the personnel had been allowed to retain all articles of clothing, certain items of equipment such as water bottles, haversacks, ration tins and cooking utensils, which had been issued from I. N. A. Ordnance Stores. The Japanese authorities informed the D. M. B's H. Qrs. that they (the Japanese) could not issue more stores to the I. N. A. so all articles on the stock of I. N. A. should be withdrawn from the separated personnel.

Ascertainment

D. M. B.'s H. Qrs. ascertained that the Japanese would issue necessary articles after they had taken over the personnel. In fact they did issue them with absolutely new clothing before the personnel were removed from Salitar Camp.

Collection

Being the D. Q. M. G., Army Head Quarters this unpleasant job of collecting stores was my responsibility, under orders from the D. Q. M. G., D.M. B.'s H. Qrs. then Major K. H. Thimaya and shortly afterwards Major A. D. Jahangir, Thimaya having met a car accident had been removed to a hospital.

The Japanese who were taking over the separated personnel were issuing these stores at the time these personnel left Salitar Camp. Had everything been collected at once it would have meant leaving those personnel stripped naked. I put up the matter again, and the ruling was given that the maximum stores possible would be collected immediately allowing the separated personnel to retain on loan, one shirt, one pair of shorts, a pair of P. T. shoes, a cap or pagri per man, plus cooking utensils as necessary.

These things on loan were also to be collected as they would move out of Salitar. Dates of their move by parties were to be made known to me by the H. Qrs. Hikari Kikan.

I ordered Regimental Quartermasters to carry out the collection according to instructions issued by me. During the collection certain Unit Quartermasters met with hostile attitude from the separated personnel, so Maj. A. D. Jahangir and I at times used to attend this collection. In connection with this duty I collected all separated officers and N. C. Os. and explained them why we were collecting those stores from them. After this lecture we had no difficulties in getting co-opera-

L. N. A. HEROES

tion from them. Of course we had to be very lenient in handling the situation. For this leniency Major Jahangir and myself had to answer later on.

Court of enquiry. The information regarding moves of certain parties was not given in time by the Japanese as a result of which certain stores could not be withdrawn. Maj. A. D. Jahangir and I were blamed for failing to carry out the collection properly. Eventually a court of enquiry was held under the Presidentship of Lt. Col. Alagapan, with Lt. *Col. S. M. Hussain and Maj. Pritam Singh as members

(5)

STATEMENT IN THE COURT

My story is a simple one. I was enlisted as a sepoy in the 4th Bn. of the 14th Punjab Regiment on 29th May 1933. In 1936 at the recommendation of Lt. Col. C. Hungerford Jackson, I was selected to do a prospective cadet's course at Kitchner College, Nowgong. Before this I had had a long struggle in the ranks. Eventually I was selected to do a Gentlemen Cadet's course at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun.

It was in this Institution that I learnt to serve my country above everything else. There, I read written in Chettwood Hall in block letters of gold :—

“ The honour, welfare and safety of your country comes first, always and every time. The comfort, safety and welfare of the men you command comes next, always and every time. Your own safety and comfort comes last, always and every time.”

Ever since I read this motto, the sense of duty towards my country and my men has under all circumstances reigned supreme in my thoughts. It was with this motto in front of me that I served my country as an officer in the Indian Army. After joining the 1st Bn. 14th Punjab Regiment as a 2nd Lieut. on 30th April 1940, I remained throughout with my unit, and moved overseas with it. We arrived at Ipoh in

Malaya on 18th March 1941. Then we went to Sungai Patani. Here I had the privilege of officiating under my C. O. Lt. Col. L. V. Fitz Patrick as Adjutant for about two months. In June 1941, I came back home to do an All Arms Signal Course at Army Signal School, Poona.

Just before the outbreak of war in East Asia I rejoined my unit at Jitra on 5th December 1941. During the Malayan campaign I was the Bn. Signal Officer. My Bn. was the foremost unit in Jitra sector to contact with the Japanese forces. We held them for three days. After a battle at Changlun, as we were withdrawing to Jitra, which was to be our main defensive line, we were surprised by the enemy tanks. The C. O. and most of the officers and men were cut off. On 12th December 1941 after a day of roaming about I managed to contact Capt. Habib-ul-Rahman who was also in a similar plight.

We managed to collect about 80 men of different units of including British. The main road being in the Japanese occupation we had to cut our way through jungles and paddy fields. On the 13th early in the morning, we were attacked by the enemy and most of the men deserted us except about 26 of our own unit. During the day, however, we managed to gather some more stragglers and in the evening when we were two miles from Alor Star we were informed by some civilians that Jitra and Alor Star had fallen. We could not believe this and Habib instructed me to follow him by bounds while

he with a small party proceeded towards Alor Star to find out the situation for himself. We had hardly advanced a mile when we saw some people running away from the town. They too told us about the fall of Alor Star and asked us to withdraw. We did so, and on 14th evening sailed in small coastal boats for Penang from Kuala dah. On arrival at Penang we with our party reported at 3 M. R. C. Within 15 minutes of our arrival we were ordered to leave Penang. On 16th morning we arrived at Nibong Tibal about 26 miles from Penang on the mainland. Here Habib and myself were given the command of a company each and were ordered to defend two brigades. I was placed in command of Gurkha Company formed out of the M. R. C. and a detachment of 1st. Bahawalpore Company. I remained in position until all our troops North of that point had withdrawn. Eventually on 19th December we were ordered to withdraw. We fell back to Taiping and then to Ipoh, where I rejoined the remnants of my Bn.

I had not had a single whole meal ever since the war had started, i.e., the 8th December. Rest was out of question during such a retreat. I had an attack of fever and was admitted into a Hospital and then evacuated to Singapore. On my discharge from the Hospital I reported for duty at 7 M. R. C. I tried to rejoin my unit but red-tapism caused so much delay that by the time arrangements were made for my conveyance, the battle of Singapore had begun. During stay with the 7 M. R. C., I offi-

ciated as the Indian Wing Commander and Adjutant. The situation became such that the Commandant of the 7 M. R. C. wanted my presence in order to control the Indian Troops who were getting dissatisfied due to discriminatory treatment. The Commandant said that he had great confidence in my way of handling the Troops.

By the 11th February, 1942 we began hearing rumours that Singapore was going to surrender. I or any body else could not believe it. While evacuating Bidadari Camp where 7 M. R. C. was stationed, on the way to town I saw thousands of Indians gathered in an open space. They had hoisted many Indian National Flags. I pointed this out to a British Col. who was with me. He said, "I don't blame them. If we cannot defend them they have to look after themselves."

On 13th evening we were told officially that 500 of our aeroplanes would arrive by the 15th morning and that the Americans were going to land at Pinang and come down South. But they never did. On the 15th at about 2200 hours the C. O. called for me and told me that Singapore had surrendered unconditionally. This came to me as a great shock. With a heavy heart and tears in my eyes I dropped my revolver, and ordered my men to collect their arms. A still bigger shock came when the C. O. told me that the Indians would march off to Ferrar Park and the British to Changi. At Ferrar Park Col. Hunt representing the British Supreme Command handed us over to Maj. Fujiwara, a representative

of the Japanese Army, who in turn handed us over to Capt. Mohan Singh who was introduced to us as G. O. C., Indian National Army. I felt like one deserted by the British in a state of utter and tragic helplessness.

Mohan Singh spoke. He expressed his intention of raising an Indian National Army for the liberation of India. His declaration was received with great enthusiasm and a feeling of hope and joy by all of us present at Ferrar Park.

I had known Mohan Singh before as we belonged to the same Unit. He was one of my dearest friends and I had confidence in him. However it was after a long mental struggle that I could persuade myself to accept him as G. O. C. With my knowledge of the recent events and of the state of the Eastern Defence of India I felt convinced that Singapore, the biggest naval base in the world, having surrendered so ignobly, there was no possibility of the British being able to defend or hold India against the Japanese invasion.

Mohan Singh's task was a hard one. He had never even imagined that one day he would have to handle 75,000 officers and men under circumstances unprecedented in the history of the world. Discipline had to be maintained amongst a demoralised and defeated Army. Freedom of political thought had to be given as the I. N. A. was entirely based on a voluntary basis. On top of all this lives of officers and men suspected by the Japanese had to be saved.

Our civilian nationals had to be protected against all sorts of dangers. And all this had to be done consistently with India's national honour and laws of humanity. And in doing all this he had constantly to deal with highly suspicious people like the Japanese.

I had seen how people in Malaya had suffered as a result of the Japanese invasion in consequence of the utter lack of preparation on the part of the British Government which had undertaken responsibility for her defence and I shuddered to think of the plight of my own countrymen on invasion of India. It was at this time that I got to realise the full significance of the havoc done to my unfortunate country by the one and a half century of the British Rule. While the British, I thought to myself, had exploited all our material resources for their own benefit and freely drawn upon our man power to fight their own imperialistic wars, they had not only done nothing to prepare us for the defence of our mother-land in case of need but had, in order to keep us in bondage for all time to come, completely emasculated us. I felt that if India had been free and in a position to look after her own defences no aggressor could have thought of crossing her border. In the Indian National Army proposed to be organised by Mohan Singh I saw a new hope for India. I felt that if a strong and willing National Army could be raised at that juncture it could not only liberate India from foreign rule but could also resist the Japanese in case they should try to go back upon their word and instead of

helping us to win our freedom, should seek to exploit our country for their own purpose. Such an army could also give protection to our Indian brethren and sisters in the Far East against aggression by people belonging to other nationalities. Mother India seemed to be calling me and I decided to respond to her call and threw in my lot with Mohan Singh.

I co-operated with Mohan Singh in the organization of the Indian National Army till 29th June 1942 when I became very ill and had to go to the hospital. On being discharged from the hospital on 2nd October 1942 I was sent to Penang for reasons of health. I still not being quite well and fit for work, I returned from Penang about the time when very sharp differences had arisen between Mohan Singh and the Japanese culminating in the arrest of the former and dissolution of the I. N. A. by him. On receiving the assurance that Netaji Subash Chandra Bose would come to lead the movement I decided to continue in the 2nd I. N. A.

Recruitment of the I. N. A. at all times was on a purely voluntary basis. To my knowledge no coercion or force was ever used to induce any Prisoner of War to join the I. N. A. In fact use of force or coercion for such purpose was wholly unnecessary because we always had a very large number of surplus volunteers whom we were unable to arm or put on training for want of equipment. The evidence given by some of the prosecution witnesses that prisoners of war were sent to Concentration or Detention Camps to coerce them into volunteering is absolutely false. There was

no concentration camp in existence at all. There was a detention camp to which only persons found guilty of indiscipline or other offences were sent by^t way of punishment. That camp had, however, nothing to do in any shape or form, with enlistment in the I. N. A. On the contrary persons confined in the Detention Camp were not accepted as volunteers even if they offered to do so, because detention in that Camp for any period indicated some defect of character and was a disqualification for membership of the I. N. A. These witnesses have told false and distorted tales to save their own skins or to curry favour with the Government. In all lectures delivered by me I warned my audience in the clearest possible terms that they should volunteer only if they loved their country and were willing and able to bear all kinds of hardships and sufferings in her cause. At the time of going into action I again warned the men under my command that we had to fight against an enemy much better equipped and far superior in men and materials and that any body who, either for want of courage or otherwise, did not wish to go to the front need not do so and could, if he so desired, be sent back to the rear areas. Some of the officers and men did show their unwillingness and about 200 such men were sent back to Rangoon before my Regiment left Myingyan. This option I gave to my command at every stage of the campaign and it was due to this particular reason that although for weeks I stayed within two miles of the enemy lines yet none of my men ever went and reported my location to the Allies. Many a time I

had to go without water for 20 to 30 hours and without food for two or three days. If as a Brigade Commander I had to undergo these hardships my men must have suffered much more yet they accompanied me. No man who had joined under duress or coercion could have done so.

It is true that I committed four men for trial on charges of desertion and attempting to communicate with the enemy. It is, however, quite untrue that those men were shot at my instance or under my orders. On the day and at the time they are said to have been shot I was confined to bed and unable to move. In fact the sentences of death passed on these men were subsequently remitted by the Divisional Commander and were never executed.

Whatever I did, I did as the member of a regularly organised force fighting under the Provisional Government of Free India and am therefore not liable to be charged with or tried under the Indian Army Act and the Criminal Law of India for any offence on account of any act done by me in the discharge of my duties as a member of such force. I am further advised that in point of law my trial before this court martial is illegal. I joined the I. N. A. with the best and purest of motives. As a member of the I. N. A. I was able to help a number of Prisoners of War with money and materials. The I. N. A. was able to protect life, property and honour of the Indians residing in the Far East. It saved the lives of many civilians and prisoners of war who had been sen-

tenced to death by the Japanese on different charges. It successfully persuaded the Japanese to refrain from bombing civilians and their properties in Indian towns. The Indians in the Far East showed their appreciation of the services rendered to them by the I. N. A. by contributing crores of rupees to the funds of the Provisional Government of Free India.

I respectfully maintain that the I. N. A. rendered distinguished service to 2½ millions of Indians who owed allegiance to the New Provisional Free Government of India, and was actuated by the most patriotic motives.

PROCLAMATION
OF THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF
AZAD HIND

After their first defeat at the hands of the British in 1757 in Bengal, the Indian people fought an uninterrupted series of hard and bitter battles over a stretch of one hundred years. The history of this period teems with examples of unparalleled heroism and self-sacrifice. And in the pages of that history, the names of Sirajuddaula and Mohan Lal of Bengal, Haider Ali, Tippu Sultan and Velu Tampi of South India, Appa Sahib Bhonsle and Peshwa Baji Rao of Mahrashtra, the Begums of Oudh, Sardar Shyam Singh Atariwala of Punjab and last but not least, Rani Laxmi-Bai of Jhansi, Tantia Topi, Maharaj Kunwar Singh of Dumraon and Nana Sahib among others—the names of all these warriors are for ever engraved in letters of gold. Unfortunately for us, our forefathers did not at first realize that the British constituted a grave threat to the whole of India and they did not, therefore, put up a united front against the enemy. Ultimately, when the Indian people were roused to the reality of the situation, they made a concerted move and under the flag of Bahadur Shah in 1857, they fought their

last war as free men. In spite of a series of brilliant victories in the early stages of this war, ill-luck and faulty leadership gradually brought about their final collapse and subjugation. Nevertheless, such heroes as the Rani of Jhansi, Tantia Topi, Kunwar Singh and Nana Sahib live like eternal stars in the nation's memory to inspire us to greater deeds of sacrifice and valour.

Forcibly disarmed by the British after 1857 and subjected to terror and brutality, the Indian people lay prostrate for a while—but with the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885 till the end of the last world war, the Indian people, in their endeavour to recover their lost liberty tried all possible methods—namely, agitation and propaganda, boycott of British goods, terrorism and sabotage—and finally, armed revolution. But all these efforts failed for a time. Ultimately in 1920, when the Indian people haunted by a sense of failure, were groping for new methods, Mahatma Gandhi came forward with the new weapon of non-co-operation and civil disobedience.

For two decades thereafter, the Indian people went through a phase of intense patriotic activity. The message of freedom was carried to every Indian home. Through personal example, people were taught to suffer, to sacrifice, and to die in the cause of freedom. From the cities to the remotest villages, the people were knit together into one political organisation. Thus the Indian people not only re-

covered their political consciousness, but became a political entity once again. They could now speak with one voice and strive with one will for one common goal. From 1937 to 1939, through the work of the Congress Ministries in eight provinces, they gave proof of their readiness and their capacity to administer their own affairs.

Thus, on the eve of the present world war, the stage was set for the final struggle for India's liberation. During the course of this war, Germany, with the help of her allies, has dealt shattering blows to our enemy in Europe,—while Nippon with the help of her allies has inflicted a knock-out blow to our enemy in East Asia. Favoured by a most happy combination of circumstances, the Indian people today have a wonderful opportunity for achieving their national emancipation.

For the first time in recent history, Indians abroad have also been politically roused and united in one organization. They are not only thinking and feeling in tune with their countrymen at home, but are also marching in step with them along the path to freedom. In East Asia in particular, over two million Indians are now organized as one solid phalanx, inspired by the slogan of "Total Mobilization." And in front of them stand the serried ranks of India's Army of Liberation, with the slogan "Onward to Delhi" on their lips.

Having goaded Indians to desperation by its hypocrisy, and having driven them to starvation and

death by plunder and loot, British rule in India has forfeited the goodwill of the Indian people altogether, and is now living a precarious existence. It needs but a flame to destroy the last vestige of that unhappy rule. To light that flame is the task of India's Army of Liberation. Assured of the enthusiastic support of the civil population at home and also of a large section of Britain's Indian Army, and backed by gallant and invincible allies abroad, relying in the first instance on its own strength, India's Army of Liberation is confident of fulfilling its historic role.

Now that the dawn of freedom is at hand, it is the duty of the people to set up Provisional Government of their own, and launch the last struggle under the banner of that Government. But with all the Indian leaders in prison and the people at home totally disarmed—it is not possible to set up a Provisional Government within India or to launch an armed struggle under the aegis of that Government. It is, therefore, the duty of the Indian Independence League in East Asia, supported by all patriotic Indians at home and abroad, to undertake this task—the task of setting up a Provisional Government of Azad Hind (Free India), and of conducting the last fight for freedom, with the help of the Army of Liberation (that, is, the Azad Hind Fauj or the Indian National Army) organized by the League.

Having been constituted as the Provisional Government of Azad Hind by the Indian Independ-

dence League in East Asia, we enter upon our duties with a full sense of the responsibility that has devolved on us. We pray that Providence may bless our work and our struggle for emancipation of our motherland, and our comrades in arms for the cause of her Freedom, for her welfare and her exaltation among the nations of the world.

It will be the task of the Provisional Government to launch and to conduct the struggle that will bring about the expulsion of the British and of her allies from the soil of India. It will then be the task of the Provisional Government to bring about the establishment of a permanent National Government of Azad Hind constituted in accordance with the will of the Indian people and enjoying their confidence. After the British and their allies are overthrown, and until a permanent National Government of Azad Hind is set up on Indian soil, the Provisional Government will administer the affairs of the country for the Indian people.

The Provisional Government is entitled to and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Indian. It guarantees religious liberty, as well as equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens. It declares its firm resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally and transcending all the differences cunningly fostered by an alien Government in the past.

In the name of God, in the name of by-gone generations who have welded the Indian people into one nation, and in the name of the dead heroes who have bequeathed to us a tradition of heroism and self-sacrifice, we call upon the Indian people to rally round our banner, and to strike for India's freedom. We call upon them to launch the final struggle against the British and all their allies in India, and to prosecute the struggle with valour and perseverance and with full faith in Final Victory—until the enemy is expelled from Indian soil, and the Indian people are once again a free Nation.

**SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF AZAD HIND.**

SUBHAS CHANDER BOSE (Head of State,
Prime Minister and Minister for War and
Foreign Affairs) :

Capt. Mrs. Lakshmi (Women's Organisation) ;

Lt. Col. A. C. Chatterji (Finance) ;

S. A. Ayer (Publicity and Propaganda) ;

Lt. Col. Aziz Ahmad, Lt. Col. N. S. Bhagat, Lt.
Col. J. K. Bhonsle, Lt. Col. Gulzara Singh, Lt.
Col. M. Z. Kiani, Lt. Col. A. D. Loganandan, Lt.
Col. Ehsan Qadir, Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz.

(Representatives of the Armed forces) ;

A. M. Sahay, Secretary (with ministerial rank) ;

Rash Behari Bose (Supreme Adviser) ;

Kaum Gani, Debnath Das, D. M. Khan, A.
Yellappa, J. Thivy, Sardar Ishar Singh (Advisrs) ;
A. N. Sarkar (Legal Adviser).

APPENDIX
DEFENCE STORY.

I

SHAHNAWAZKHAN.

NOMINAL ROLL OF DEFENCE WITNESSES.

1. *Subedar Hazara Singh*

(a) That during the fighting in Singapore I commanded 'B' Coy. in which he was the senior V.C.O.

(b) That at Bidadari, Br. troops from our right and left flanks ran away, including the British officers. The A.A. gunners manning the guns in our Coy. area also bolted led by their officers.

(c) That I with my Coy. held on to the ridge till ordered to surrender. That I had issued orders to men to fight to the last there.

(d) That I went to the Separation Camp 'Seletar' and lectured to all officers and men and asked for true volunteers who would even fight the Japs in India. I also stated that we would give all possible aid to those who were leaving the I. N. A.

(e) That a few days later he was separated from others and taken to P. O. W. Camp, Seletar, with other "old men" approx. 20 in number, as it was intended to save them from going to Pacific Island.

(f) That after the formation of the 2nd I. N. A. I went to Seletar Camp several times and always tried to help him and others in the P.O.W. Camp.

2. Jemedar Mirzaman, 2/10 Baluch Regiment.

1. That at the Farrer Park on 17th February 1942 I told him to inform all P. M's not to join the I. N. A.

2. That in September 1942, he fell dangerously ill and all doctors told him that there was no hope for him, and that I took him to my Bungalow, gave him best nourishment and that he recovered, and was taken back by me to his unit, still a P. O. W.

3. That about the end of September 1942, C. H. M. Mohammad Khan came to me at Neesoon and informed me that the P. O. W. at Seletar had decided to volunteer for the I. N. A. and that I went to Seletar the same day and dissuaded them not to do so.

4. That during the crisis I told Mirzaman, that I was out to break the I. N. A. and that I used to have meetings with various officers in my Bungalow for the purpose.

5. That in September 1943 I went to bid farewell to P. O. W. in Serangoon R. D. Camp and told them that the reason for my accepting the command of No.1 Regt. (Bose Bde.) was that :—

(a) The Japanese were definitely going into India, and that there was a good chance of their success and in such an event the P. M's would be looked down upon for not participating in the fight for Free India.

(b) That because the P. M's. as a class were out of the I. N. A. I was in it to safeguard their interests.

3. *Jemedar Naushad, 1/4 P. Regt.*

1. That at the Farrer Park I told him among many others not to join the I. N. A.

4. *Jemedar Abdul Hannan, 1/14 P. Regt.
(I. N. A. Lt.).*

1. That I told him at Bidadari hill during the battle of Singapore that we would fight to the last on our positions in spite of the fact that our flanks were exposed.

2. That I told him at the Farrer Park and at Neesoon not to join the I. N. A.

5. *2/Lt. Tajamul Hussain, 6/14 Punjab Regt.*

1. That at the Farrer Park I told him not to join the I. N. A.

2. That at Neesoon, we formed a "Block" to resist the I. N. A. and held several meetings.

3. That I refused to allow anyone from my camp to be sent to the Concentration camp and when I was forced to do so I resigned and went to the Naval base.

4. That I lectured to all officers at Col. Gill's bungalow, on the eve of his departure to Bangkok and blamed him for putting us in a difficult situation, and made other anti-I. N. A. and anti-Mohan Singh remarks.

5. About mid-May 1942, "Block" met again and reviewed the situation and it was decided that all of us should join the I. N. A. with the undermentioned objects :—

- (a) To help P. M's. who were to remain out as a body, while a few of us were to join the I N. A to gain control of its' policy, and try and keep it as straight as possible. If we all kept out we felt that we would be maltreated and humiliated as others were being done in the concentration camp.
- (b) To wreck the I N. A. when and if we had an opportunity of doing so

6. Next day a meeting of all officers in Neesoon Camp was called, where I told them that I had received orders that everyone was to finally make up his mind, whether or not they wished to volunteer for the I N A. But told everyone it was their own free choice. Non-volunteers were then sent to another camp.

7 Early in June owing to certain differences of opinion with Mohan Singh over the choice and selection of candidates for Bangkok Conference, Shahnawaz was sent out of Singapore as a punishment. This was much resented by officers and men in Neesoon.

The same day Mohan Singh held a mass meeting of approximately 15,000 P O W. and volunteers at Seletar and gave a speech in which he declared that there was a party within his party which was trying to "wreck the movement" and before people of that party could do so, he would wreck it.

On the night of Shahnawaz's departure a deputation of senior officers including undermentioned officers went and protested to Mohan Singh against his transfer but were told that since he was forming

a party within Mohan Singh's party, he had been punished and if anyone of his friends wished to follow him they could do so. He threatened to send such men to the concentration camp.

8. During the crisis I (S. N. K.) played a leading part in breaking it, and at Bidadari in February 1943 vigorously refuted the statements made by Gen. Iwakuro. He also told us that it was our opportunity of getting out of the I. N. A. and that our object of wrecking it had been achieved.

9. Next met S. N. K. at Johore, where S. N. K. told him that he was very worried about him, as the Japanese had definitely succeeded in re-forming a new I. N. A. and that they were going to send the non-volunteers to the Pacific Islands. Shahnawazkhan told him that he had already arranged for Capt. Dilawarkhan, Lt. Shafiullah, Capt. T. M. Khanzada and several other members of the 'Block' not to be sent overseas, but for me he could find no excuse and so asked me to join the I. N. A. to escape hardships.

6. *Lt. Ghulam Mohd., 3/16 Pb. Regt.*

1. That he was also a member of the "block."
2. His statement up to the time of my departure from Neesoon camp in June 1942 is the same as that of Lt. Tajamul Hussain.
3. In June 1942 he went with his unit to Seremban for labour duties. On arrival there the Japs tried to persuade his men to take up arms and learn Japanese drill and words of command. He refused and as a result M. Gs. were put around his

camp, he himself was put into a cell. The Japs held that unless they obeyed their orders they would all be shot, after 24 hours. A crisis thus arose. I went from Kuala-Lumpur and settled the affair in favour of P. O. W.

4. That on his camp there were volunteers (guard parties) as well as labour parties and that there were orders that any soldier could change from a P. O. W. to a volunteer any time. The names of such men were periodically sent to the H. Q. Mainland at K. L. through the Jap officer in Command of the camp. This being the method agreed upon by Lt. Nakamiya of Fujiwara Kikan, Jem. Sadhu Singh who was an Assistant of Mohan Singh and the local Jap Garrison Comdr. under whom we were placed.

5. That I persuaded the Japs not to arrest any Indian soldiers who had turned civilians during the fight in Malaya, and were then doing business. Sy. Abdul Rab of 2/16 Pb. Regt. at Seremban Railway Station was one.

6. That I visited his camp several times, but never asked him or anyone else to become volunteers.

7. That during the crisis I took a prominent part in breaking up the I. N. A. and refuted Iwakuro's statement that according to the resolutions passed at Bangkok, the I. N. A. could not be disbanded.

8. That I asked all friends to take chance of that opportunity and get out of the I. N. A.,

and that I assured all of them that I would do my best to help them.

9. Other instances of help given to P. O. W. including Jem. Mirzaman.

7. *Sub. Jahan Dad Khan, 6/14 Punjab Regt.*

That Major Mahabir Singh delivered a lecture at Neesoon in March-April 1942 to all V. C. Os. 500 stating that the Japs had landed at Madras. My conclusion—"It was a very sad piece of news, when the sacred soil of our motherland was being trodden under the dirty feet of an invader, we were not there to prevent it."

2. Dua-Khair in the Mosque ?

8. *Sub. Mohd. Sadiq, 5/14 Pb. Rgt.*

1. That I read out Biddadari resolutious and that on second meeting I declared myself a volunteer, and asked for lists of volunteers.

2. That I informed all present that it was being done under orders and that every man was to make up his own mind.

3. That I called a meeting of all P. M. officers in Mosque at Neesoon in May 1942 and told them that I hoped they would not become volunteers through coercion, after being separated from my camp. In a "Dua Khair" it was agreed to by all.

9. *Sub. Sardar Khan, Farrer Park Coy., S. and M., Roorki.*

1, 2, 3.—Same as Sub. Mohd. Sadiq.

4. That in Farrer Park I told him not to join the I. N. A.—Major Mahabir's lecture ?

5. That in June 1943 I met him at Chua Camp and delivered a lecture to all P. O. W. there and told them that more volunteers were wanted for the I. N. A. but the essential qualification was that they should be prepared to fight against the Japs, if they were dishonest with us.

6. That I was always very concerned about the welfare of the P. O. W. and supplied medicines to them.

10. Capt. Firoze Khan, 2/10 Baluch Regt.

1. That in Neesoon Camp it was well-known among the P. Ms. that I was in the I. N. A. to help the P. O. W. and to wreck it when the time came and also that I did not wish the P. Ms. to join it.

2. That while I was Commanding Neesoon no one from my camp went to the concentration camp, although from all other camps large numbers were sent there.

3. That in Sep./Oct. 1942 I was sent for by him at Seletar and told about the hardships the P. Ms. were undergoing, and their decision to join the I. N. A. and when the time came to shoot up the Sikhs.

4. That I advised them not to join the I. N. A. Tore up their lists, went and saw Mohan Singh and helped to do away with their hardships.

5. That in Sep. 1943 I met them in Serangoon Rd. Camp and told them (P. M. officers) that I had been put in command of No. 1 Regt. (Bose Bde.) the first one to go into action. I told them that I accepted the Command because :—

(a) I felt the Japs were definitely going into India and that there was a reasonable chance of their success, and that in Free India, they (P. Ms.) would be looked down upon as having taken no part in the fight for India's liberation. By being the foremost in fighting I would be able to stand up for their interests even in a free India.

(b) That I had been completely won over by Netaji S. C. Bose, who I was sure would never allow the Japs to exploit us or to do anything unbecoming of India's honour.

6. Other instances of help rendered to the P.O.W.

11. *Capt. Sherdil Khan, 2/15 P. Regiment.*
1. That I met him while he was in the concentration camp. Had him released and sent to P. O. W. Camp.

2. Instances of help given to the P. O. W.
3. Never asked them to become volunteers.

12. *Jem. Mohd. Khan, 2/10 Baluch Regt.*

Same as Capt. Firoze Khan.

13. *Jem. Mohd. Sadiq, 2/16 P. Regt.*
14. *Jem. Sardar Khan, 2/16 P. Regt.*
15. *Jem. Buta Khan, 3/16 P. Regt.*

That I always helped the P. O. W.

16. *Maj Gilani, I.M.S.*

17. *Capt. Narula, I.M.S.*

That I refused to allow them to be taken to the concentration camp.

18. *Capt. (S.M.) Painda Khan, 5/2 Punjab Regt.*

1. Same as above.
2. Mosque "Dua Khair" in May 1942.
3. Malacca—Talk to all P.O.W. officers.

19. *Jemedar Sadhu Singh, 1/14 Punjab Regiment.*

That he came to take above-mentioned officers to the concentration camp if refused to allow him to take them away.

20. *S. M. Bakhtawar Singh, H.K.S.R.A.*

1. That from his unit or sector no one went to the concentration camp on account of their political views.

2. That he was present during the meeting held at Mohan Singh's Bungalow to select delegates for Bangkok Conference.

3. That he was one of many selected to go but refused to go as a result of my transfer.

4. That I advised him not to give any more A.A. gunners to M. S. for handing over to the Japanese.

21. *S. M. Chanan Singh, 5/14 Punjab Regiment.*

1. That during the crisis I advised him to leave the I. N. A. because I was of the opinion that the British would win the war.

2. My lecture at Seletar.

3. That he did not go to the Pacific Island and that I met him again to enquire about his health.

22. *Jemedar Kutab Sher, H.K.S.R.*

That I did my very best to get them out of the Japanese clutches, and to improve their lot.

23. *Jemedar Mohd. Sharief, H.K.S.R.A.*

They had been handed over to the Japanese in February-March 1942, as A.A. gunners.

24. *Captain Rabnawaz Khan, 5/2 P.R.*

1. That I met him at Jitra, when he was I/C P. O. W. parties and talked to all officers in his party and told them that to me all were alike (volunteers or P. O. W.) and that I was concerned only with their welfare.

2. Again met him at Port Dickson in June 1943. He was Commanding P. O. W. camp containing 2,000 prisoners ; and that I talked only to volunteers of the old I. N. A. I stayed with him for two days.

3. The system of becoming a volunteer and submitting lists to the Head Quarter (Mainland).

4. That I never persuaded him to join the I. N. A., and told him that the circumstances (Iwakuro's meeting) had forced me into it, and that I had been sent on tour by order as I know the mainland.

3. That I was not happy in the I. N. A. as the Japanese were trying to exploit us, and we could do nothing about it.

25. *Lt. P.J. Madan.*

1. That on arrival of P. O. W. on the mainland the Japanese Comd. at K. L. came and addressed them stating that :—

(a) The Japanese did not look upon Indians as Prisoners but as brothers, and that they sympathized with their desire for Independence.

(b) That the Japanese at K. L. had made arrangements for their proper arriving and training, P. O. W. resented this and refused to discuss, and a crisis arose. I in the presence of senior officers (P. O. W.). explained everything to the Jap officer and a final settlement was reached :—

That the P. O. W. would perform only such duties as they are bound to do under the International Law.

2. That I resisted all Jap efforts to teach Jap drill, words of command, saluting, etc, to our men, by quoting Cebu incident. In March 1942, the Japs took away some Indian P. O. W. (A. A. Gunners) from Neesoon Camp on some pretext and made them fight against their wishes at Cebu, where a large number of them were killed.

3. That I secured excellent living conditions for the men under my command.

(a) Very light fatigues, regular pay, good rations (Madan was Q. M.) Recreation, leave out of camps, prayers, cinemas, etc.

4. That 21 men of S. and M. unit were taken away by the Japs and six of them were selected for execution for being "too Pro-British" during my absence on tour. On return I had all of them released.

5. (a) That at a mass rally at Kuala-Lumpur in August 1942, in the presence of approx. 15,000 men of all nationalities I stated that the Japanese should give up all ideas if they had any of making a puppet

I. N. A. and to understand that the Indian soldiers would fight them with all vigour if they found that the Japs had intentions of dominating India.

(b) That I refused to allow any of my men to carry a Jap flag to the meeting, although they tried to persuade me to do so, we carried only our National flag.

(c) That there was no difference in the treatment and living conditions of P. O. W. volunteers.

6. That I persuaded the Japs not to arrest Indian soldiers who had become civilians during the war and were earning their living as such.

7. That all Camp Comds. in Malaya periodically sent names of new volunteers from their camps. Volunteers and non-volunteers were all living in the same units and camps.

26. *Sub. Fazal Din, Bengal S. and M.*

That I persuaded the Japs in his presence not to force the P. O. W. to take up arms or do drill. (Jap) or saluting.

27. *Hav. Bostan Khan, S. and M.*

28. *Sy. Sarfaraz Khan.*

That the Japanese took them away and decided to execute them besides four others, and that I went and had them released, after my return from tour. That they had signed their "Will."

29. *Capt. H. L. Chopra. 17 Dogra Regt.*

1. Same as Lt. P. J. Madan 1—7.

2. That I met him as Camp Comd. at Port Sweturbam and delivered a lecture stating that :—

- (a) The old I. N. A. had been broken and a new one raised, on the basic principle that there should be no force or coercion used to make anyone become a volunteer.
- (b) That everyone who became a volunteer should be prepared to fight the Japs in India, if they were dishonest.
- (c) That I had come, because we felt we ought to ask all surplus volunteers if they still wished to remain in the I. N. A.

3. That at Pyinmana in Feb. 1945, he acted as the defending officer for S. O. Mohd. Sharief who was "let off" and the decision of the court was promulgated to him.

4. That when the court was convened I was not present in Pyinmana, and had been apptd. offg. command, 2nd Div.

30. Capt. A. I. S. Dara, 1/14 Punjab Regt.

- 1. That at the Farrer Park we decided not to join the I. N. A. as there was danger of exploitation by the Japs.
- 2. That at Neesoon we had a discussion in which Gen. M. Z. Kiani said that M. S. would probably have some of us shot for our previous differences of opinion in our Bn. All of us took a pledge to help each other. We felt helpless and deserted for having been placed at his mercy.
- 3. That at Neesoon we formed a "block" to resist the I. N. A.

4. About this time concentration camps were started, an intensive propaganda campaign was launched, and ruthless measures were being taken to humiliate those who opposed this movement.

5. That my main concern was how to protect the P. O. W.

6. That I refused any one out of my camp to be sent to the concentration camp, and when some people were forcibly taken I resigned in protest and they were released.

7. That at the end of April I received an order from Mohan Singh's H. Q. with a typed copy of Biddadari resolutions, which were read out to all in accordance with the instructions.

8. That at the time of Gill's departure to Bangkok I lectured to all officers and accused Gill of putting us in a very difficult situation.

9. That for the undermentioned reasons the "Block" decided to join the I. N. A. :—

- (a) There was no discipline left among the troops, and unit commanding officers were beaten.
- (b) Cows and pigs were being killed in camps and there was a danger of communal riots.
- (c) Senior officers and men were being taken to concentration camps at the discretion of junior officers and N. C. O.'s for no offence at all, and they were being put through very humiliating experiences. Life meant nothing to the organizers of this I. N. A. The Japs gave them full powers of life and death over us. Things looked very dark for

us and we decided that the best thing for us officers was to join the I. N. A., gain control of it and give protection to the P. O. W.

10. That at the end of May 1942, a lecture party arrived in Neeson Camp to address all officers, who were asked to decide finally whether or not they were going to become volunteers. I addressed the meeting as Camp. Comdt. and declared myself as a volunteer and told everyone to decide for himself.

11. That in the afternoon same day I called a meeting of Muslim officers in Mosque, and told them that the time for us to separate had come and that up till then I had given full support to them in my camp, but in future I foresaw great hardships for them. I told them that I agreed with the stand they had taken and not to change it through fear. They then said a "Dua-Khair" to that effect. Volunteers and non-volunteers were then separated but I always kept an eye on the P. O. W. and visited their camps frequently and saved a large number from concentration camp. I sent Dara and Sarwar many times to the D. P. M. to request him not to be too severe on P. O. W. who in majority of cases were innocent.

12. That in June 1942 I was sent to K. L. as a result of trouble with Mohan Singh over Bangkok Conference. That I met Dara at Ipoh in July and told him all about this trouble and that Mohan Singh was trying to get us out of the way, as he had realized our intentions, but that we were going to "stick in."

In Sept. 1942 I returned to Singapore and that my first task was a tour of P. O. W. camps in Singapore, where I found a reign of terror going on. Concentration camp was full of officers. I visited this camp and had most of them released.

13. That I also tore up the lists of P. O. W. in Seletar Camp who had decided to volunteer through coercion.

14. In Nov. 1942 a crisis arose between Mohan Singh and the Japs. We took this opportunity as God sent to wreck the I. N. A. We held meetings of the "Block" at Neesoon and played an important part in wrecking the I. N. A. In Dec. 1942 Mohan Singh was arrested and taken away, and there were propaganda lectures by Mr. Ras Behari Bose and Fujiwara. I stated at that meeting that we did not take R. B. Bose to be an Indian as his son was in the Jap Army.

15. I also opposed the demand of the I. N. A. to have P. O. W. under their command.

16. Final lecture by Gen. Iwakuro at Biddadari. The impression of officers who considered it a very critical moment and senior ones kept out of the light, as it was feared that the Japs were looking for a few scapegoats, to keep the I. N. A. intact through sheer force. I was known to be a ring leader and my friends kept a keen watch over me and asked me not to speak.

My reply to Gen. Iwakuro.

17. At this stage it was clear that the Japs would keep the I. N. A. going at all costs, and that there were enough junior and unscrupulous element who would play in the Jap hands and become complete puppets, and possibly restart a worse era of terrorism.

18. As a result of my reply to him Gen. Iwakuro agreed to allow all such men who came into the I. N. A. through fear, coercion and deceit to leave its ranks. As a result of this there was a general feeling of relief, and a feeling that a considerable amount of bloodshed had been averted.

19. That the next day I was sent for by Gen. Iwakuro and offered the leadership of the I. N. A.—returned and gave full details of the interview to my friends—I still continued to remain out of the I.N.A. In Feb. 1943 I was offered the job of the Chief of Operations Branch D. M. B. and I still refused to come into the I. N. A. but later due to persuasion of Iwakuro had to join it.

20. My talk with Dara :—

- (a) That I had committed myself too far in trying to get others out of the I. N. A. and that I advised all the rest of my friends to get out—Capt. Imamuddin—Sher Khan.
- (b) That since I was forced by circumstances to be in the I. N. A. my efforts were going to be directed to see that every one who wished to leave the I. N. A. was able to do so and without any danger of reprisals.

- (c) That those who remained in the I. N. A. were to be prepared even to fight against the Japs, if they proved dishonest.
- (d) To stop the Japs exploiting us for their own benefit.

21. In March 1943, the Japs took over control of all ex-I. N. A. men and were going to send them to the Pacific Islands, where the conditions were known to be very unpleasant. I, however, managed to save the undermentioned, most of them because they were too old to face such hardships.

- (1) Capt. Dilawarkhan; (2) S. M. Channan Singh;
- (3) Lt. Shafi Abdulla (4) S. M. Lalkhan; (5) Capt. T. M. Khanzada; (6) Sub. Hazara Singh and a large number of other aged officers.

22. Reorganization of the I. N. A. units was then started, as approx. 3,000 officers and men had gone out of it. To fill up these gaps a party was sent to the mainland where there were a large number of surplus volunteers of the I. N. A. to inform them of what had taken place in Singapore and to find out if any of them still wished to join the I. N. A. For this officers with a previous knowledge of the mainland were sent, to make arrangements for any men to come to Singapore for purpose of joining the I. N. A.

23. That at K. L. I found the Japs in control of a Rect. Training Centre, that I resented this strongly and on return reported to Col. Bhonsle and then went to see Col. Kawaga of the Hikari-Kikan.

24. That during all this time I was not very happy as I found that the Japs were ruthlessly exploit-

ing us, and my sympathies were with the P.O.W. whose camps I visited regularly and distributed medicines, money, etc., to them.

25. In July 1943 Netaji S. C. Bose arrived. We had never seen him before—we watched him very carefully. In Aug. I told Dara that we had now a leader who would not let the Japs exploit us—he would never sell India's honour for anything in the world and that I had completely changed my heart and from then onwards started working honestly for the movement.

26. In Sept. 1943, No. 1 Grla. Regt. (Subhas Bde.) was raised and I got Command of it. While leaving Taiping in Nov. 1943 for the front, I told Dara that I had accepted the command of No. 1 Regt. because :—

- (a) The Japs were definitely going into India, and that there was every chance of their overcoming the British resistance and carrying the fight into India. We had seen the Japs looting and raping in Singapore and were determined to see that it did not occur in India—if it did we would be able to turn round and fight the Japs.
- (b) Also I had a feeling that by my earlier actions I had kept a large number of Muslims out of the I. N. A., and that in the event of India being liberated they would be looked down upon in "Free India" for having taken no part in the fight for her liberation. So I felt an additional responsibility on those of

us who were in it for making an extra effort to make up this deficiency and to prove that the Muslims were as patriotic and as willing to make supreme sacrifices for India's independence as any other class or community.

Dara's Evidence

27. Conclusion :—

- (a) That I was mainly responsible for keeping a large number of people out of Mohan Singh's I. N. A. and that I gave every possible assistance and protection to them. Their welfare was uppermost in my heart.
- (b) That I played a prominent part in bringing about the crisis, although through force of circumstances I could not get out of it myself.
- (c) That after the arrival of Netaji I worked in the I. N. A. with the noblest of intentions and with full determination of making the supreme sacrifice for being a soldier for the first to the last day of fighting in Burma concentrated on fighting, under the most adverse conditions. That having given my word of honour to Netaji to fight for India's Independence I stood by it.

31. *Capt. M. Riaz, 3/16 Pb. Regt.*

1. Same as Dara. In addition that in October he was court-martialled as a part of the campaign to clear the I. N. A. of the party within the party.

32. Lt. Mohd. Sarwarkhan, 2/16 Pb. Regt.

Same as Dara, in addition that I did a lot for the P. O. W. especially at Seletar.

33. That he was my adjutant in Neesoon Camp—his evidence from Feb. 1942 to March 1943 as that of Dara.

34. Lt. Col. Loganadhan, I.M.S.

1. That during the crisis I played an important part against the I. N. A.

2. That in Feb. 1943, I refused the offer of the Executive Committee to the post of "Chief of Operations Branch."

35. Capt. I. Hassan, 1/14 Pb. Regt.

1. From the day of surrender till May 1942—
Same as Dara (1-9) (26-27).

2. That he was on the camp staff at Q. M.

36. Capt. M. A. Rashid, 1/14 Pb. Regt.

Same as Dara. In addition, that in May 1942, I went to the Naval Base and joined him on fatigue duties having given up command of Neesoon Camp in protest of the arrest of four Subedar Majors. The next day Col. Gilani came and took me to my camp having given the assurance that 4 V. C. O.'s had been released and that in future no one would be taken to the concentration camp without my consent.

37. Capt. T. M. Khanzada, 5/11 Sikh Regt.

1. That he met me at the end of March 1942, when I told him all about the situation in Singapore and that we had formed a block to resist the I. N. A. He also joined the Block, and organized another "Block" in Bidaddari. From then on till Sept. 1943 his evidence is the same as Dara's.

2. In addition that when I returned from K. L. in Sept. 1942, Taj told me about the Kranji shooting incident and that he had been a member of C. M. assembled for the purpose of trying the gunners. He also stated that Mohan Singh had given them previous orders that the punishment awarded by the court would be *death*, and that the witnesses had been beaten before the court by the prosecution, and that neither he nor the president or other members had objected to this. That I had rebuked Taj for this, and had great sympathy with those who had been thus maltreated and that during the crisis I gave money to Taj to distribute to the victims.

3. That in Nov./Dec. 1942 heard about a shooting incident at K. L. and that some of men had been sent to Singapore to be tried by the I. N. A. Taj and I went to P. O. W. H. Q. and found five men were tied up there. Took steps to have them released and sent to P. O. W. camp in Seletar.

38. *Major Aziz Ahmed, Kapurthala Infy.*

1. That he met me after the surrender of Singapore and found that I was against the idea of the formation of an I. N. A. (Taj-Dara-Irshad incident).

2. That when the Biddadari resolutions were being framed, for the purpose of creating an obstruction, that I was the follower of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, and the Muslim League, and that by the words "on call from the people of India" I understood it to be a call from them.

3. That a few days after this incident typed forms bearing the Biddadari resolutions were sent to all camp Comdts. with orders that these would be read out to all officers and brought to the notice of Sepoys by them.

4. That soon after this (approx. 2-3) another order from H. Q. was received, which ordered the Camp Commandants to assemble all officers for an address by a lecture party and that every one had to decide whether or not they accepted the Biddadari resolutions. The volunteers and non-volunteers were to be separated and lists of each category were asked for.

Lecture tour party visited all camps, undermentioned were the members of the party. That I was not a member of it.

5. That we both were present at a meeting of senior officers held at Mohan Singh's Bungalow at Mt. Pleasant to discuss membership for the forthcoming Bangkok Conference—That I disagreed with the method and all present, including Mohan Singh, agreed with my proposal, but later he heard that I (Sub) had been sent to K. L.

6. That in September 1942, I was recalled from K. L. to Singapore and posted to O. T. S. Neesoon—where he was also stationed.

7. That during the crisis we worked together in bringing the crisis to a head, we also held private meetings in Neesoon for their purpose.

8. In Feb. 1943, Gen. Iwakuro addressed a meeting of all officers, approx. 200/300 and tried to establish

that the I. N. A. could not be disbanded and if anyone tried to create any disturbances, it would be treated as mutiny, and that the Jap Army would assist that I replied and convinced Gen. Iwakuro of the immorality of keeping the I. N. A. going. His agreement to this.

9. That the following day I was sent for by Gen. Iwakuro, and on return I (Sub.) told Aziz that I had been offered the leadership of the I. N. A. and that I refused it and told Iwakuro that the only way of starting a real I. N. A. was to call S. C. Bose to Singapore.

10. Later on he joined the I. N. A. as C. G. S. In May 1943, we both were present, among many others—Ogawa told that in the Arakans some Indians had been taken prisoners, but that due to the lack of food they were killed by the Japs. I (Sub.) replied to this and told Ogawa that it was a cold-blooded murder, as some of them might have come as a result of the I. N. A. propaganda and exhorted I. N. A. to cease all co-operation with the Japs so as to absolve ourselves of all responsibility of the murder of Indian soldiers.

11. That in Aug. 1943, a conference was held by Netaji at G. H. Q. All Regt. Comds. and above were present. It was decided to raise a "Crack Regt." Reasons and objects of raising this Regt.

12. That he next met me in Rangoon in Oct. 1944—after undergoing great hardships during the Imphal operations. In Dec. 1944, I was sent to

Mandalay to assist in the evacuation of 1 Div. to Pyinmana, and in March got command of No. 2 Div.

Conclusion :—

- (a) Phase (i) Risked his life on more than one occasion in his stand against the I. N. A.
- (b) Phase (2) when convinced of the sincerity of leader worked honestly under greatest hardships.

MAIN POINTS FROM NETAJI'S LECTURES.

41. *Capt. Thakur S.*
42. *Capt. Mahboob Ahmed.*
43. *Capt. P. S. Ratur.*

1. That the people inside India were labouring against great odds to secure their liberation, and that it was our moral obligation to assist them, while we were in a position to do so.
2. That he was determined to see that the Indians themselves fought for and secured their own independence, and that it would be a treachery to our country to stay behind while the Japs invaded India.
3. That for the coming fight he asked for true volunteers, and gave ample opportunities to the waverers to leave the ranks of the I. N. A. To the real volunteers he promised, thirst, hunger forced marches and in the end death, but in return for all this he promised them the liberation of their motherland.
4. He also stated on several mass meetings that he regarded himself, provisional Govt. of India, and the I. N. A. as the servants of the people of India, to

whom everything would be handed over on our arrival there.

MY LECTURES TO THE REGIMENT :

1. Reasons for which No. 1 Regiment was raised. That it was the cream of the I. N. A. and that every man in the Regiment must be prepared to pay the price of liberty with his blood.

2. That the Japanese were going into India in the near future, and that by being among the foremost, it would be our duty to see that the Japs committed no excesses in India.

Orders were issued that any soldier seeing a Jap or anyone else looting or raping in India was to shoot him at sight.

3. That every member of the Regiment was to be on alert the whole time to see that by our actions we were not merely replacing the British by the Japs and every one was warned to be prepared at all times to turn round and fight the Japs if they proved dishonest.

4. That no soldier was to accept any form of domination from the Japanese.

5. Finally chances were given to everyone to get out of the Regiment if they did not feel equal to these tasks. At Taiping a large number including Lt. Khan Mohd. and Capt. Ilyas were left behind, and similarly at Rangoon.

SOME INTERESTING INCIDENTS :

1. Bose Bde. soldiers refused to carry Japanese Flags for purposes of co-operation with Jap airforce.

:so high was their nationalism and pride they considered it an insult to carry another nation's flag into India even for co-operation.

2. That the I. N. A. soldiers refused to salute even the highest Jap officers when the Jap soldiers did not salute I. N. A. officers.

3. That there were instances where the Jap units were put under direct command of I. N. A. officers.

4. That there was a tendency among the I. N. A. soldiers to beat the Jap soldiers to establish their superiority, which they considered necessary to remove any disillusionments that any Jap may have about Indians. The Regt. Adjutant had to issue written orders to forbid this practice.

5. That there were instances when the I. N. A. had to open fire on the Japs.

39. Jem. Hari Singh, 6/14 Pb. Regt.

That the Indian soldiers taken prisoners by the Japs and the I. N. A. were handed over to him, approx. 500 and that most of them were released by him.

40. Lt. Ran Singh, 9 Jat.

That the Chin Platoon captured by us was treated as P. O. W. and given the option of either staying with us or joining Nishikikan (Chin Army) and that they were treated very kindly.

II.

P. K. SAHGAL.

NOMINAL ROLL OF DEFENCE WITNESSES.

1. *Major Aziz Ahmad.*

(a) Lt. Col. Hunt handing over ; speech at Farrer Park, 17th Feb. 1942.

(b) Maj. Fujiwara handed over Ind. P. O. W. to Capt. Mohan Singh, G. O. C., I. N. A., in the presence of Lt.-Col. Hunt. Many officers senior to Mohan Singh present among the P. O. W.—no objections raised by Col. Hunt.

(c) International character of Bangkok conference and the resolutions passed there.

(d) Gen. Tojo and various other members of the Japanese Government made declarations regarding the Independence of India, from time to time.

(e) The Prov. Government of Azad Hind was formed on the 21st October 1943. It was recognised by nine foreign Governments. Japanese Ambassador to the Prov. Government appointed.

(f) The Prov. Government of Azad Hind declared war on Great Britain and America on the 22nd October 1943.

(g) I. N. A. was a properly organised armed force, it wore uniforms and distinctive badges and

badges of ranks. It was governed by I. N. A. Act and various other rules and regulations. It waged war according to the civilised modes of warfare.

(h) Existence and the Role of I. N. A. was announced to the world by Netaji immediately after the formation of the Prov. Government of Azad Hind and the I. N. A. was recognised by the nine foreign Governments.

(i) When Netaji assumed Supreme Command of the I. N. A. every one was given the opportunity of leaving the I. N. A. if he wished to do so.

(j) Japanese exercised no influence whatsoever in the working of the I. N. A.

(k) I. N. A. was prepared to fight the Japanese if needed.

(l) I. N. A. was waging a war for the liberation of India, it was not a racial war.

(m) Many Indian Army units from among the Ps. of W. were taken away by the Japanese to fight under their Command. Some Anti-aircrafts units were even taken to Sabu in 1942, before the formation of the I. N. A. Netaji after a good deal of trouble with the Japanese brought them back into the I. N. A. These units were also given the option of either joining the I. N. A. or reverting back to proper prisoners of war.

(n) At the end of 1942, there was a crisis in the I. N. A. Japanese then tried to raise a puppet army from among the civilians and certain Ps. of W. S. M.

Hakim Khan was brought from Hongkong to command this army. Officers of the I. N. A. did not like the idea that Japanese should raise a puppet army and exploit the Indians, therefore, they decided to force the Japanese to accept their terms. The Japanese realising that they could not do without the support of sincere officers agreed to their terms. They also announced that Netaji would soon be coming to assume the leadership of the Movement in East Asia so the I. N. A. was reorganised.

- (o) When the I. N. A. was reorganised only willing volunteers were taken in the I. N. A. and no one was forced to join.
- (p) Following meetings of Indian Delegates from East Asia were held in Singapore :—
 - (i) April 1943 to revise the constitution of the I. I. L.
 - (ii) August 1943 to elect Netaji as President of I. I. L.
 - (iii) October 1943 to form the Prov. Government of Azad Hind.
- (q) In 1944, during the Bengal Famine Netaji offered 100,000 tons of rice to the Government of India. The rice had been secured from the Government of Burma and it was ready for shipment.

- (r) Territories of Andamans and Nicobars handed over to the Prov. Government. Laganandan appointed Chief Commissioner. (Islands renamed Shaheed and Sawaraj).

(s) Indian officers were not permitted to join clubs in Malaya.

(t) 1942 disturbances in India—owing to the censorship no news from their sources. Japanese stories of peaceful Indian villages being bombed and machine-gunned from the air, processions and other peaceful citizens fired at by the British troops, great indignation caused among all the Indians of East Asia.

(u) Shahnawaz was in Rangoon till the 7th March 1945.

(CC) After the surrender of Singapore the Japanese told us about the way in which the Indian civilians had been evacuated from Burma. The very worst route had been allotted to them and no arrangements for supplies and medical attention had been made *en route*. Over two lakhs Indians died owing to starvation and diseases. On arrival in India, no arrangements had been made for their reception.

(DD) After the surrender of Singapore the Japanese also told us the schemes of the British scorched earth policy in Burma—how many villages and towns had been burnt and many inhabitants massacred. On arrival in Burma, we saw the destruction caused by the British with our own eyes.

2. Lt. Col. A. D. Loganadan.

(a) Loganadan's protest to Brig Stringer re. senior officers being put under Command of Captain Mohan Singh. Stringer's reply "God help you."

- (b) Refusal of the Rep. of Swiss Red Cross to visit the Indian Prisoners of War Camp in Singapore.
- (c) Declarations by the members of the Japanese Government re. Independence of India.
- (d) International character of the Bangkok conference and the resolutions passed there.
- (e) The Prov. Government of A. H. was formed on the 21st October 1943. It was recognised by nine foreign Governments. Japanese Ambassador to the Prov. Government appointed.
- (f) The Prov. Government of Azad Hind declared war on Great Britain and America on the 22nd October 1943.
- (g) The I. N. A. was a properly organised force, it wore uniform and distinctive badges and badges of rank. It was governed by I. N. A. Act and various other rules and regulations. It waged war according to the civilized modes of warfare.
- (h) Existence and the role of the I. N. A. was announced to the world by Netaji, immediately after the formation of the Prov. Government of A. H. and the I. N. A. was recognised by the nine foreign Governments.
- (i) When Netaji assumed Supreme Command of the I. N. A. every one was given the opportunity of leaving the I. N. A. if he wished to do so.
- (j) Japanese exercised no influence whatsoever in the working of I. N. A.
- (k) I. N. A. was prepared to fight the Japanese if needed.

(l) I. N. A. was waging a war for the liberation of India—it was not a racial war.

(m) Many Indian Army Units from among the Prisoners of War were taken away by the Japanese to fight under their Command. Some anti-aircraft units were even taken to Cebu in 1942, before the formation of the I. N. A. Netaji after a good deal of trouble with the Japanese brought them back into the I. N. A. These units were also given the option of either joining the I. N. A. or reverting back to proper Ps. of W.

(n) At the end of 1942, there was a crisis in the I. N. A. Japanese then tried to raise a puppet army from among the civilians and certain Ps. of W. S. M. Hakim Khan was brought from Hongkong to command this army. Officers of the I. N. A. did not like the idea that the Japanese should raise a puppet army and exploit the Indians. Therefore they decided to force the Japanese to accept their terms. The Japanese realising Netaji would soon be coming to assume the leadership of the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia, so the I. N. A. was re-organised.

(o) When the I. N. A. was re-organised only willing volunteers were taken and no one was forced to join.

(p) Following meetings of Indian delegates from East Asia were held in Singapore:—

(i) April 1943 to revise the constitution of I. I. L.

(ii) Aug. 1943 to elect Netaji as President of I. I. L.

(iii) Oct. 1943 to form the Prov. Govt.

(q) In 1944, during the Bengal Famine, Netaji offered 1,00,000 tons of rice to the Govt. of India. The rice had been secured from the Govt. of Burma and it was ready for shipment.

(r) Territories of Andamans and Nicobars were handed over to the Prov. Govt. of Azad Hind. Loganadan appointed Chief Commissioner and took charge of the Adaman Islands renamed Shaheed and Sawaraj isles.

(s) Indian officers were not allowed to join the Clubs in Malaya—a cause of heart-burning.

(t) No Red Cross representative ever visited any Indian P. of W. camp in Singapore.

(u) Protection accorded by the I. N. A. to the Indian Civilians in Burma after the Japanese had left. Murder incidents in Thingangyan, Rangoon, after which Brig. Lauder requested the I. N. A. authorities to post guards in that area to protect Indian lives.

(v) Surrender of I. N. A. units in Rangoon. British request to wear I. A. badges of rank, etc., to avoid trouble between the I. A. and I. N. A.

(w) Great indignation caused by the British atrocities in 1942 in India.

(x) After the surrender of Singapore the Japanese told us about the way in which Indian civilians had been evacuated from Burma. The British Government gave the worst route to the Indians and no arrangements were made for supplies and medical attention in the way. Owing to starvation and disease

over 2 lakhs died in the way. On arrival in India, no arrangements whatsoever were made for their reception.

3. Maj. M. Z. Kiani.

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r are same as for Maj. Aziz Ahmad.

(u) Capt. I. J. Kiani administered liberated Indian territory in Manipur area from the H. Qrs. in Chamol.

(v) According to the understanding between Netaji and the Japanese General H. Qrs. the I. N. A. was recognised as an Allied army equal in status in every form. No one from the I. N. A. was at any time subject to the Japanese Military Law whereas Phillipines, Burma and Nanking armies had accepted such conditions under which members of their armed forces could be tried according to the Japanese Law and by Japanese courts, under certain conditions.

(w) Col. P. K. Sahgal had been given full powers of punishment by the Supreme Command.

(x) No representative of Red Cross ever visited any Indian Prisoner of War Camp.

(y) Difference between British and Indian Commissioned Officers.

(z) Low rates of pay of Indian Sepoys.

(CC) and (DD) same as for Maj. Aziz Ahmad.

4. Capt. A. D. Jahangir.

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s and t same as Maj. Aziz Ahmad.

(u) It was in the month of Oct. 1944 when Lt. Col. A. D. Jahangir, Secretary, Recruiting and Training Deptt. H. Qrs., I. I. League, East Asia, was ordered by Netaji (President War Council) to proceed to North Burma on a recruiting tour. The recruiting party headed by Col. Jahangir left Rangoon in the middle of Oct. 1944. Reached Pegu the next day and convened a meeting of League officials (District Officer and others) and Japanese authorities (Chief of Kimpe Tai and others) were also requested to attend.

(i) In a meeting at Pagu in Oct. 1944 the Indian public complained to Col. Jahangir (Secty. R. and T. Deptt. on tour) about the removal of cattle by Japs specially Mori Butai authorities assisted by Burmese officials. (Burmese and Jap officials were present in the meeting).

(ii) An enquiry was made on spot and a complete report submitted to Vice-President H. Qrs. I. I. League at Rangoon.

(iii) Reported to Officer in Charge I. I. League (Sri Sarkar) who authorized Col. Jahangir to liaise with (who arrived Pagu on the following morning on his way back to Rangoon), Burmese and Jap authorities concerned and settle down the whole affair.

(iv) Col. Jahangir explained the situation, repercussions, and the consequences to Burmese and Jap authorities and requested them to stop this action until the matter was finally decided by Mori Bontain H. Qrs. and Burmese Govt. (Ministry of Commodity and Tpt).

(v) The same 'complaints were made by other League Bros., on the way. The local Jap authorities were approached.

(vi) At Kyautaga 30 miles south of Ziawaddy, an Indian Grant under Jap Administration with a population of 9,000 Indians, the same complaint was strongly made and that of forced labour. The Burmese Tuggis had already fixed a date and warned local Indians to produce their cattle on certain spot. Local Burmese and Jap authorities were approached too and the delivery of cattle was delayed for some time. An elaborate report was prepared and despatched to H. Qrs. in Rangoon, requesting them to meet Mori Bontai authorities and get orders cancelled.

(vii) Col. Jahangir proceeded to Ziawaddy. The date of delivery of cattle approached, but no answer was received from Rgn. H. Qrs due to bad communication and transport difficulties. A party of one Jap officer and 20 O. R. arrived Kyautaga with transport to take the delivery. Few hundred Indian civilians demonstrated, but Japs informed them that they will take the delivery by to-morrow morning and use force if necessary.

(viii) Two men were despatched to Ziawaddy by the League's Chairman to inform the whole affair to Col. Jahangir. The prestige and honour of B. G. A. H. was at stake. Hence, Lt. Shiv Singh, O. C. Ziawaddy Trg. Camp with armed guard was despatched to Kyautaga. Col. Jahangir wrote a personal letter to O. C. Japs party and requested him not to take the

delivery until Col. Jahangir's return to Rangoon. Lt. Shiv Singh was given definite orders to use force if Japs misbehaved.

(ix) Shiv Singh and party arrived Kyantaga at 4 P.M. the following morning and met the Jap officer at 6 A.M who was slightly rude. He wanted to use force, but Shiv Singh told him that he too had an armed guard with him and he will be compelled to use force against force.

Indian Banner was helped and Japs withdrew.

(v) Sahgal's letter to Hikari Kikan regarding exchange of compliments.

(w) Release of Naidu from the Japanese M. P.

(CC) and (DD) the same as for Maj. Aziz Ahmed.

5.

1. a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s and t same as for Maj. Aziz Ahmad.

(u) In Dec. 1942, Sahgal was staying with Hussain and they often discussed the crisis in the I. N. A. Sahgal's views were "we should make every effort to counter the Japanese efforts to raise a puppet army under S. M. Hakim Khan or any one else. As the Japanese seemed to be determined to raise an army, it was essential that we should raise a strong I. N. A. consisting of true volunteers, who were not only willing to fight the British for the liberation of India but they must be prepared to fight the Japanese also if they failed to honour their pledge ?

(v) Efforts of the British and Free French authorities to induce the French men interned in St.

John's island to join the Free French forces in 1940—1941.

(w) F. M. S. Railway regulation prohibiting Asiatics to travel in the same compartment of a European.

(x) Difference between British Officer's and I. C. O.'s pay.

(y) Low rates of pay or Indian Sepoys.

(z) Shahnawazkhan left Rangoon 7th March 1945.

(aa) Chimpan—clash between the Japanese and Thai Units.

(bb) Magwe—clash between the Japanese and B. D. A.

(cc) and (dd) the same as for Maj. Aziz Ahmad.

(ee) Discriminate treatment of Asiatics during the evacuation of Penang and Singapore.

(ff) The first aid posts established in Singapore refused to give medical attention to Indian air raid casualties.

(gg) Effect of news concerning the British atrocities in India during 1942 disturbances.

6. Capt. T. A. Naidu.

(a) At Popo Sahgal in his lectures gave the option to each officer and soldier to return to Rangoon if he was unwilling to stay in the front line.

(b) Sahgal in his lectures at Popo told all the officers and men under his command that anyone wishing to go over to the allies would be allowed to do so.

(c) On the 28th April Sahgal sent a letter through Banta Singh offering the conditional surrender of the officers and men under his command to the Allies as prisoners of war.

(d) After the surrender, at first the officers were separated from the men, but later, they were allowed to rejoin them. Sahgal told us that it was done on his request and that he had given the British Commander an assurance that he would be personally responsible for the behaviour of his men during the period he was with them. On the night of the 28th there was exchange of fire between the Gurkhas and some Japanese. No incident caused by the I. N. A. troops. I. N. A. troops were only about 10 to 20 yards from the arms and ammunition that they had surrendered that day.

(e) On the night of the 16th March 1945, during the raid of Pynbin 2/Lt. Joginder Singh beat a Japanese 2/Lt. who had refused to advance along with the I. N. A. unit.

7. *Capt. Mahboob Ahmad.*

(a) Mahboob sent a telegram to Sahgal, conveying the Supreme Commander's confirmation of the sentence of death passed in case of Ganga Ram, and giving full powers of punishment to Sahgal.

(b) Divisional Commanders in the field were given full powers of punishment by the S. C.

(c) Sahgal was officiating commandant, No. 2 Division in Popoa area during the period 13th Feb. to 12th March 1945.

(d) Difference between British Officers and I.C.O's pay.

(e) Low rates of pay of Indian Sepoys.

(f) Extreme indignation caused by the atrocities caused by the British in India during the 1942 disturbances.

(g) Shahnawaz Khan left Regiment on the 7th March 1945.

(h) Indian Officers not admitted into clubs in Malaya.

(cc) and (dd) the same as for Major Aziz Ahmad.

8. Captain J. W. Rodergues.

(a) Arshad, Sahgal and Rodergues met in July 1944, and discussed rejoining the I. N. A. At the time it seemed very likely that the Japanese would soon be going into India and to save the Indians from the ravages of the Japanese and to ensure that there would be strong armed body ready to oppose the Japanese in case they decided not to honour their pledges, it was decided to volunteer for the I. N. A.

(b) Discussions during the crisis, decision to join the I. N. A. to counter the Japanese efforts to raise a puppet army.

(c) In Magwe together in Ps. of War cage and accorded the treatment of Ps. of W.

(d) Difference between British Officer's and I.C.O's pay.

(e)) Low rates of pay for Indian sepoys.

(f) Indian Officers not allowed to become members of clubs.

9. *Captain R. M. Arshad.*

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, and t the same as for Major Aziz Ahmad.

(u) In June-July Arshad, Rodrigues and Sahgal met to discuss the subject of joining the I. N. A., decided to do so to save the Indians from the ravages of the Japanese and to be in a position to fight the Japanese if they decided not to honour their pledges with regard to Indian Independence.

(v) Discussions during the crisis, decided to join the I. N. A. to counter the Japanese efforts to raise a puppet army.

(w) Protection of Indian civilians in Burma after the Japanese had left.

(x) Surrender of I. N. A. in Rangoon, British request to the I. N. A. to wear I. A. badges of rank, etc., to avoid trouble with the I. A.

(y) No Red Cross representative ever visited any Indian P. O. W. Camp.

(z) Difference between British Officers and I.C.O's pay.

(aa) Low rates of pay for Indian sepoys.

(cc) and (dd) the same as for Major Aziz Ahmad.

(ee) Discrimination between the Europeans and Asiatics during the evacuation of Singapore.

(ff) The first aid posts set up in Singapore refused to treat Indian air raid casualties.

10. Subedar Banta Singh.

(a) In Rangoon Sahgal told all ranks in the Regiment, that those who go to the front must be prepared to face great hardships and on arrival in India willing to fight against the Japanese if they did not honour their pledges, and such persons who were not willing or fit to face these hardships should give their names to him and arrangements would be made to give them jobs in Rangoon.

(b) A number of such persons who were either unfit or unwilling to go to the front were transferred to the Reinforcement group and no action was taken against anyone.

(c) Sahgal told all ranks in the Regiment that in Burma, their behaviour towards the Burmese and other people should be exemplary. They should be as their friends and not oppressors. "In India," he told all his officers and men, "they should feel that they are the servants of their people and not as masters."

(d) After arrival in Popo, Sahgal gave an option of going back to Rangoon, to all those who could not stand up to the danger and hardships of the front line.

(e) In Popo Sahgal also gave an option to all ranks of his Regiment that they could go over to the Allies. In such cases they would not be allowed to take any arms or papers with them and arrangements

would be made to allow them a safe passage through the I. N. A. sentries.

(f) On the 28th of April, Sahgal sent a letter offering the conditional surrender of the officers and men under his command as Prisoners of War to the British Commander in Magigaon area. Banta Singh carried the letter and the British Commander accepted the conditional surrender. If the conditional surrender had not been accepted it were possible to continue fighting.

(g) After the surrender, first the Officers were separated from the men, but later they were allowed to rejoin them. Sahgal told us that it was done on his request and that he had given an assurance to the British Commander that he would be personally responsible for the behaviour of all ranks under his Command. That night, there was exchange of fire between the Gurkhas and the Japanese, no disturbances caused by the I. N. A. I. N. A. troops were only 10 to 20 yards from the arms and ammunitions that they had surrendered that day.

(h) In Magwae Sahgal, I and the rest of the unit were in a P.O.W. cage.

(i) In March 1945, Banta Singh put up about 5 men including Mr. Ahmad Khan before Colonel Sahgal. These men were charged with desertion. Sahgal pardoned these men and let them off.

(j) On the 16th March during the raid on Pyinbin 2/Lt. Jogindar Singh slapped the Japanese 2/Lt.

(k) Sahgal had issued order that any Jap who misbehaved was to be beaten up.

(l) Before the Regiment left Rangoon, Sahgal issued order that all Prisoners of War were to be treated kindly.

12. Havaldar Shiv Singh.

To corroborate Captain Jehangir's statement—regarding Kyantaga incident.

13. Captain A. B. Singh.

Certain men of No. 2 Infantry Regiment were sent back from Popo, because they were unwilling to stay in the front line. No action was taken against any of them.

14. Captain S.V. Krishnan.

In 1942 when Krishnan was serving with the 7/10 Baluch Regiment in Burma a report was received describing a patrol action carried out by troops under Sahgal's Command in Malaya.

15. Captain Gulzara Singh.

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s and t the same as for Major Aziz Ahmad.

(u) Corroborate Major Kiani's statement regarding the understanding concerning the I. N. A. arrived at between Netaji and the Japanese General Head Quarters.

(v) Difference between the rates of pay of the British Officers and the I.C.O.'s.

(w) Low rates of pay for the Indian sepoys in Malaya.

(x) Extreme indignation caused by the British atrocities during the 1942 disturbances.

(y) ; The fight put by Sahgal during the discussion with the Japanese regarding the understanding concerning the I. N. A.

16. *Lt. Col. Hunt.*

(a) Handing over ceremony at Farrer Park on the 17th February.

(b) Lt. Col. Hunt was present when Fujiwara handed over the Indian Ps. O. W. to Captain Mohan Singh, G. O. C., I. N. A.

(c) Lt. Col. Hunt made no protest about the handing over of the Senior Officers of the I. A. to Capt. Mohan Singh.

17. *Lt. Col. P. W. Davis*

Information he had received regarding Sahgal's work during the Malayan Campaign.

When the 2/10th Baluch Regiment arrived in Kot Bham, the local people were very frightened of the Indian soldiers, because of the high-handed treatment accorded to them by one Coy. of Indian troops which was sent there to quell a rising.

18. *Captain Rashid Yusuf Ali.*

(a) Yusuf Ali examined a number of persons who had served under Sahgal's Command and they told him that Sahgal had given every one under his Command the opportunity to go over to his allies if any one wished to do so.

(b) Sahgal was living in a Prisoner of War cage in Magwe when he met him.

19. Major A. K. Dass.

Up to July 1942 Sahgal was living in Tengah aerodrome Camp which was a non-volunteer Camp. About 3 months before that Officer and men had been asked to volunteer on the basis of the Bidai dari resolution and the volunteers and non-volunteers had been put in separate Camps.

20. Captain Zahir-ud-Din.

Zahir was dropped by the Allies in Burma to carry out espionage work for them. He was arrested by the Japanese Military Police and it was mainly through Sahgal's efforts that was released.

21. Major Ghanshyam Singh.

(a) Certain Officers and men from among the Indian Ps. O. W. in Singapore were taken away by the Japanese and Ghanshyam Singh was one of them. They were being forced against their wishes to take up arms and to do guard duties. They appealed to the D. N. B., I. N. A. and it was through the efforts of the I. N. A. that they were released. Sahgal played an important part in this.

(b) No Red Cross representative ever visited the Indian P.O.W. camps in Singapore.

22. Major Aung Sen.

(a) Origin of the B. D. A. and its objects in 1941.

(b) B. D. A. contained a number of persons who had once belonged to the British armed forces.

(c) B. D. A. and I. N. A. used to hold combined staff conferences with the Japanese.

(d) B. D. A. fought against the Allied forces.

23. *Colonel Kyado.*

a, b, c, and d the same as for Major General Aung Sen.

(e) Col. Kyado was once in the Indian Army, i.e., 2/1st Punjab Regiment and later transferred to the Burma Military Police.

24. *Major General Kajmura.*

(a) The I. N. A. had been accorded the status of an Allied Army by Japan and functioned as such.

(b) In 1944, Staff Officers of the I. N. A., B. D. A. and Japanese General Head Quarters used to hold combined conferences.

(c) B. D. A. was armed, equipped and trained by the Japanese and it fought against the Allied Force.

25. *Lt. Col. Thein Haw.*

Some as Major General Aung Sen.

26. *Lt. Col. Fujiwara.*

(a) Lt. Col. Hunt on behalf of the British Government handed over the I. Ps. of W. to him as the representative of the Japanese Government.

(b) Lt. Col. Fujiwara handed over the Indians to Captain Mohan Singh, G. O. C., I. N. A., in the presence of Hunt. Hunt raised no objection on this procedure.

(c) Declaration by General Tojo and other members of the Cabinet regarding Independence.

27. *Lt. Col. Takaki.*

(a) Recognition of the Prov. Government of Azad Hind by nine foreign powers.

(b) Recognition of the I. N. A. as an Allied Army, equal in status by the Japanese and other foreign Governments.

(c) Declaration of war on Great Britain and America by the Prov. Government of Azad Hind.

(d) Handing over of the Andamans and Nicobar Islands to the Prov. Government of Azad Hind.

(e) Administration by I. N. A. Officers of the liberated areas.

(f) Sahgal's independent attitude and the refusal to allow the Japanese to interfere with the I. N. A., affairs.

(g) Zahir-ud-Din's release due entirely to Sahgal's efforts.

(h) Combined Staff Conference of the I. N. A., B. D. A. and Japanese Staff Officers.

(i) The B. D. A. had accepted terms according to which personnel of the B. D. A. could be tried according to the Japanese Law by Japanese Courts under certain conditions, but Sahgal on behalf of the I. N. A. had categorically refused to accept such terms.

(j) Sahgal on behalf of the I. N. A. had categorically refused to subordinate the I. N. A. Military Police to the Japanese Military Police.

(k) Sahgal, on behalf of the I. N. A. had refused to allow any information of the I. N. A. being placed under the Unified Command of the Commander of a lower Japanese formation, even if the Japanese Commander concerned was senior in rank to the I. N. A. Commander, whereas the Burmese and certain other authorities had accepted it.

28. *Representative of the Japanese Foreign Office.*

(a) Declaration by the Japanese Government regarding Indian Independence.

(b) Recognition and status of the Indian Independence League.

(c) International character of the Bangkok Conference and the resolutions passed at the Conference.

(d) Formation of the Prov. Government of Azad Hind on 21st October 1943. Recognition by Japan and eight other Governments.

(e) Terms of the treaty between the Prov. Government of Azad Hind and the Government of Japan.

(f) Recognition of the I. N. A. as an Allied Army by Japan and other powers.

(g) Declaration of war by the Prov. Government of Azad Hind on Great Britain and America on 22nd October 1943.

(h) Handing over of the Andamans and the Nicobars to the Prov. Government of A. H.

(i) Diplomatic relations established between the Government of Japan and the Prov. Government of India. Japanese Ambassador appointed.

29. *Lt. Gen. Ishoda.*

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, and i the same as for witness No. 28.

(j) I. N. A. was properly organised armed body, wore uniform and distinctive badges of rank and fought according to the civilised forms of warfare.

(k) No Japanese influence in the working of the I. N. A.

(l) Sahgal's independent attitude and his refusal to allow the Japanese to interfere in any manner in the working of the I. N. A.

(m) Contents of the understanding *re.* the I. N. A. arrived at between Netaji and the Japanese General Head Quarters.

30. *N. Raghavan*

(a) Aims and the early history of the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia.

(b) Tokyo Conference, 1942.

(c) Japanese declarations regarding Indian Independence.

(d) International character of Bangkok Conference and the resolutions passed therein.

(e) Functions of the Council of Action and the working of the I. I. L.

(f) Crisis—December 1942.

(g) Formation of the Prov. Government and its recognition by foreign Governments.

(h) Declaration of war by the Prov. Government of Azad Hind on Great Britain and America.

(i) I. N. A. was an organised armed force, wearing uniforms, distinctive badges and badges of rank.

(j) I. N. A. fought according to the recognised rules of civilised warfare.

(k) Independent attitude of Sahgal towards the Japanese.

(l) Indignation caused by British atrocities during 1942 disturbances.

31. *Subedar Thayacrajan.*

(a) Before leaving Rangoon, Sahgal warned all officers and men under his command that their behaviour towards the population of Burma should be exemplary. Furthermore on arrival in India they should work as the servants of the Indian people.

(b) In Popo Sahgal gave the option of going back to Rangoon to all those persons under his Command, who were unwilling to stay in the front line.

(c) In Popo Sahgal offered a safe passage through his lines to all those persons, who wished to go over to the Allies.

(d) On the 28th of April 1945 when the Conference of all the Officers decided to surrender, Sahgal wrote a letter offering the conditional surrender of the

officers and men under his command, as P. O. W. to the Allied Commander. This conditional surrender was accepted and we surrendered as P.O.W. If the conditional surrender had not been accepted, it was possible for us to continue fighting and all the officers and men were determined to carry on fighting to the bitter end.

(e) After the surrender, first the officers were separated from the men, but they were allowed to rejoin them. Sahgal told us that it was done on his request and that he had assumed responsibility for the good behaviour of the officers and men under his command. That night there was exchange of fire between the Gurkhas and some Japanese. No disturbance caused by the I. N. A. I. N. A. men only 10 to 20 yards from the arms and ammunitions that they had surrendered that day.

(f) In Magwe we were all in a P. O. W. cage.

(g) Col. Sahgal had issued orders in his Regiment that every one in the Regiment must uphold his dignity while dealing with the Japanese. If anyone acted otherwise, he would be severely dealt with.

(h) Sahgal had issued orders that if any Jap misbehaved himself he should be given a thorough beating.

(i) Firing on Indian Labourers in Khaug.

(k) Discriminate treatment accorded to the Asiatics during the evacuation of Penang.

32. *Doctor S. Lakshmi.*

(a) Prov. Government of Azad Hind was formed on the 21st October 1943. It was recognised by nine foreign Governments.

(b) The Prov. Government declared war on Great Britain and America on the 22nd October 1943.

(c) Soon after the formation of the Provisional Government Netaji made an announcement to the world about the formation of the I. N. A. and its objects.

(d) The I. N. A. was a regular armed force, wearing uniforms, distinctive badges and badges of rank and fought according to the recognised civilised form of warfare.

(e) In 1944, Netaji offered to send 100,000 tons of rice to India to relieve the famine-stricken Bengal. This rice was ready for shipment.

(f) Sahgal continuously worked to keep the I. N. A. clear of the Japanese influence. He always aimed to counter all Japanese efforts to exploit the I. N. A. or the Indians.

(g) Extreme indignation caused by the British atrocities during the 1942 disturbances.

(h) Firing on Indian labourers on Khaug.

(i) Discrimination shown to Asiatics during the evacuation of Penang and Singapore.

33. *Mr. A. Vellarpa.*

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h and i the same as Doctor S. Lakshmi.

(j) Money collected in East Asia by the Prov. Government was entirely through voluntary contributions.

34. *Capt. I. J. Kiani.*

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s and t the same as Maj. Aziz Ahmad.

(u) I. J Kiani administered liberated Indian territory in Manipur area.

(v) No representative of the Red Cross ever visited any Indian P. O. W. camp in Singapore.

(w) Difference between the British and I. C. O.'s pay.

(x) Low rates of Indian sepoys.

35. *Capt. S. A. Malik.*

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s and t the same as Maj. Aziz Ahmad.

(u) Capt. Malik administered the liberated areas in Bishanpur sector.

(v) No Red Cross Rep. ever visited any Ind. P. O. W. camp in Singapore.

36. *Capt. S. N. Gupta.*

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s and t the same as Maj. Aziz Ahmad.

(u) Sahgal's constant efforts to counter Japanese efforts to interfere in I. N. A. affairs or to try and exploit Indians.

(v) No Red Cross rep. ever visited any Ind. P. O. W. camp in Singapore.

(w) Difference between the pay of the British and I. C. O.'s.

(x) Low rates of pay of the Indian sepoys in Malaya.

(y) Europeans and Asiatics not allowed to travel in the same railway compartment in Malaya.

37. *Jem. Hari Singh.*

500 Ind. P. O. W. saved in Kolumia area from the Japanese.

38. *Mr. S. C. Goho.*

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i and j the same as Mr. Raghavan.

(k) Discrimination shown to the Asiatics during the evacuation of Penang and Rangoon.

(l) The 1st aid posts in Singapore did not give treatment to Indian air raid casualties.

39. *Capt. A. N. Kashap.*

The help given by Sahgal to the Prisoners of War.

40. *Capt. K. L. Saleem.*

(a) Letter written by Sahgal to Hikari Kikan regarding exchange of compliments.

(b) Sahgal's fight with Hikari Kikan re. the camps in Malaya.

(c) Incident regarding the move of No. 4 Eng. Company.

BATTLE OF JITRA.

1. Sahgal on taking over command of No. 2 Inf. Regt. addressed the officers and men of each unit under his command in turn and told them :—

(a) We should consider ourselves fortunate that we have been given this opportunity to fight for the liberation of our motherland. We are fighting for a sacred cause and none of us should have any desire for personal gain. We are the vanguards of the future National Army of India and it is our duty to create such traditions, which future members of the Indian National Army would be proud to follow. We should conduct ourselves in such a manner that our foreign Allies should feel proud to be associated with us. Our behaviour towards the inhabitants of Burma should be friendly and helpful. On entry into India, we should conduct ourselves as the servants of our people and should do our best to help them in every manner and to work to alleviate their sufferings. Any officer or other rank of the I. N. A. who did not conduct himself properly would be severely dealt with.

(b) We are fighting against an Imperialist Power, which has vast resources of men and material at her disposal. Compared to our enemy our numbers are small, and equipment poor. Therefore those who are going to participate in this battle must realise that they are going to fight against heavy odds. Every one who goes to the front must be prepared to face

hardships, hunger, thirst, sufferings, dangers and finally death. If there is any one who is either mentally or physically unfit to face these hardships and dangers must give his name to his Platoon Commander, and arrangements will be made to fit such persons into employment at the base.

After these lectures a number of men who were either unwilling or unfit to proceed to the front were transferred to the Reinforcement Group and no disciplinary action was taken against anyone.

2. As each unit of No. 2 Inf. Regt. arrived at Popa, Sahgal addressed the officers and men of that unit and told them :—

(a) "Now, you have seen something of the life in the front line and if there is anyone among you who finds himself incapable of facing its dangers and hardships he should let me know and I will arrange for him to go back to Rangoon."

Two men of the signal platoon represented that they wished to go back to Rangoon. They were sent back to the Div. H. Q. to be despatched to Rangoon. No action was taken against them.

(b) "There may be some persons among you who are desirous of going over to the British. I do not wish to hold you back against your wishes. Therefore, those of you who want to go over, should give me their names and I shall arrange for them to go safely through our lines. Such persons must go in one group and I do not like men going away in ones or twos.

Persons going over to the British would not be allowed to take any arms or papers with them."

3. Sahgal had issued orders in the regiment that every officer and man in the regiment should uphold his dignity with the Japanese. Any one found acting otherwise would be very severely dealt with.

Sahgal had also issued instructions that if any Japanese misbehaved towards any member of the I. N. A., such a Japanese should be given a thorough beating and that Sahgal would assume full responsibility for the consequences.

On the 16th March 1945, one Coy. of No. 21 Inf. Reg. under command of 2/Lt. Joginder Singh attacked Pyinbin, two Japanese Secs. under a 2/Lt. were under command of 2/Lt. Joginder Singh. At one stage the Japs refused to advance any further, thereupon 2/Lt. Joginder Singh slapped the Japanese 2/Lt. and forced them to advance further.

4. In March 1945, Comd. No. 3 Bn. reported that two officers under his command, 2/Lts. Narinder Singh and Ismail were conspiring to desert. Col. Sahgal called these officers and questioned them. The officers protested their innocence and although there was sufficient proof available against these officers, Sahgal decided to give them another chance and transferred them to No. 1 Bn. 2/Lt. Narinder Singh deserted shortly afterwards.

5. In March 1945, Comd. No. 2 Bn. produced five prisoners including one Ahmad Khan in front of Col.

Sahgal. All these men were charged with desertion. All the accused persons pleaded guilty but said that they deserted in a moment of weakness and if they are given another chance, they would carry out their duties satisfactorily. Sahgal pardoned all the accused persons and set them free.

6. Sahgal had issued orders in the Regt. that if any prisoners of war were captured by the members of the Regiment, such prisoners must be treated kindly and on no account was any prisoner, whether he was an Indian, British or an American, to be beaten or ill-treated in any other way. This order was issued when the Regt. was ordered to move from Rangoon.

7. On the 28th April, at Magigaon, Col. Sahgal called a curfew of all the officers under his command and acquainted them with the current situation and told them the alternatives in front of them. All the officers after discussing the situation with their men decided to surrender as "Prisoners of War." Sahgal wrote a letter to the Allied Comd. in which he said that he had offered the conditional surrender of the officers and men under his command as Prisoners of War. Capt. Banta Singh took this letter and later told me that the Allied Comd. had accepted the conditional surrender. If this conditional surrender had not been accepted, the officers and men were determined to fight to the last. We had sufficient arms and ammunition to do so.

8. After the surrender, on orders from the British Comd., all the officers were separated from the men.

Later Sahgal told me that we could rejoin the men. He explained that he had spoken to the British Comd. about the separation of the officers from the men, but he had argued that this was the proper procedure in case of Prisoners of War. Later, however, when Sahgal gave him an assurance that if the officers were permitted to rejoin the men, he would be personally responsible for the behaviour of the men, the Br. Comd. had agreed to allow the officers to rejoin the men. That night the Gurkha Bn. was attacked by the Japs but there was no incident among our men although the arms and ammunition that we had surrendered that day, were only 10 to 20 yds. away from us.

9. In Magwe our unit was put into a Prisoner of War cage and we were treated as P. O. W. I. N. A. officers were separated from the men.

10. It is only heresy that I learned that Mohd. Hussain belonged to the Indian Army. I have no definite information on the subject.

SPECIAL INCIDENTS

1. *Compliments.*

In 1944, when Colonel P. K. Sahgal was in charge of Head Quarters Supreme Command in Rangoon, a letter was received from the Hikari Kikan, complaining that the soldiers of the I. N. A. did not salute the officers of the Japanese Army. In reply Colonel Sahgal wrote that originally orders had been issued for the exchange of salutes on reciprocal basis between the officers and men of the I. N. A. and the Japanese officers and men, but as the Japanese soldiers did not salute the I. N. A. officers, the Japanese Army should not expect the I. N. A. soldiers to salute their officers.

Witnesses :

1. Lt. D. C. Nag.
2. Captain K. M. Saleem.
3. Captain A. D. Jehangir.

2. Arrest of an Indian Civilian Recruit.

About August, 1944, the Japanese Military Police arrested an Indian civilian recruit Naidu, who was undergoing training at the Gowshala Camp Rangoon, on a charge of sabotage. Colonel A D. Jehangir, Secy. 1/L Recruiting and Training reported the matter to Colonel P. K. Sahgal Head Quarter Supreme Com. I. N. A. Colonel P. K. Sahgal approached the Japanese M. P. for the release of Naidu, but the Japanese refused. Sahgal then made it clear to the Japanese authorities that if they did not release Naidu, he would use armed force to take him out of their

custody. The P. M., thereupon, agreed to release him.

Witnesses :

Captain A.D. Jehangir.

3. *Camps in Rangoon.*

End of July, a number of new I. N. A. units were expected in Rangoon, but no Camps were available to accommodate them. Repeated references to the Japanese authorities were of no avail. Eventually a number of buildings belonging to Indians who had evacuated from Burma were taken charge by the I. N. A. under orders of Colonel Sahgal. These buildings were actually under the charge of the Japanese Military authorities who had reserved them for the Japanese units which were expected to arrive in Rangoon. The Japanese asked the I. N. A. to vacate the buildings but Sahgal refused to do so unless suitable accommodation was provided for the I. N. A. units and posted armed guards on the buildings in question. The Japanese threatened to take possession of these buildings by force. Sahgal retaliated by saying that he would order the I. N. A. sentries to open fire at any one attempting to take possession of the buildings. Eventually the Japanese had to climb down and the buildings were occupied by the I. N. A. units.

The buildings in question were Gandhi Niwas, B. E. T. High School and Radar High School.

Witnesses :

I t. D. C. Nag.

Captair K. M. Saleem.

4. Unified Command.

The Japanese General Head Quarters in Rangoon issued instructions that, when units of the I. N. A. or B. D. A. were placed under the unified Command of a Japanese Commander, then, in certain cases the members of the I. N. A. or B. D. A. could be tried according to the Japanese Military law and by Japanese Courts. The B. D. A. accepted it, but Sahgal told the Japanese that I. N. A. under no circumstances would accept such an order and eventually the Japanese had to cancel this order.

Witnesses :

Major M. Z. Kiani.

Captain Gulzara Singh.

Captain I. J. Kiani.

Lt.-Colonel Takaki.

5. In May 1944, No. 4 Engineer Coy. of the I. N. A. was detailed to leave Rangoon for the front. The Japanese had made all transport arrangements for they failed to provide good quality boots for the company. Sahgal threatened that unless good boots were provided the Coy. would not proceed to the front. The Japanese pleaded that such a postponement would completely upset their transport arrangements, but Sahgal refused to allow this Coy. to move unless the boots were forthcoming. Eventually the Japanese produced the required boots.

Witnesses :

Captain K. M. Saleem.

6. Colonel P. K. Sahgal, Commander No. 2 Inf. Regiment, had issued orders in his Regiment that if any

If Japanese soldier or officer misbehaved towards any I. N. A. person the I. N. A. men should give him a thorough beating and that Sahgal would assume full responsibility for the consequences.

Witnesses :

Havaldar Ghulam Mohammad.

Subedar Banta Singh.

Subedar Thayagarajan.

7. On the night of 16th March 1945, one Coy. of No. 2 Inf. Regiment under the command of 2/Lt. Jogindar Singh went to attack Pynbin. A platoon of the Japanese was also under the command of 2/Lt. Joginder Singh. After the first phase of the attack, the Japanese 2/Lt. commanding the platoon refused to advance any further. 2Lt. Joginder Singh slapped the Japanese 2/Lt. and forced him to advance further.

Witnesses :

Havaldar Ghulam Mohammad.

Subedar Banta Singh.

Captain Naidu.

Entry in Sahgal's diary dated 17th March.

8. *Japanese-Thias Clash.*

In July 1942, certain elements of Head Quarters 2 Division I. N. A. and some units of No. 2 Inf. Regiment were in Chumpan (Siam) on their way to Burma. At about that time there was an armed clash between the Japanese and Thai armed units in Chumpan area and both sides suffered heavy casualties. The Japanese Commander approached Lt. Col. Chopra, Senior I. N. A. officer in Chumpan, for help. Colonel

Chopra told the Japanese Comd. that the I. N. A. was only fighting for the Independence of India and would on no account interfere in Japanese-Thai quarrel. The Japanese Commander insisted that Allies the I. N. A. units were bound to come to the aid of the Japanese units who were outnumbered by the Thais. Thereupon Colonel Chopra went to Bangkok to consult Lt. Colonel S. M. Hussain, a Senior Officer of the Division, who was on his way to Rangoon. Lt.-Colonel Hussain and Colonel Allagaoapan, who also happened to be in Bangkok, told Chopra that the I. N. A. was only fighting for the freedom of India and it would not fight against the Thais, on any account. These officers ordered Chopra to convey their decision to the Japanese Commander and assured him that they would assume full responsibility for the consequences.

The I. N. A. units consequently did not render any help to the Japanese in their fight with the Thai units in Champan.

Witnesses :

Captain S. M. Hussain.

9. *B. D. A. Japanese Clash.*

In March 1945, the B. D. A. rebelled against the Japanese and started attacking their convoys and dumps, etc. The Japanese approached Lt.-Colonel S. M. Hussain, No. 1 Inf. Regiment, I. N. A., in Magwe to help them to fight the B. D. A. troops. The Indian civilians were also worried by the B. D. A. and were frightened that they may once again be subjected to

the same brutal treatment which was meted out to them in 1943. Lt.-Col. Hussain informed the Japanese that the I. N. A. would not fight, against the B. D. A. unless the B. D. A. attacked any I. N. A. units or any Indian civilians in that area. Hussain conveyed this message to the B. D. A. units also.

Witnesses :

Captain S. M. Hussain.

10. *Kyaulaga Incident.*

Included in the evidence of Captain A. D. Jehangir.

III

G. S. DHILLON

We were with the Japanese because they were in a position that we could take some help from them in order to attack our old enemy the British. Our policy was to make use of 'any old stick to kill a snake.'

Here are some instances to prove that I carried out my dealings with them according to our movement's policy :—

I. Just after the I. N. A. crises in February 1943, in a public rally held in connection with Mahatma Gandhiji's fast, I made a statement something as this, "Our strength lies in having complete faith in ourselves, and in having courage enough to attack the Japanese in case they betray us". During this rally there were present Japanese officers of Hikari Kikan, M. P. and Press Mr. Rash Bahari Bose was in the chair and it was a gathering of several thousands.

Can be proved by :—

1. Captain Jaswant Singh, 4-19 Hyd. A Major of I. N. A.
2. Maj. Aziz Ahmad, Kapurthala Int. A Major General of I. N. A.
3. Captain A. D. Jehangir, Bahawalpur Infantry. A Colonel of I. N. A.

II. In March 1943, during my tour upcountry, I made statements similar to the one referred above in para. I. These statements I made wherever I addressed surplus volunteers. During this tour I also addressed a public rally in Penang and had made this very statement.

Can be proved by :—

1. Lt. Colonel Alagapan, I. M. S. A Major Gen. in I. N. A.
2. Prosecuting

7-8 Punjab. Paras 50-52 in the summary of evidence.

3. H. V. Major Kartar Singh, 26-1st Punjab Regiment. Captain in I. N. A. 1/4 General Regiment.

III. In December 1944, during my command of Nehru Brigade, a Japanese Colonel occupied a certain building in my area at Myingyan. The Colonel had taken permission from my Jap Liaison Officer Captain Izuni of Hikari Kikan, but Capt. Izuni failed to ask me or any of my Staff Officers. I called him in my office and told him to get the building vacated at once. He felt sorry for the mistake but said that he was helpless to take any action because the Colonel was a very senior officer and Regimental Commander. To this, I replied, "Captain Izuni, for your information I am not a Major only. I am also a Regiment Commander—an appointment of a Colonel. Again I am the Station Commander and the senior most Indian National Army Officer in the area.

I cannot image a Regimental Commander or any officer, does not matter how senior, entering my area and occupying a building under my charge without action on my part. I take it as an insult not only personal but national. I warn you to get the building vacated at once otherwise I will not hesitate to use force, colonel or no colonel. Now I do not want to hear any excuses. You may please go."

The result was that in the evening the colonel accompanied by his adjutant the Japanese Garrison Commander, a Major and Capt. Izuni called on me and apologised. After this they never occupied any building within my area. Actually the local Burmese officials came to know of the fact and asked me to occupy certain of their buildings so that the Japanese might keep away.

Can be proved by :—

1. Hav. Darwan Singh Rawat, 2/18 Garhwal, was Captain in I. N. A., Adjutant Nehru Brigade.
2. Mohindar Singh, 18th Garhwal. Was a Lieut. in the I. N. A. Intelligence Officer Nehru Brigade.

IV. On my resuming command of the Nehru Brigade at Myingan, I found that the Japanese Garrison Commander, a representative of their operational H. Qrs., namely, Major Ogawa, would give orders dealing with Myingyan Defences direct to my Dn. Commanders. One day during the presence of certain staff officers and Battalion Commanders, I strongly

objected to this practice and explained him the I. N. A. policy. Our talk grew to a heated discussion just short of a quarrel. I asked him to let me have the full scheme of defence, and I would make my own plan in consideration with my strength, armament and tactical training. Again, it was my command and not his, and I would not stand any direct dealings with my subordinates by him on a matter of principle. In the end he apologised and told me that he was doing so only to save more time and trouble and that he would not do so again. Regarding telling me the full scheme he said that he was not in a position to do so as the Army Head Quarters were informing him bit by bit. I reported this irregularity to Col. Arshad, Officiating Divisional Commander No. 1 Div., who took up the case with the higher authorities and after an interval of some days the full scheme was revealed to me.

Can be proved by :—

1. Captain Chandar Bhan, 4-19 Hyd. A Maj. in the I. N. A. O. C. 2/14th Grla. Regiment.
2. Mohindar Singh, 18th Garhwal. A Lieut. in the I. N. A. Head Quarters Nehru Brigade.
3. Hav. Darwan Singh Rawat, 2/18th Garwhal. Capt. in the I. N. A. Adjutant Nehru Brigade.
4. Capt. Arshad, 5/2nd Punjab. Colonel in I. N. A.

V. On 19th March 1945 while in action at Kweb-yok, the Jap Commander of Hosokawa Butri was led to attain a certain position for which I had also made preparations and had detailed No. 1. Dn. Towards the evening the Japanese asked me to give them only one platoon. They said that the platoon would be used as guides, and they (the Japanese) would carry out the main attack. I told them that I had taken their message as an insult and though my men were ready yet I was not prepared to risk their lives in a role where the Japanese wanted to play the main part. In the end they asked even for only two men which I also refused. I did this because it was against the declared policy and prestige of the I. N. A. to allow itself to be used for the benefit of the Japanese by playing a secondary role.

At about mid-night the Hosokawa Butri Commander called on me to explain that all his plans for that night were being upset due to my non-co-operation. I explained my point of view, he apologised. After this incident he never dared to play a selfish trick.

Can be proved by :—

1. Hav. Darwan Singh Rawat, 2-18 Garhwal.
Adjutant Nehru Bde.
2. Jem. Mohd. Hussain in 2-9 Jat. Captain
in the I. N. A. O. C. 1/4 Grla. Regiment.
3. Mohindar Singh, 18 Garhwal. Lieut in the
I. N. A. My Intelligence Officer.

4. Havaldar Major Kartar Singh, 6/1 Punjab.

VI. On resuming command of my Regiment, I issued following instructions and orders to all units under my command :

1. No Officer or a man will have any direct dealing with Hikari Kikan or any of the Japanese officers. In case they are being approached by the Japanese their Head Quarters will be immediately informed.

Can be proved by :—

Same witnesses as in V above.

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